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PART XXXVI.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF EGYPT.

106

January to June 1891.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

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AFFAIRS OF EGYPT.

January to June 1891.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Egypt.

PART XXXVI.

No. 1.

The Marquis of Salisbury to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 1.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 1, 1891.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 219, Confidential, of the 21st ultimo, informing me of your semi-official communication to the Italian Government of certain statements which had reached Colonel Slade privately from the military authorities in Egypt respecting the contraband trade carried on with the Dervishes through some of the ports on the western shore of the Red Sea.

Your action in the matter is approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 2.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, January 5, 1891.

THE Egyptian Council of Ministers decided to-day that two European Inspectors should be appointed to look after the Egyptian monuments.

The Council also settled satisfactorily the terms on which private persons are to be allowed to excavate, a question which has also caused a great deal of trouble.

No. 3.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 6, 1891.)

(No. 334.)

My Lord,

Cairo, December 23, 1890.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a Khedivial Order which has appeared in the "Official Journal," under which Mohammed and Ahmed Abd-el-Gawad, who were concerned in the Arabi revolt, have been pardoned. The Khedive has, I venture to think, exercised a wise discretion in extending his clemency to these two men.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of December 22, 1890.

Ordonnance Khédiviale transmise pour exécution à son Excellence le Ministre de l'Intérieur à la date du 9 Gamad Awul, 1308 (21 Décembre, 1890).

AYANT pris connaissance de la supplique présentée par les nommés Mohamed Abd-el-Gawad et Ahmed Abd-el-Gawad, habitants de Minieh, condamnés, conformément à notre Décret du 13 Safar, 1300, à la dégradation de tous insignes honorifiques et à un exil de quatre années hors d'Égypte, pour participation au mouvement insurrectionnel de 1882;

Cédant aux sentiments de bonté et bienveillance dont nous sommes animé à l'égard de notre peuple, nous ordonnons que les individus susnommés soient réintégrés dans la possession des grades, décorations, et titres honorifiques qu'ils pouvaient avoir.

Nous vous transmettons, en conséquence, la présente Ordonnance, afin qu'elle reçoive la suite qu'elle comporte.

(Signé) MÉHÉMET TEWFIK.

No. 4.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 6, 1891.)

(No. 337. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, December 29, 1890.

BY my telegram No. 131 of the 9th instant, and previous correspondence, I have had the honour to keep your Lordship informed of the progress of the negotiations which have recently taken place between Egypt and Turkey for the abolition of the "raffieh" system.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith a draft of the Convention which has been concluded between the Turkish and Egyptian Customs Administration.

The Egyptian Government have not yet received a signed copy of the Convention, but they have received a telegram from M. Ornstein, who has been representing the Egyptian Customs Administration, reporting that he had signed this draft without any further alterations.

The Egyptian Government request that the terms of this Convention may for the present be treated as confidential, as they do not wish it to be published immediately.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Projet d'Arrangement à conclure entre l'Administration des Contributions Indirectes de l'Empire Ottoman et l'Administration des Douanes Égyptiennes.

CONSIDÉRANT qu'il y a lieu de mettre un terme aux fréquentes contestations qui surgissent entre l'Administration des Contributions Indirectes de l'Empire et l'Administration des Douanes Égyptiennes, au sujet de la perception des droits de Douane;

Considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt des deux Administrations de sauvegarder et d'assurer leurs recettes respectives, en prenant pour base de principe de prélèvement des droits de Douane dans le pays de consommation, sans toutefois porter atteinte aux stipulations des Traités.

Vu l'Iradé Impérial du

sanctionnant ce principe,

Il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :—

ARTICLE I.

Les marchandises de provenance étrangère exportées de l'Égypte à destination d'une autre partie de l'Empire, et vice versa, seront accompagnées, comme par le passé, d'une "raftieh hasbieh" constatant l'acquiescement des droits de douane. A l'arrivée de ces marchandises au lieu de destination, indiqué dans la "raftieh," la Douane locale établira les droits d'entrée à percevoir, d'après le système en vigueur soit en Égypte, soit dans le reste de l'Empire.

Dans ce but, la Douane constatera la valeur, à l'échelle de débarquement, de la marchandise au jour du dédouanement si celle-ci est taxée *ad valorem*, ou elle appliquera la classification et les droits fixes du Tarif si la marchandise est tarifée; dans le cas où les droits à percevoir à la Douane d'arrivée sont supérieurs à ceux perçus par la Douane d'expédition et mentionnées dans la "raftieh," la Douane d'arrivée percevra pour son propre compte l'excédent constaté.

Si au contraire, les droits d'entrée à percevoir à la Douane d'arrivée étaient inférieurs à ceux prélevés par la Douane d'expédition, celle-ci ne sera tenue à aucun remboursement aux propriétaires de ces marchandises.

ARTICLE II.

Les "raftiehs" qui auront été délivrées comme il vient d'être indiqué à l'Article précédent, seront enregistrées, avec soin, par chacune des deux Administrations dans un compte courant qui sera tenu spécialement à cet effet.

Dans ce compte courant, la Turquie sera créditée et l'Égypte sera débitée pour les marchandises expédiées en Turquie, après paiement des droits dans un port Égyptien, et l'Égypte sera créditée et la Turquie sera débitée pour les marchandises expédiées en Égypte, après paiement des droits dans un port Turc.

Les enregistrements dans le compte courant s'effectueront d'après les règles suivantes :—

Si les droits indiqués dans la "raftieh" sont égaux ou inférieurs à ceux constatés par la Douane de destination, ils seront inscrits sans changement dans le compte courant.

Si, par contre, les droits indiqués dans la "raftieh" sont supérieurs à ceux établis par la Douane de destination, celle-ci ne fera figurer, au compte courant, au débit de l'autre Administration Douanière, que les montants réduits.

De cette façon chacune des deux Administrations centrales n'encaissera que les sommes qui lui reviennent légalement et qu'elle aurait encaissées si les marchandises consommées dans sa circonscription lui seraient parvenues directement de l'étranger.

Tous les trois mois, les Directions centrales de ces deux Administrations établiront la balance des débits et crédits et celle d'entre elles qui aurait encaissé la somme la plus forte, versera intégralement, à Constantinople ou à Alexandrie, la différence à l'autre, en monnaie d'or (livres Turques ou Égyptiennes, suivant le cas).

Les excédents, provenant de la différence des estimations ou des Tarifs en vigueur, qui auront été prélevés par l'une ou l'autre de ces deux Administrations, ainsi qu'il a été dit à l'Article I^{er}, ne seront pas portés dans le compte courant, mais resteront acquis à l'Administration qui les aura perçus.

ARTICLE III.

Les marchandises, produits du sol ou de l'industrie de l'Égypte ou des autres parties de l'Empire, seront dorénavant assujetties aux droits de douane dans le pays où elles seront consommées.

Ces droits seront perçus d'après le système le plus favorable appliqué dans l'un ou l'autre pays aux marchandises similaires de provenance étrangère; c'est-à-dire que ces produits seront soumis à l'estimation et au paiement d'un droit *ad valorem* si les articles similaires de provenance étrangère sont taxés *ad valorem*, et qu'ils seront classifiés et taxés d'après le Tarif le plus favorable, si les articles similaires de provenance étrangère sont tarifés. Jusqu'à la mise en application des nouveaux Traités de Commerce les droits *ad valorem* à percevoir tant en Égypte que dans les autres parties de l'Empire seront de 8 pour cent.

Les "raftiehs," qui ci-devant accompagnaient les marchandises indigènes, seront remplacées par des "ilmhabers" contenant tous les renseignements utiles pour la constatation de l'origine et de l'identité des marchandises expédiées.

ARTICLE IV.

Les marchandises, produit du sol ou de l'industrie de l'Égypte, expédiées dans les autres parties de l'Empire et vice versa, ne seront pas soumis au droit d'exportation.

ARTICLE V.

Les stipulations contenues dans le présent arrangement ne s'appliquent pas aux tabacs et tombacs sous toutes leurs formes, au sel ou natron, au hachich, à la poudre, aux armes blanches ou de guerre, ou à tous autres articles prohibés ou faisant l'objet d'un régime spécial, soit en Égypte, soit dans les autres parties de l'Empire.

ARTICLE VI.

Un Règlement spécial sera élaboré, d'un commun accord, par les deux Administrations, et déterminera le mode de la délivrance des "raftiehs" pour les marchandises de provenance étrangère, les conditions dans lesquelles, elles pourront être acceptées et le modèle et la tenue des registres devant servir à l'établissement du compte courant.

ARTICLE VII.

Les dispositions du présent arrangement entreront en vigueur, à partir du 1^{er} (13) Octobre, 1890; toutefois, en ce qui concerne les marchandises arrivant dans les ports de l'Égypte ou des autres parties de l'Empire, ces dispositions ne seront applicables qu'en tant que ces marchandises auront été expédiées avec des "raftiehs" ou "ilmhabers" délivrés à partir du 1^{er} (13) Octobre, 1890.

ARTICLE VIII.

Toutes dispositions contraires au présent arrangement sont et demeurent abrogées.
Fait en double à Constantinople, le

No. 5.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, January 9, 1891.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1 of the 5th instant, I have to-day had a conversation with Count d'Aubigny, in the course of which he informed me that, acting under orders from Paris, M. Grébaut would propose the appointment of two Frenchmen as Inspectors of Monuments. I said that I should not propose that an Englishman be appointed, but that I was unable to guarantee that no opposition would be raised to M. Grébaut's proposal.

It might perhaps be possible to obtain the nomination of one German or Swiss. The French would be displeased at this, but it would show the English public that the Museum Department is not a monopoly for the French.

What action would your Lordship wish me to take?

Except on account of the effect which might be produced on English public opinion, I attach little importance to the nationality of the Inspectors, provided capable men are selected; but if the appointment of two Frenchmen is carried out, it would be well to find men with a knowledge of English, if possible.

No. 6.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

** Foreign Office, January 10, 1890, 1.40 P.M.*

INSPECTORS of Monuments of Ancient Egypt.

I have received your telegram No. 2 of the 9th instant.

The appointment of two Frenchmen is open to objection, and I consider it preferable that one of the Inspectors should be of another nationality, if it can be so arranged.

No. 7

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 2, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report that on receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 257 of the 25th ultimo, I addressed a letter, of which I inclose a copy, to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The question of the preservation of Egyptian monuments has been for some time under consideration, and frequent communications have passed between the various Egyptian authorities concerned and myself on the subject.

I anticipate that in a short time the Egyptian Government will be in a position to arrive at some final decision in this matter. The long delays which have occurred in dealing with it, and which are not unfrequently incidental to the introduction of reforms in Egypt, are to be regretted, but they have had the effect of somewhat diminishing the difficulties with which, for various reasons, the question is surrounded. Notably as regards the question of the appointment of an inspector, I may mention that when this proposal was first made some months ago, it encountered strong opposition. I am now, however, led to understand that the appointment of two inspectors is contemplated. I am unable to say at present from what nationalities these inspectors will be chosen.

I propose to address your Lordship at greater length on this subject when I receive the answer of the Egyptian Government to my communication of this day's date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Sir E. Baring to Zulfikar Pasha.

M. le Ministre,

Cairo, January 2, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Marquis of Salisbury by the Earl of Wharncliffe, who is Chairman of the Society formed in London for the preservation of ancient monuments in Egypt.

The Earl of Wharncliffe has communicated two Memorials to the Marquis of Salisbury. Both draw attention to the necessity of adopting measures with a view to arrest, so far as is possible, any further destruction of the ancient monuments in Egypt. They only differ in one particular: one of the Memorials prays for the appointment of an English official to be inspector of the ancient monuments; the other prays for the appointment of a competent official not necessarily English, to fill a similar post. The Earl of Wharncliffe points out that those whose signatures are appended to the first form are not necessarily in opposition to the modification which some of the signatories thought it advisable to have made before attaching their signatures or proceeding further in the matter.

The names attached to these Memorials amply testify to the widespread interest felt in this subject in England. Your Excellency is aware that it is also one in which Her Majesty's Government takes the greatest interest. The frequent communications I have made, especially during the last year, on this subject to the various Egyptian authorities concerned, render it unnecessary for me to dwell at any length upon the details of the question. I am aware that the matter is now being considered, and I would earnestly beg your Excellency to give the utmost attention to the views of the memorialists, with a view, if possible, to the adoption of their proposals. I have only

to add that Her Majesty's Government has no wish to insist upon the appointment of an Englishman to the post of inspector. They consider that this is a matter which lies wholly within the competence of the Egyptian Government. Their only desire is, that adequate steps should be taken to preserve the monuments from further destruction or mutilation.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 8.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 4, 1890.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an interesting Report which has been prepared by Major Wingate on the state of affairs in the Soudan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Précis of Major Wingate's General Report on the Soudan, 1890.

- Page 1. ONE of the first steps of the late Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, on entering on his divine Mission, was to appoint four Khalifas, as had been done by the Prophet Mohammed. Of these the first was Abdullah-el-Taaishi, a religious teacher belonging to the great "Baggara" tribe, one of the most powerful in the Soudan, dwelling nearly in the centre, and formerly its great slave-dealers, supplying slaves to the retail markets in Khartoum. The other Khalifas were Ali Wad Helu, and Mohammed Esh-Sherif, the son-in-law of the Mahdi, the fourth chair being said to have been left unfilled.
- Page 2. Abdullah-el-Taaishi, to whom the Mahdi was obliged to intrust much of the management of affairs, used his influence with the latter to get himself appointed to succeed him, instead of his eldest son, and at the Mahdi's death, by a clever *coup d'Etat*, seized every single weapon in Khartoum while a parade of sorrow was being held, and so rendered powerless the factions of the other two Khalifas, who since that date have held but a small share of power or government.
- Page 3. Abdullah-el-Taaishi can neither read nor write, is exceptionally ignorant and abnormally vain; any one hinting at the superior power of any of his enemies pays the penalty of imprisonment. He is, however, a man of great determination, and versed in every kind of fraud and deceit. He has consolidated his power by the wholesale massacre of all important men who remained disaffected to Mahdism, on the ground that only the meek and lowly are acceptable to God; and because all worldly goods are to be despised, he has forced every one to deposit his goods in the Beit-el-Mal, or public warehouse, where they are administered to his best advantage. His tactics are thus the destruction of all opposition and the accumulation of all wealth. His chief hold upon the people, however, is through their superstition, upon which he works by accounts of his intercourse with the Prophet and certain angels. These visions, or "hadras," are followed by a Proclamation.
- Page 4 and 5. The Sheikh and most of the important men of almost every tribe are forced to dwell in Omdurman, while the Khalifa sends a member of his own tribe, the Baggara, to govern the country from which they have been withdrawn, thus weakening all tribal authority in the outlying districts, and concentrating all tribal influence in Omdurman, where it is powerless. The Khalifa is, in a word, "a despotic and tyrannical Ruler, utterly ignorant and regardless of all recognized laws and forms of Government."
- Page 6. He has thirty-four wives, and employs an official to find out the best-looking
- Page 7. Pages 8 and 9.
- Page 9.

women, whose husbands he compels to divorce them, or else puts to death. No one may behold his face; he must be approached on all-fours, and while he is preaching in the Mosque the people must turn their heads away. As his successor he has nominated his brother Yakub, the only man who shares his confidence, and the Commander-in-chief of all the fighting Dervishes. He utilized a secret meeting convened by the other two Khalifas in favour of the Mahdi's son, as a pretext for further diminishing their power and promoting Yakub, who is directly responsible for the Beit-el-Mal and the Beit-el-Amana, in which all arms and ammunition are stored. Yakub reads and writes well, and is the Khalifa's admitted successor.

Page 10.

Pages 11-
and 12.

The Military Strength in the Soudan.

The Mahdi's power was probably at its zenith at the time of the fall of Khartoum, since when from one cause or another, whether famine, sickness, or constant warfare, it has gradually declined. Still, weary as the tribes are of the despotism of the present Khalifa, it is a mistake to suppose, as is frequently stated, that the Soudan could be reconquered by a handful of men, as no considerable tribal support could be counted on, though they would probably throw in their lot with a successfully advancing force.

Page 13.

Page 14.

The nucleus of the Khalifa's army are the "Gehadiehs," or regulars, mostly composed of Blacks, whose superiority as fighting men is now recognized, and who are purchased by the Khalifa for 30 dollars. Cavalry there is little or none. The total troops at the Khalifa's disposal are roughly estimated at 15,000 regulars and 50,000 Arab fighting men.

Page 15.

Page 17.

Every 100 men of the regulars are commanded by an Emir, and known as a "Raya," literally flag, so that 100 Rayas are equivalent to 10,000 men.

Page 18.

Next in importance to the Khalifa's Raya, commanded by Yakub, come those of the "Emirs of Emirs," upwards of twenty in number, who are in control of their districts, and directly responsible to Abdullah and Yakub; they are also summoned to attend the Khalifa's councils when any expedition is projected.

Page 19.

The Khalifa is attended by a body-guard of fifty Blacks, chosen for their fidelity, and twenty aides-de-camp, chiefly men whom he wishes to keep under his eye.

Page 21.

Food and pay are only issued to the regulars, both in small quantities and with great irregularity. The nominal pay of the regulars is about 6*d.* a-month, but it is frequently withheld. Emirs receive from 20 to 100 dollars a-month, intended to provide for the wants of their men, who, however, very rarely derive any profit from it.

Page 22.

There is no system for the transport of food on an expedition, but, as a rule, the women and children act as carriers, being in the proportion of about three to one man.

Page 23.

It is believed that they possess upwards of 60,000 rifles, distributed in various parts of the Soudan (many of which, however, have become useless from neglect), and from thirty to forty mountain guns. Ammunition is very scarce, there being at present at Omdurman only about 275,000 rounds, and fresh ammunition being only obtainable with great difficulty.

Page 24.

Military Operations of the Dervishes during the past Year.

Galabat.—Since the battle in which King John was killed the relations between the Dervishes and the Abyssinian tribes in the neighbourhood of Galabat have been friendly, and a considerable trade has been carried on in horses, grain, beans, honey, and cotton. In the district of Gebel Dair a certain Emir, Johar, who had deserted from Galabat, successfully resisted the forces of the Khalifa with a band of negro mountaineers of that district, which has always been opposed to Mahdism.

Page 27.

Page 28.

The country lying round Kassala has been the scene of "constant intertribal conflicts and incessant raids." Here the Dervishes have come into collision with the Italians, who had for some time been on friendly terms with part of the great "Beni Amer" tribe, which from the first had been opposed to Mahdism. Many of them had taken service under the Italian flag as Bashi-Bazouks, and had been of great use for patrolling purposes. The Italian Commander at Senheit took advantage of a raid made by this tribe on Kassala, in which some of Osman Digna's camels were captured, to issue instructions to the Arab auxiliaries to collect camels, with a view to opening up the trade route to Kassala, and thus offer a means of escape to Italian protection for all who did not wish to join Osman's forces. Shortly afterwards an important Sheikh of the Beni Amer, who had been recaptured while attempting to

Page 29.

Page 30.

Page 31-

escape from Osman, was rescued by a force of Bashi-Bazouks commanded by Italian officers. After this skirmish a Bashi-Bazouk force under an Italian officer was stationed at Babaru Kaibara, and Bisha and Kufit were occupied.

Pages 33
and 34.

The force of Dervishes at Tokar, Kordofan, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Berber is very small. At Dongola are some 3,000 men.

Page 35.

Six steamers, including Gordon's small steamer "Mohammed Ali," now the "El Khartum," are reported to be in working order, and are chiefly used for the transport of grain.

Civil Administration.

Page 36.

"The broad limits of the Khalifa's administration may be said to extend from the Egyptian frontier—Sarras, on the north, to Fashoda, in the south, a distance of some 900 miles, and from El Fasher, on the west, to Suakin, on the east, some 1,000 miles."

At each of the military stations—Omdurman, Galabat, Kassala, El Fasher, Dongola, and Tokar—the Khalifa has appointed an A'Amill, or Mudir, two Kadis, or Judges, and a Treasurer.

The A'Amill is responsible to the chief military Emir of the district for the collection of the tithes on grain, and the "zeka," or "tax on camels, cattle, property, and money."

Page 37.

One of the Kadis performs all legal and religious duties; the business of the other is to settle all disputes between the people and the Beit-el-Mal, or Treasury. All are responsible to the principal Amin Beit-el-Mal at Omdurman, whither they are periodically summoned to render their accounts, and are changed every year, unless the Khalifa is satisfied with their services.

Page 39.

Page 40.

The "zeka" is the holy tax which covers wholesale plundering, and is levied on everything alike. Other sources of revenue are derived from land, all ground within gun-shot of the Beit-el-Mal in every garrison belonging to the Beit-el-Mal, and being let at the rate of 5 dollars the feddan per annum. All boats are considered as the property of the Beit-el-Mal, and bring in a gross annual revenue of 520,000 dollars.

An enormous profit is derived from goods given out from the Beit-el-Mal, that on gum being at least 200 per cent.

Page 42.

Altogether the yearly revenue of the Khalifa is estimated at considerably over 1,000,000 dollars, and his expenditure only reaching the sum of 40,000 dollars, it is calculated that the sum actually in his possession cannot be under 7,000,000 dollars, which are supposed to be stowed in ammunition boxes and buried under Yakub's house.

Page 43.

Trade in sugar, coffee, Manchester goods, honey, butter, oil, scents, cheese, &c., is carried on with merchants from Suakin, Assouan, Korosko, and Derawki; these merchants are taxed twice before reaching Omdurman.

Pages 43
and 44.

The Slave Trade is in a flourishing condition, the principal depôts being Omdurman, Galabat, Beni Shangul, and El Fasher. Large quantities of slaves leave the Soudan by the Red Sea mersas, and, since the closing of the gates of Suakin, the stream is said to have been deflected northwards by Berber and Haimar, and thence to the Red Sea.

Page 44.

System of Justice.

Page 45.

In every garrison the Kadi sits all day and administers justice according to the wishes of the Khalifa, which he previously takes care to ascertain. The punishments are very severe, and a large percentage of the population of Omdurman have lost either a hand or a foot for theft.

This punishment is inflicted by two butchers in the large bazaar, the limb being slowly removed with an ordinary knife. Disobedience to the Khalifa's orders is punished by death.

Page 47.

Page 48.

All payments are made in dollars struck at Omdurman by order of the Khalifa, who hoards all the Egyptian money which comes in his way. The Khalifa's dollar is known as the El Makbul.

Europeans.

Pages 49 to
55.

There are supposed to be in all some eighty-five European men, women, and children at Omdurman, most of them Greeks, with some Austrians, some of them holding official positions under the Khalifa, others being regarded as prisoners.

The Khalifa's relations with Egypt, &c.

Communication with Egypt is carried on chiefly by means of merchants, who, on arriving in the Soudan, put on the Khalifa's uniform, and make the most violent protestations of adherence to Mahdism. Page 55.

Threatening letters demanding immediate conversion have been received by the Khedive from the Khalifa; but all attempts at communication on ordinary lines are considered by the Khalifa as absurd.

Two messengers sent to demand the return of General Gordon's clothing, &c., were detained eight months in order that troops for a general assembly might be collected, and at the end of that time a review of about 45,000 men was held for their benefit, after which one was again thrown into prison for observing that the Egyptian army was even more powerful. Page 56.

No pilgrimages to Mecca are permitted, on the ground that at present the Turks in Mecca are not true believers. Page 58.

The town of Omdurman extends for a considerable distance along the west bank of the Nile, and its population is believed to be from 15,000 to 20,000. The large Mosque is situated in the centre of the town; it is an enormous rectangular yard, about 1,000 yards long and 800 yards broad, and quite uncovered. (A plan of it is annexed to the Report.) Page 59.

The Khalifa leads prayers every day but Friday in the large Mosque, but does not excel as a preacher; his dialect is not generally understood. All persons of note have their assigned places, and any absentees who cannot prove the plea of illness are imprisoned. Page 62.

The lithograph press is used for the printing of Proclamations and Prayer Books. Page 63.

The most conspicuous object in Omdurman is the tomb of the Mahdi, of which the dome is 50 feet high.

The Khalifa's Daily Life.

The Khalifa rises at dawn and proceeds to the Mosque, where he opens prayer, which lasts for a quarter of an-hour. He then returns to his house and interviews the principal Emirs and officials, transacts business (after sleeping for about two hours). He is then lifted on to his horse by one Abu Jakka, the most powerful man in the Soudan, and with a large and miscellaneous procession rides to the barracks, after which he returns to his house and breakfasts. At noon he proceeds to the Mosque for midday prayer. The rest of the day is occupied in repose, two more visits to the Mosque, at the second of which he preaches and announces any news or visions suitable to the occasion, and another interview with his officials. After the evening meal he pays his fifth visit to the Mosque, and then retires to rest. On Fridays he holds a review of all his troops. Page 64.

Pages 65
and 66.

The present Situation in the Soudan.

For the past three years there has been a serious famine in the Soudan, brought on partly by natural causes, but chiefly owing to the continuous wars, the neglect of cultivation, and the misgovernment of the Khalifa. During the past year, however, a plentiful rainfall, and the abnormally high Nile resulting from it, have brought about a better state of things, and dhurra, the principal food, is said to be plentiful. This has induced the Khalifa to turn his attention again to the invasion of Egypt, and he is reported to have issued orders for a general concentration of troops at Omdurman in September last, but judging from the time taken to collect troops for the Egyptian messengers, it is not probable that this concentration will be completed before March. The plan is to march to Debbeh and thence down the Nile, but even should this invasion be actually set in motion, experience shows it could not reach the frontier before next summer. On the other hand, many events might occur—such as an Italian advance on Kassala—to put a stop to the expedition. Page 67.

Page 68.

Considerable difficulty in collecting troops will be experienced by Abdullah, even his most faithful adherents being tired of the constant warfare, and it is said that the expedition would consist chiefly of tribes disaffected to Mahdism.

In the Eastern Soudan, it is extremely improbable that Osman Digna can collect his scattered forces. There is little doubt that from various causes Mahdism has lost ground more in the Eastern Soudan than elsewhere, and the general impression is

Page 70.

that "any advance on the part of the Government in this direction would be hailed with delight by all the tribes who are unable to oppose Mahdism unsupported." Were Tokar once occupied by Government troops, Osman Digna could not maintain a foothold in the neighbourhood of Suakin, and his men must retire either to Kassala or Berber; the loyal support of all the surrounding tribes for a considerable distance could then be relied upon, and, moreover, "the roads from Kassala and Berber would be rendered very difficult for the Dervishes, if Government held the only place in the neighbourhood in which there is a plentiful supply of grain and water."

No. 9.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 8.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 14, 1891.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 2 of the 2nd instant, and I approve the terms of the note in which you forwarded to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs the Memorial inclosed in my despatch No. 257 of the 25th ultimo, praying for the appointment of an official Inspector for the better preservation of the ancient monuments of Egypt.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 10.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 9.)

(Extract.)

Cairo, January 12, 1891.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 3 of the 3rd instant,* I have the honour to report that, during the course of last week, negotiations have been going on between the Egyptian Government and French authorities, with a view of settling the question of the manner in which the economies resulting from the conversion shall be employed. These negotiations were mainly conducted by Mr. Palmer on the one side, and by Count d'Aubigny and M. le Chevalier on the other side. They were proceeding satisfactorily. The French were prepared to devote 150,000*l.* a year to the abolition of the corvée for four years, and also to allow of 100,000*l.* being devoted to the abolition of the system of "rachat militaire." They asked as a concession on their side, that the Egyptian Government should devote the sum of 6,000*l.* to the repair of a hospital to which the poorer classes of French and Italians usually resort when they are ill. To this latter proposal Mr. Palmer understood that Riaz Pasha was prepared to consent.

Unfortunately, at this moment another question was raised, which has caused great irritation. Some two years ago M. Vidal, a Frenchman, at the head of the School of Law, died. His place has remained vacant ever since, and I believe that the school is now very badly conducted. Just at the moment when the negotiations with the French about the economies were on the point of being completed, Riaz Pasha and Aly Pasha Mubarek, the Minister for Public Instruction, without consulting any other authority, proposed to appoint a native in M. Vidal's place. The proposal came at a most unfortunate moment. Moreover, Riaz Pasha let his proposal be known to the local newspapers. The result was that Count d'Aubigny immediately said that French consent to the economies proposal must be contingent upon the appointment of a Frenchman to be head of the School of Law.

The name of the native whom it was proposed to appoint is Hussein Bey Wassif. There can be no doubt that he is not a proper person to fill the post. He was formerly a Judge in the Native Tribunals, but was obliged to resign his appointment under grave suspicion of corruption. Subsequently he was proposed as one of the native members of the Mixed Courts, but the Court of Appeal refused to accept the nomination, and another native was nominated in his place.

Mr. Scott is very strongly of opinion that, if ever a competent body of native Judges is to be formed, it is essential that an European should be at the head of the School of Law, and, inasmuch as the Egyptian Codes are based on French law, and very many of the students speak French, he wishes to see a Frenchman appointed.

* Printed in "Egypt: Finance."

Mr. Palmer also strongly supported the acceptance of the French terms on the ground that the concessions made were of slight importance as compared with the advantage of obtaining a relief of taxation to the extent of 250,000*l.* a-year. He found, however, Riaz Pasha violently opposed to any concession, whether in respect to the grant to the hospital, or in respect to the nomination of a Frenchman to the School of Law.

Mr. Palmer accordingly wrote this morning appealing to me for support. I at once went to the Ministry of Finance and saw Mr. Palmer. He gave me an account of his conversation with Riaz Pasha. He also complained to me generally of Riaz Pasha's conduct, which, he said, had become very violent of late. He mentioned to me several instances in point, such, for example, as an act of injustice in connection with certain lands which had been committed, because the possessor was Nubar Pasha's son.

I then went to see Riaz Pasha. I found him in a state of great excitement and irritation. He read to me a paper which he was about to submit to the Council of Ministers, in which he inveighed in strong language against European interference in general, and against the French in particular. He spoke of publishing this paper and of laying the whole case before the Chamber of Notables. He said that he certainly would give nothing to the hospital, and that he would not appoint a Frenchman to the School of Law. He spoke bitterly, and I must say with some reason, of the French system of bargaining, by which they obtained some paltry advantage whenever their consent was asked to a measure beneficial to Egypt. He talked of sending in his resignation.

I told him that the system of bargaining to which he alluded was quite as inconvenient and disagreeable to Mr. Palmer as it was to himself, but that after all what had mainly to be considered was the interests of the Egyptian population, and from that point of view I shared Mr. Palmer's opinion that the main interest of the Egyptian population was to obtain a large relief from taxation. I told him that I should greatly regret if he gave his resignation; that I was fully aware of the difficulties of his situation, and that I sympathized with him. At the same time I added that he should consider the interests of the people of Egypt as well as his own personal dignity; that when he accepted the post of President of the Council, he must have been aware of all the very exceptional difficulties connected with the general situation of Egypt, and more especially that the Government could only be carried on by mutual conciliation and concession on the part of all the various authorities concerned. I begged him, at the meeting of Council that was to be held in the afternoon, to consider fully the advice of Mr. Palmer, who was only actuated by a desire to do his best for the country in the difficult situation in which he was placed. As regards his resignation, I said that no doubt he would wish to await the Khedive's return from Upper Egypt, but that, much as I should regret his resignation, at the same time, if he, after full consideration, really thought that he could not conscientiously adapt himself to present circumstances in Egypt, he would no doubt be acting rightly, and indeed wisely, in resigning.

My remarks appeared to have produced some effect, if not on Riaz Pasha, at all events on his colleagues. Mr. Palmer informs me that, at the meeting of Council which took place this afternoon, the matter was fully discussed. Riaz Pasha maintained his attitude of refusal to all concessions, but the rest of the Council were unanimously of opinion that the money should be granted to the European hospital, and that the question of the appointment to the School of Law should stand over for the present.

It remains to be seen whether it will now be possible to obtain the French adhesion to the economies proposal.

As the mail is about to leave, I am unable, in the present despatch, to state anything on the subject.

No. 11.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, January 23, 1891.

THE following telegram has been received from the Governor, Suakin:—

"Osman Digna left Tokar with all available forces. Supposed destination Habab country. Favourable opportunity to occupy Tokar by a *coup de main*."

General Walker will ask that further information be sent with a view to ascertaining whether any action should be recommended. Meanwhile, it might be as well to communicate the information as to Osman Digna's movements to the Italians.

No. 12.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, January 26, 1891.

I HAVE received the following on the subject of my telegram of the 23rd, No. 5, from Sir F. Grenfell:—

"I have every reason to suppose that action proposed by Smith is quite feasible, and consider that the opportunity should not be lost. He telegraphs to me that there are only cultivators left at Tokar, and that Digna's army consists of very few fighting men, though there are many camp-followers and boys.

"1,200 infantry will compose force, by Trinkitat; 300 Friendlies, with 120 mounted troops and most of transport by road to Teb. At Tokar and Teb there will be redoubts. There will be no great difficulty about transport at Suakin."

I shall report further after consulting General Walker.

No. 13.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 14, 1891.

SINCE I wrote my despatch No. 9 of the 12th instant Mr. Palmer has seen Count d'Aubigny. The latter is evidently very unwilling to provoke a Ministerial crisis on the question of the appointment of a Frenchman to be Head of the School of Law. He will therefore recommend his Government to accept the proposal about the economies without insisting on an absolute promise that a Frenchman shall be named. It remains to be seen whether the French Government will accept this view.

For the moment, the incident may therefore be said to have terminated. It has a good effect so far as to show the French that the English authorities in this country are quite ready to consider any reasonable claims put forward in French interests.

Mr. Palmer tells me that during the last few days his relations with Riaz Pasha have been improved. At the same time, looking at Riaz Pasha's personal characteristics, I cannot feel much confidence that his Ministry will be of long duration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 14.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, January 29, 1891.

OCCUPATION of Handoub.

Action of Colonel Smith was taken on his own initiative. I think, however, that he was justified in going to Handoub under all the circumstances of the case. General Walker proposes that his action should be approved. I agree. Will your Lordship inform me, or cause General Walker to be informed, through the War Office, whether this may be done.

Colonel Holled Smith's proposal now is to land a force of about 1,500 men at Agig, for the purpose of attacking Osman Digna, who is believed to be in the neighbourhood, and subsequently to move the troops back to Trinkitat and occupy Tokar. In the opinion of General Walker, considerable military objections may be made to this proposal.

To me it appears that the situation may be materially altered by the occupation of Handoub. The constant raids made up to the walls of Suakin, the prevention of which was one of the chief reasons for proposing the occupation of Tokar, will very

probably be ended. The necessity or desirability of any further action is very questionable. The matter, in any case, may well stand over for discussion on Sir F. Grenfell's return a few days hence. If necessary, I can then submit further proposals to your Lordship.

Meanwhile, the Governor of Suakin has been authorized to keep, until he receives further orders, an Egyptian battalion at Handoub, and to report fully as to arrangements for the future, notably, as to whether the place should be handed over to friendly Sheikhs or permanently occupied by Egyptian troops. Very clear orders have also been sent to him to take no steps in the direction of offensive measures against Tokar or Osman Digna unless further orders are received.

General Walker is communicating with the military authorities in London.

No. 15.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 3, 1891.

GENERAL WALKER, General Grenfell, and myself have fully discussed the Suakin situation.

It appears certain that Tokar is held by a mere handful of men, and that by detaching a force from Suakin the capture of the place would be easy. Colonel Smith urges strongly that this should be done without delay. General Grenfell and General Walker agree. After considering the matter fully I am prepared to support the proposal. The recent capture of Handoub, I am assured, will not by itself insure tranquillity round Suakin. I am under no apprehension that the capture of Tokar will lead to any further advance.

Please send an early reply. Osman Digna, according to the last intelligence, was 100 miles from Tokar, marching south, with 400 to 500 men.

No. 16.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 2, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt on the 25th ultimo by Messenger Callander of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 7 and 9, Commercial, of the 12th and 20th January, with reference to the application of the new Commercial Treaty between Germany and Turkey to Egypt.

Your Lordship will perhaps remember that long before that Treaty was concluded I took the liberty to call attention in my despatch No. 105, as far back as the 16th March, 1889, to the considerable importance as regards Egypt of the projected draft of Article XXII of that Treaty, of which I inclosed a copy.

Your Lordship took the matter up, and exchanged views on the subject with the Cabinet of Berlin in confidential communications, which took some time, and the result was that the Germans redrafted the text of their Article XXII, and inserted a clause in it which appears now in the Treaty as follows:—

"Il est bien entendu qu'à l'arrivée dans les autres parties de l'Empire de marchandises expédiées de l'Égypte, munies de Raftiés conformément à l'Article IX, et dont les droits de douane seraient par suite des modifications consenties inférieurs à ceux portés dans le Tarif Général, la différence en plus sera acquittée à la Douane du lieu de destination."

It is evident that in the mind of the negotiators the existence of different commercial arrangements between Egypt and Germany from those stipulated in this Treaty were in contemplation and hereby admitted, and that on the supposition that the rate of duty on German importations into Egypt would be lower (which will probably be the case) than the one agreed upon in the new Turkish Tariff, and that the difference should be paid on the admission of those goods into the Ottoman dominions.

Such was evidently the view taken by Sir E. Baring in his despatch to your Lordship of the 12th May, 1890, No. 114 (p. 69 of Confidential Print, January 1891).

At the time M. de Radowitz told me that Her Majesty's Government had expressed itself satisfied with the manner in which the Article was worded, but I

never received any direct corroboration of this being your Lordship's view, and when the question of obtaining instructions as to the mode of settling this very point under Article XXVI in our own Treaty came under discussion, I addressed an exhaustive despatch on the 6th September, 1890, No. 17, Commercial, Secret, in which I recapitulated the various views expressed, and the inconvenience which might arise from various courses proposed for our adoption.

Your Lordship has been now pleased to instruct me in the above-quoted despatches to support "any representations which the Egyptian Government may make to the Porte on this matter."

No occasion will arise for me to act until the Egyptian Government has given this delicate subject full consideration in all its bearings; but your Lordship is too well aware how irritable the Turks from the Sultan downwards are whenever we come forward as the advocates of Egyptian interests with them to render it necessary for me to call attention to this point.

I notice from the paraphrase of Sir E. Baring's telegram of the 19th January, 1891, that he agrees with me entirely in foreseeing the difficulties which may arise on this question from other interested Powers, such as Russia and France, with both of whom our views with reference to Egyptian interests would, I fear, obtain less attention than they ought to with Austria and Germany.

Should any Power conclude a Treaty with Turkey, and not come to terms for another arrangement with Egypt, it becomes highly probable that they will insist on their Turkish Treaty applying to Egypt except on such points where the most-favoured-nation treatment will give them a more favourable position in that country.

It is to be regretted that Egypt should not have availed herself of the recent negotiations about the conversion of the Tribute Loan to clear up this question with the Porte if it is really one of such importance to her interests.

I am sending your Lordship a copy of this despatch in my Commercial Series, and also one direct to Cairo to Sir E. Baring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 17.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1891, 1:30 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government have no objection to offer, in view of the opinions of yourself, the Egyptian Government, and the military authorities to the occupation by the Egyptian troops of Tokar.

It should, however, be understood that Her Majesty's Government object as strongly as ever to any further advance into the interior; and expect that the Egyptian Government will maintain an effective control over the military authorities in that respect.

No. 18.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 6. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1891, 2:45 P.M.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram, I think the Egyptian Government would be wise if they gave information to the Italian Consul-General, at the earliest date their arrangements permit, of their intention to occupy Tokar.

No. 19.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 8, 1891

THE Governor of Suakin has been given authority to reoccupy Tokar. Strict instructions have been sent him not to advance beyond that place.

(Secret.)

I will arrange that the Italian Consul-General receives unofficial information in the next few days.

No. 20.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 27, 1891.

WITH reference to my previous despatch about the state of affairs at Suakin, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a telegram from Colonel Holled Smith, the Governor of that town, reporting a raid on cattle made by about forty Arabs from Handoub. The Egyptian cavalry went out and recovered the cattle and drove the raiders back to Handoub, capturing at the same time over forty thieves, but in doing so lost one of their number killed and two wounded.

Colonel Holled Smith adds that Handoub has become unbearable, being a nest of slave-dealers and robbers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Colonel Holled Smith to Major-General Sir F. Grenfell.

(Telegraphic.)

Suakin, January 26, 1891.

PARTY, forty, from Handoub, raided cattle to-day. Cavalry recovered cattle, and pursued raiders to Handoub. One cavalry man killed, one slightly wounded. Cavalry brought in forty-two thieves levying blackmail outside. Handoub become unbearable; nest of slave-dealers and robbers.

No. 21.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 28, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a telegram from Sir Francis Grenfell, reporting the arrival of a man from Khartoum with letters from some of the European prisoners there.

This man brings information that the Dervishes have been recently defeated in Darfour and Jebel Dair. He states that the Dervish force at Dongola is about 4,000 men, but that they intend to restrict themselves to defensive action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to Colonel Kitchener.

(Telegraphic.)

Assouan [undated].

MESSENGERS have arrived from Dufaalah Khojali, Dongola, bearing letters from Neufeld, Manoli, Ohrwalder, and others, mostly concerning money, except that

Kaba-Mallah has just arrived Dongola few men; strong patrols reported in Batu-el-Wagar. Dervishes recently defeated in Darfur and Jebel Dair. Force at Dongola, about 4,000. Reported intention of Dervishes, defensive rather than offensive.

No. 22.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 31, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, reporting on the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of that town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, January 20, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report that this district remains perfectly quiet.

Trade is reviving in spite of existing restrictions. About 500 camel loads of gum have recently arrived from Berber, and more is expected. Manchester print goods have been exported to the Soudan in large quantities to the value of about 45,000*l*. All this is legitimate trade, and I am sure we shall have no cause to find fault with it. The grain in store since August is being gradually disposed of, partly through Agig, partly to Massowah.

The situation at Tokar is unchanged. Osman Digna remains passive, with a force of about 470 Jaaleens, Baggaras, and Dongalowers. Mahmud Karai is Emir of Handoub, *vice* Ahmed Mahmud, lately deceased. His small band of Dervishes has given very little trouble to Suakin for some time past.

Four more of the Fadlab mounted police deserted on the 11th instant, but no importance is to be attached to the incident. Handoub is so near, and there are so many of their relations and fellow-tribesmen in its neighbourhood, that this is scarcely matter for surprise, and, indeed, scarcely for regret, for there are far finer men to be had for the purpose. About the same date a convoy of fifty-nine slaves (young boys and girls) while being brought to the coast for shipment were rescued by the Sheikh of the Courbabs, brought to Rowayyah, and placed upon a Government dhow. They were then brought into Suakin for grant of freedom papers and final disposal. This incident has caused great excitement in Handoub, where the slave-owners now are; and although there are large depôts of slaves at Handoub at the present moment, their owners will, I think, be afraid to run them down to the coast for fear of similar opposition on land, or from the English man-of-war, or the Government dhows, which have certainly kept an active look-out lately both for slaves and for contraband grain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. D. BARNHAM.

No. 23.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 1, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of two telegrams of to-day's date from Colonel Hotted Smith to Colonel Kitchener, urging strongly the desirability of immediately occupying Tokar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Colonel Holled Smith to Colonel Kitchener.

(Telegraphic.)

Suakin, February 1, 1891.

REBELS north dispersed; leaders isolated with twenty followers. Arabs refuse to join. I expect shortly to arrest disloyal Sheikhs. Between Suakin and Tokar they have only one port, near Tamai, under Gapsa, with twenty men, who has written asking peace.

Tokar deserters report Osman at Relicit, marching south, and intention of the Hababs and Beni-Amers to arrest the Tokar force, consisting of 100 to 300 Dervishes.

I press urgently for occupation of Tokar by way of Makdam Mersa. Force here sufficient to carry this out; probably walk over. Telegraph ship could be obtained for immediate use.

Reply anxiously expected by all. Large numbers of Arabs would give assistance to Government.

Following is later telegram from the same:—

"Deserters from Tokar just arrived report 100 Dervishes and 35 Soudanese with 25 horsemen in the town."

No. 24.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 10, 1891, 2 P.M.

YOUR telegram No. 11.

The military authorities consider that Colonel Holled Smith should be approved for having occupied Handoub.

No. 25.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 10, 1891.

THE troops are expected to be at Trinkitat by next Friday.

No. 26.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 10, 1891.

OSMAN DIGNA is reported to have returned to Tokar with a few horsemen.

No. 27.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 12, 1891.

COLONEL HOLLED SMITH expects that the Tokar affair will not present any difficulties.

At Suakin everything is going on in a satisfactory manner.

No. 28.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 13, 1891.

THE Governor of Suakin telegraphed yesterday as follows:—

“Trinkitat has been occupied without opposition. The disembarkation of the stores is completed; to-morrow the remainder of the force will sail. Application of Osman Digna to the tribes for joint action has been refused.”

No. 29.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord,

Rome, February 9, 1891.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 219 of the 19th December last, forwarding copy of a Memorandum which I had sent to the Italian Foreign Office relative to the supplies furnished to the Dervishes through the Italian possessions in Africa, I have the honour to inclose herewith a translation of a *pro-memoriâ* which I have received from the Italian Government, stating that it appears from inquiries made at Massowah that the consignments of rice, &c., dispatched by Ali Yahia and other merchants, which were referred to in my Memorandum, were destined for the Habab tribe, and not for the Dervishes.

It is added that the other information contained in the Memorandum is stated by the Governor of Massowah to be incorrect, but his Excellency has promised to make further inquiries, the result of which will be communicated to me if they throw any further light on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Pro-memoriâ.

(Translation.)

THE Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs lost no time in transmitting to the authorities at Massowah the *pro-memoriâ* of the British Embassy, dated the 16th December last, with orders to make careful inquiries as to the facts therein contained.

General Gandolfi has now replied that the result of a careful examination of the registers of the port of Massowah, of the declarations of the consigners, and the receipts of the Royal Custom-house, has shown that some packages of dhurra, rice, dates, and flour were sent by Massowah merchants, among who was Ali Effendi Yahia, to the ports Gulbul and Taclai, but that these provisions were destined exclusively for the Habab, a tribe protected by Italy, and which, being a pastoral tribe, is entirely without cereals. The quantity of provisions itself being very small proves that it is no question of supplying food to the Dervishes.

The other information contained in the *pro-memoriâ* was found by the Governor of Massowah to be inaccurate; but he has promised in any case to make fresh inquiries, and if these throw any light on the question the Ministry will take care to communicate the substance thereof to the Marquis of Dufferin.

No. 30.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 14, 1891.

OSMAN DIGNA has left Tokar, according to reports from Suakin.

No. 31.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 26.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 3, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to address your Lordship on the subject of the proposed advance from Suakin to Tokar.

With a view to eliciting an authoritative statement of the facts of the case from a military point of view, I addressed certain questions to Sir Francis Grenfell about six weeks ago. I have the honour to inclose a copy of these questions and of Sir Francis Grenfell's answers.

I would, in the first instance, invite your Lordship's attention to Sir Francis Grenfell's answer to my fifth question, which dealt with the advantages which would accrue from the reoccupation of Tokar. I agree with Sir Francis Grenfell that those advantages would be considerable.

Your Lordship is aware that great misery has been caused in the Eastern Soudan owing to the obstacles which from time to time it has been found necessary to impose to the free introduction of food supplies from the coasts of the Red Sea. It is true that owing to an abundant harvest in the Soudan, the suffering is at present less great than it was a few months ago. At the same time it cannot be doubted that the population of the Eastern Soudan generally would benefit greatly if no restrictions were placed on trade. Your Lordship is also aware that considerable difference of opinion has existed amongst the local authorities of Suakin as to the wisest course to be pursued under all the circumstances of the case. A policy which is almost prohibitive of trade, as also one which places no hindrance on trade, have been supported with an equal degree of conviction by competent authorities.

The course pursued by the Egyptian Government has under these circumstances been almost necessarily vacillating and uncertain. At times trade has been allowed. At other times it has been, either wholly or in part, prohibited. This can be no matter for surprise, for the arguments which the advocates of both policies have been able to advance have been perfectly valid, if considered exclusively on their own merits. On the one hand the military authorities have urged that, if grain be once allowed to leave the coast, it cannot be prevented from reaching the Dervishes, who at the same time receive contraband supplies of munitions of war. Thus attacks on Egyptian territory, which would have to be repulsed with a considerable loss of life and money, are facilitated. I believe this argument to be perfectly valid. There is every reason to suppose that a serious attack which was contemplated on the part of Osman Digna a few months ago was only prevented by the withdrawal of the permission to trade which had been previously accorded.

On the other hand, it is urged that the Dervishes are few in number, that they tyrannize over the rest of the population, and that it is both unjust and impolitic to make the mass of the people suffer for the fault of a few, who, moreover, are not the indigenous population of the Eastern Soudan, but, on the contrary, tribesmen who come from distant parts and whose presence is most unwelcome. Further, it is argued that it is almost impossible to prevent contraband trade, and that if trade is stopped at the Egyptian ports, it will pass through the Italian ports, which lie somewhat further south.

These arguments, considered on their own merits, are also perfectly valid.

The only way of solving this difficulty is to drive the Dervishes away from the immediate neighbourhood of Suakin. Your Lordship will observe that Sir F. Grenfell's opinion is that, "Tokar being the only oasis of fertile ground of importance to the east of Kassala and Berber, once it was occupied, the only possible Dervish posts would be at those places, which are in either case over 200 miles distant."

I would further draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that the reoccupation of Tokar would greatly facilitate any measures adopted for checking the Slave Trade, which, under the auspices of the Dervishes, is now being actively carried on.

A further advantage to be obtained is that the inhabitants of Suakin would, as Sir Francis Grenfell points out, be free from molestation, and would be able to cultivate the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of the town. Theretofore any isolated wood-cutter or cultivator has been exposed to the risk of being killed or captured by the stray Dervishes who haunt the vicinity of Suakin.

* Substance received by telegraph.

The Reports which I have recently sent home will have informed your Lordship that there is some reason to suppose that a short time ago the Dervishes contemplated a renewed attack on Egypt along the valley of the Nile. Your Lordship will observe that, in answer to one of my questions Sir F. Grenfell states that "in all probability it (that is the reoccupation of Tokar) would prevent any advance on Egypt along the Nile Valley."

On these grounds, therefore, I should be glad to see Tokar reoccupied by Egyptian troops.

Great, however, as these advantages are, I certainly should not be prepared to recommend any advance on Tokar if I thought that it would of necessity lead to any further forward movement. I need not now discuss the question of the reoccupation of the whole of the Soudan. It will be quite sufficient for my present purposes if I state that, for the present at all events, any project having for its object an advance to Khartoum is wholly impossible of execution. I would invite your Lordship's attention to the answers given by Sir F. Grenfell to the questions which I addressed to him with a view of eliciting his opinion on this point. The fighting strength of the Egyptian army at present consists of about 11,000 men. When I addressed my questions to Sir F. Grenfell some unofficial negotiations were going on with the French Government with a view to ascertaining whether a portion of the economies resulting from the conversion of the debt could be applied to increase the military expenditure. Had the French Government been prepared to entertain this proposal, it would have been possible to increase the strength of the army by about 2,500 men. It is, however, now understood that the French Government is not prepared to give its assent to any measure of this nature. Under these circumstances, the proposed increase of the army has become impossible.

The fighting force which the Egyptian Government has at its disposal must, therefore, be taken at 11,000 men and no more.

Sir F. Grenfell states that in order to move to Khartoum the strength of the Egyptian army would have to be raised to 22,000 men; that the expedition would cost not less than 1,000,000*l.*; and that the annual expenditure would have to be raised to 750,000*l.*, an increase over its present cost (448,000*l.*) of about 300,000*l.*. This estimate, moreover, takes no account of such expenditure on the civil government of the country as would be attendant on the reoccupation.

In other words, any attempt made at the present time to reoccupy the whole of the Soudan would again plunge the Egyptian Government into the most serious financial difficulties and give a fatal check to the course of Egyptian reform. Further, it is quite clear that no military Commander would undertake the responsibility for a general forward movement with the forces which are at present available, and which for the time being cannot certainly be increased. Any idea of this sort may, therefore, for the present, be absolutely discarded.

I am aware that in cases of this sort there is generally some risk that one forward step may lead to another. If we were dealing with any question of advancing up the Valley of the Nile, the risk would be very serious. Your Lordship is aware that, in common with, I think, every authority who has dealt with this subject, I am of opinion that it would be both useless and undesirable to move to Dongola unless the Egyptian Government were in a position to continue the movement on to Khartoum.

I have given my utmost consideration to the conclusion that, in this particular instance, there is little or no risk of the nature to which I allude. I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to Sir F. Grenfell's observations on this branch of the subject. To these, I venture to add that there can certainly be no military necessity for any advance beyond Tokar. Even if such an advance were considered desirable by those who might be inclined to favour the adoption of a forward policy, I feel confident that the military movements could be controlled from London and Cairo. Did I entertain any doubts on this point, I should certainly not recommend the reoccupation of Tokar to your Lordship's favourable consideration. In fact, I consider the reoccupation of Tokar as a matter purely local to the Eastern Soudan, and that it can be treated quite independently of the larger question of advancing to Khartoum, and reoccupying the whole or the greater part of the Soudan.

Sir Francis Grenfell communicated to me his Memorandum towards the end of December, as he was on the point of leaving Cairo for Upper Egypt. In spite of my general agreement with his views, I decided not to make any further immediate representation to your Lordship on the subject. Sir Francis Grenfell had, very properly, proposed to employ a force sufficiently large to overcome with certainty all possible opposition. The collection of transport and other operations would have required

time which might have enabled Dervish reinforcements to come up so soon as the intention to advance became generally known. The expenditure involved was considerable.

When an advance to Tokar was first suggested, I was given to understand that the place could be easily captured by a *coup de main*. Sir Francis Grenfell's proposals appeared to me to involve a somewhat larger undertaking than had at first been contemplated. It appeared to me that the question of whether, under all the circumstances of the case, it was desirable to make any forward movement at all, required further careful consideration. I decided to await Sir F. Grenfell's return before laying the matter again before your Lordship. Moreover, by the adoption of this course, General Walker, who only took up the command of the British troops on the 1st January, would have time to consider the question.

Sir F. Grenfell returned to Cairo a few days ago. Almost simultaneously with his return, news arrived from Suakin of the capture of Handoub. It appears certain, moreover, that Tokar is now occupied by a mere handful of men, and that Osman Digna is at a considerable distance, with a force of only some 400 to 500 men. It was strongly urged on me that the movement was favourable for the capture of Tokar by a *coup de main*, and that this could easily be effected by a detachment from the Suakin garrison; also that the capture of Handoub by itself was not sufficient to insure tranquillity round Suakin.

Under these circumstances, after fully discussing the question afresh with General Walker and Sir F. Grenfell, I have to-day telegraphed to your Lordship recommending that authority should be given to effect the capture of Tokar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

Memorandum for Sir F. Grenfell.

1. WHAT is the present strength of the Egyptian army?
2. What will be the strength if the Finance Department are able to grant the extra 70,000*l.* a-year resulting from the economy on the conversion of the debt?
3. Do you consider that this strength would be sufficient to undertake a forward movement, having the capture of Khartoum for its object?
4. If not, can you give me any idea of what force would be required, and any rough estimate of the probable expenditure?
5. What advantages do you consider will accrue from the reoccupation of Tokar and Handoub?
6. What, according to the latest intelligence, is the Dervish force at those places?
7. Can you give me a rough estimate of the force which would be required to reoccupy Tokar and Handoub, and of the cost of the expedition?
8. What measures would you propose if those places are reoccupied? Would any increased expenditure be involved?
9. Would it be possible on military grounds to remain in occupation of Tokar and Handoub without any further advance being made? I am particularly desirous that this question should be very carefully considered.
10. Do you consider that the reoccupation of Tokar and Handoub would have any effect on the offensive movement along the Nile Valley which the Dervishes are said to contemplate at present?

(Signed) E. BARING.

Cairo, December 20, 1890.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Sir F. Grenfell's Answers to Sir E. Baring's Questions.

1. The present fighting strength of the Egyptian army is approximately :—

Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	770
Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	970
Camel Corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	300
Infantry (Egypt)	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,340
„ (Soudan)	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,800
Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	11,180

N.B.—These numbers do not include medical and departmental services.

2. The fighting strength after the proposed grant will be approximately :—

Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,600
Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,200
Camel Corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	600
Infantry (Egypt)	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,340
„ (Soudan)	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,000
Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	13,740

3. Certainly not.

The army would have to be probably raised to 22,000 men, of whom 16,000 would be required to take the field. Egypt must still be garrisoned, Suakin held, and a large number of men retained on the line of communications.

4. The cost would not be less than one million, and £ E. 750,000 all told yearly for the army alone, without considering the expenditure on civil government attendant on reoccupation.

5. The following advantages would accrue from the reoccupation of Tokar :—

- (1.) The relief of Suakin and its inhabitants from any fear of molestation.
 - (2.) Clearance of the greater part of the Eastern Soudan from Dervish influence.
 - (3.) Trade would be re-established and increased imports and exports would result.
- It would stop all the starvation and misery amongst the tribes, who would resume peaceful pursuits and cultivation.

Tokar being the only oasis of fertile ground of importance to the east of Kassala and Berber, once it was occupied, the only possible Dervish posts would be at those places, which are in either case over 200 miles distant.

The difficulties of an attack on Tokar by Dervishes, supposing the Arab tribes loyal, from either of the above posts would be enormous, as no supplies could be procured on the march. The Dervishes, with posts at Kassala and Berber, would be completely cut off from the Red Sea; Slave Trade and contraband import of ammunition and arms would therefore cease.

A large amount of territory and taxing ground would be at once removed from the Dervish rule.

The loss of Tokar would be a grave blow to the prestige of Mahdism.

6. At most there are at Handoub about 100 men, and at Tokar 450.

7. I consider that though Tokar might be occupied by a small force, that at least three battalions should be landed to impress the tribes and to prevent resistance, but this might be modified according to intelligence received when the force was about to be organized; the cost would be, roughly, £ E. 7,000, part of which might be met from the yearly Budget, as it so happens that Suakin reliefs of two battalions and a battery of artillery are due this year.

Therefore, these troops could go down as reliefs without attracting notice.

Subsequent expenditure would largely depend on local circumstances.

Handoub need not be permanently occupied; it would fall with Tokar.

8. A certain number of Sheikhs of tribes would have to be subsidized; a civil administration would have to be established, and a local police force organized; about £ E. 9,000* annual increase to the Suakin Budget would be necessary, and probably one battalion would be occupied in garrison at Tokar.

Against this expenditure, the increase to trade at Suakin by the occupation of the very fertile delta of Tokar, where most valuable cotton is produced, would probably, if not cover expenditure, certainly reduce it by half.

* 9,000*l.* would comprise expense of communication by sea and land, hire of camels, subsidies to Sheikhs, and extra staff for government of Tokar. This is putting it at its highest figure.

9. The occupation of Tokar demands no further advance. The very reasons that render an attack by Dervishes on Tokar so difficult would cause further military operations from Tokar to be extremely difficult and arduous, and, though the difficulties would not be insurmountable, why, when holding the fertile ground, should any one advance into the Desert.

10. The reoccupation of Tokar would act like driving the outposts on the flank of an enemy's march.

The Dervishes could never be sure that their flank at Berber or Kassala might not be threatened, and although it is impossible to say what Dervishes may not do, in all probability it would prevent any advance on Egypt along the Nile Valley.

(Signed) F. GRENFELL, Sirdar.

No. 32.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 7, 1891.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 7 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, giving a report on the recent occupation of Handoub by the Egyptian troops and of the events which led to that step being taken by the Governor of Suakin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, January 29, 1891.

I HAD the honour to inform your Excellency by telegraph yesterday that the Governor-General occupied Handoub on the previous day.

I have to supplement my telegram by explaining more fully the events of the past few days which compelled his Excellency to take this step.

1. Handoub, distant 11 miles from Suakin, is a strategical position which commands the only caravan route from Suakin to Berber. Held by a party of brigands and slave-dealers, by a nominee of the Khalifa, supported by the riffraff who have from time to time deserted from Suakin, it has long been evident that no effective step could be taken towards reopening trade along this route, nor could the lives of our townspeople be safe until this open sore had been removed.

The position of Handoub may be described as two low red-coloured hills separated by a khor, varying in width from 300 to 1,000 yards having the wells in its centre, and about 1,200 wattle huts scattered over it in every direction, while others are grouped on the open plain beyond.

For quite a mile this side of Handoub there is no vegetation, the bush having apparently been purposely destroyed. The open country beyond Handoub is thick bush.

2. On Monday the 26th instant a party of forty raiders from Handoub came round in the early morning to the south side of the town, near Fort Foolah, and carried off a large quantity of cattle.

The cavalry under Captain Beech recovered the cattle, with a loss of one trooper killed, and one wounded. They pursued the raiders nearly to Handoub, and outside that place (at Khor Tobain) came upon a party of thieves levying blackmail. They captured forty-two of these and brought them into Suakin. Three women and a child were wantonly murdered by the raiders outside the forts.

3. Next day, the 27th instant, at 8 A.M., Colonel Holled Smith left for Handoub with the two Black battalions, a party of Friendlies, and native Arab cavalry, employed as scouts. The Egyptian cavalry had started earlier. At 11 o'clock the wattle huts of Handoub were in sight, and a party of Dervishes standing on a low hill near the graveyard, beating the war-drum.

The 11th Battalion was now prepared for a final advance, but remained stationary for some time to allow the 12th Battalion to come up.

Meantime the native scouts were riding at a hard gallop into Handoub, encountering no opposition beyond an occasional shot fired from the hills on the left. Then one of them came back with the news that the place had been abandoned.

The cattle had probably been removed in the night, as well as a large convoy of slaves, which had been in Handoub for the past three weeks.

It appears that the Dervishes received warning of the intended attack on the previous evening.

It is very difficult to keep things secret in Suakin.

While the Black troops entered and encamped the cavalry were in the open country beyond, pursuing the enemy, and overtook a party of them within 2 miles of Handoub, going in the direction of Otao.

Forty-five were killed and about thirty captured.

The Ameer Nafa-bin-Mahmoud Ali and his cousin Mahomed Karai are believed to have escaped to the Asortriba mountains.

Among the prisoners was the Nakeeb-ul-Ashraff, a well-known figure at Suakin a year ago, where he affected the character of a saint, while mixed up in every nefarious proceeding on foot. He deserted last spring and made a journey to Omdurman to induce the Khalifa to place him in a position of influence, but returned to Handoub, where he has since been active in slave-running. It is proposed to exile him, either to Halaib or Kosseir.

4. It is the intention of the Governor-General to definitely break up this Handoub settlement, inviting those of the inhabitants who are law-abiding to settle here or elsewhere.

A fort having accommodation for fifty Soudanese police is being erected near the wells. No other habitation will be permitted.

The Beit-ul-Mal, or Dervish Treasure-house, was the only stone building in Handoub. The wattle huts were mostly thatched, dome-shaped structures, more substantial than anything of the kind at Suakin.

The interiors, moreover, showed that the owners were well-to-do, with articles of furniture and cookery, poultry and dhourra. The contents of the Beit-ul-Mal and the property of the Dervish have been brought into Suakin.

5. The Governor-General is anxious to complete this work by securing the safety of the caravan road as far as possible towards Berber. He proposes to subsidize four tribes along the road:—

(1.) That of Mahomed Guillor, known variously as the Shinderai or Weled Guilai Tribe, and holding the road to Otao; (2) the Hamdabs; (3) the Hussimabs; (4) the Shebodinabs; and to raise this subsidy he proposes to take 5 per cent. from the merchants, being one half of the amount they have hitherto paid to the Handoub Dervishes.

If the Pacification Fund does not suffice to pay the subsidy, I am sure the merchants will cheerfully pay the 5 per cent. This will, perhaps, be a matter for later consideration.

Everyone here is pleased at what has taken place, and remembering that it has been effected without the slightest accident on our side, their is, I think, great cause for satisfaction.

Marauders have lately appeared near Tamai. It would be well if they could be dispersed in the same way.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

No. 33.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 8, 1891.

IN my despatch No. 337, Confidential, of the 29th December last, I had the honour to forward to your Lordship the draft of an Arrangement which had been concluded between the Turkish and Egyptian Customs Administration for the abolition of the Raftieh system.

This Arrangement, which was signed on the 18th December by the Director-General of Turkish Indirect Revenues and by M. Ornstein on behalf of the Egyptian

Customs Administration, has now been officially published in yesterday's "Journal Officiel."

I have the honour to inclose a copy of it herewith, as well as of a Declaration annexed to the Arrangement, providing that its dispositions shall come into force from the 1st January, 1891, instead of the 13th October, as had been previously arranged by the terms of Article 7.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 33.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of February 7, 1891.

MINISTÈRE DES FINANCES.

Arrangement entre l'Administration des Contributions Indirectes de l'Empire Ottoman et l'Administration des Douanes Égyptiennes.

CONSIDÉRANT qu'il y a lieu de mettre un terme aux fréquentes contestations qui surgissent entre l'Administration des Contributions Indirectes de l'Empire et l'Administration des Douanes Égyptiennes au sujet de la perception des droits de douane;

Considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt des deux Administrations de sauvegarder et d'assurer leurs recettes respectives en prenant pour base le principe de prélèvement des droits de douane dans le pays de consommation, sans toutefois porter atteinte aux stipulations des Traités.

Vu l'Iradé Impérial du 4 Ramazan, 1307 (11 Avril, 1306 [1890]), sanctionnant ce principe.

Il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :—

Article 1^{er}. Les marchandises de provenance étrangère exportées de l'Égypte à destination d'une autre partie de l'Empire, et vice versa, seront accompagnées, comme par le passé, d'une Raftieh Hasbieh constatant l'acquittement des droits de Douane. A l'arrivée de ces marchandises au lieu de destination, indiqué dans la Raftieh, la Douane locale établira les droits d'entrée à percevoir d'après le système en vigueur soit en Égypte, soit dans le reste de l'Empire.

Dans ce but, la Douane constatera la valeur, à l'échelle de débarquement, de la marchandise au jour du dédouanement si celle-ci est taxée *ad valorem*, ou elle appliquera la classification et les droits fixes du Tarif si la marchandise est tarifée; dans le cas où les droits à percevoir à la Douane d'arrivée sont supérieurs à ceux perçus par la Douane d'expédition et mentionnés dans la Raftieh, la Douane d'arrivée percevra pour son propre compte l'excédent constaté.

Si, au contraire, les droits d'entrée à percevoir à la Douane d'arrivée étaient inférieurs à ceux prélevés par la Douane d'expédition, celle-ci ne sera tenue à aucun remboursement aux propriétaires de ces marchandises.

Art. 2. Les Raftiehs qui auront été délivrées comme il vient d'être indiqué à l'Article précédent, seront enregistrées avec soin par chacune des deux Administrations dans un compte courant qui sera tenu spécialement à cet effet.

Dans ce compte courant, la Turquie sera créditée et l'Égypte sera débitée pour les marchandises expédiées en Turquie, après paiement des droits dans un port Égyptien, et l'Égypte sera créditée et la Turquie sera débitée pour les marchandises expédiées en Égypte, après paiement des droits dans un port Turc.

Les enregistrements dans le compte courant s'effectueront d'après les règles suivantes :—

Si les droits indiqués dans la Raftieh sont égaux ou inférieurs à ceux constatés par la Douane de destination, ils seront inscrits sans changement dans le compte courant.

Si, par contre, les droits indiqués dans la Raftieh sont supérieurs à ceux établis par la Douane de destination, celle-ci ne fera figurer, au compte courant, au débit de l'autre Administration Douanière, que les montants réduits.

De cette façon chacune des deux Administrations Centrales n'encaissera que les

sommes qui lui reviennent légalement et qu'elle aurait encaissées si les marchandises consommées dans sa circonscription lui seraient parvenues directement de l'étranger.

Tous les trois mois, les Directions Centrales de ces deux Administrations établiront la balance des débits et crédits, et celle d'entre elles qui aurait encaissé la somme la plus forte versera intégralement à Constantinople ou à Alexandrie la différence à l'autre en monnaie d'or (livres Turques ou Égyptiennes, suivant le cas).

Les excédents provenant de la différence des estimations ou des Tarifs en vigueur, qui auront été prélevés par l'une ou l'autre de ces deux Administrations, ainsi qu'il a été dit à l'Article 1^{er}, ne seront pas portés dans le compte courant, mais resteront acquis à l'Administration qui les aura perçus.

Art. 3. Les marchandises, produit du sol ou de l'industrie de l'Égypte ou des autres parties de l'Empire, transportées par terre ou par mer à une ville ou échelle de l'autre partie, seront dorénavant assujetties aux droits de Douane dans le pays où elles seront consommées.

Ces droits seront perçus d'après le système le plus favorable appliqué dans l'une ou l'autre partie aux marchandises similaires de provenance étrangère, c'est-à-dire que ces produits seront soumis à l'estimation et au paiement d'un droit *ad valorem*, si les articles similaires de provenance étrangère sont taxés *ad valorem* et qu'ils seront classifiés et taxés d'après le Tarif le plus favorable si les articles similaires de provenance étrangère sont tarifés.

Jusqu'à la mise en application des nouveaux Traités de Commerce, les droits *ad valorem* à percevoir tant en Égypte que dans les autres parties de l'Empire seront de 8 pour cent.

Les Raftiehs qui ci-devant accompagnaient les marchandises indigènes, seront remplacées par des Chahadet-Namés contenant tous les renseignements utiles pour la constatation de l'origine et de l'identité des marchandises expédiées.

Art. 4. Les marchandises, produit du sol ou de l'industrie de l'Égypte, expédiées dans les autres parties de l'Empire et vice versa, ne seront pas soumises au droit d'exportation.

Art. 5. Les stipulations contenues dans le présent Arrangement ne s'appliquent pas aux tabacs et aux tombacs sous toutes leurs formes, au sel ou natron, au hachich, à la poudre, aux armes blanches ou de guerre, ou à tous autres articles prohibés ou faisant l'objet d'un régime spécial, soit en Égypte, soit dans les autres parties de l'Empire.

Art. 6. Un Règlement spécial sera élaboré, d'un commun accord, par les deux Administrations et déterminera le mode de la délivrance des Raftiehs pour les marchandises de provenance étrangère, les conditions dans lesquelles elles pourront être acceptées et le modèle et la tenue des registres devant servir à l'établissement du compte courant.

Art. 7. Les dispositions du présent Arrangement entreront en vigueur à partir du 1^{er} (13) Octobre, 1890; toutefois, en ce qui concerne les marchandises arrivant dans les ports de l'Égypte ou des autres parties de l'Empire, ces dispositions ne seront applicables qu'en tant que ces marchandises auront été expédiées avec les Raftiehs ou Chahadet-Namés délivrés à partir du 1^{er} (13) Octobre, 1890.

Art. 8. Toutes dispositions contraires au présent Arrangement sont et demeurent abrogées.

Fait double à Constantinople le 6 (18) Djemazi-el-Ewel, 1308 (6 (13) Décembre, 1906 [1890]). Les dispositions du présent Arrangement ont été sanctionnées par l'Idadé Impérial du 21 Rebi-el-Akher, 1308 (22 Novembre, 1906).

Cachet de la Direction Générale des Contributions Indirectes
de l'Empire Ottoman :

Le Directeur-Général,

(L.S.)

HASSAN FEHMI.

Pour la Direction Générale des Douanes Égyptiennes,

(L.S.)

ORNSTEIN.

MINISTÈRE DES FINANCES.

Declaration annexe à l'Arrangement en date du 6 (18) Décembre, 1890 (1306), entre l'Administration des Contributions Indirectes de l'Empire Ottoman et l'Administration des Douanes Égyptiennes.

Considérant que l'Article 7 de l'Arrangement en date du 6 (18) Décembre, 1890 (1306), fixe au 1^{er} (13) Octobre, 1890, l'entrée en vigueur des dispositions de l'Arrangement;

Considérant que cette date est écoulée et que, d'autre part, il est nécessaire de réserver un délai pour la communication aux diverses Douanes de l'Empire des instructions résultant de cet Arrangement.

Considérant enfin l'impossibilité d'apporter un changement quelconque à un Arrangement sanctionné par Iradé Impérial,

L'Administration des Contributions Indirectes de l'Empire et l'Administration des Douanes Égyptiennes se sont entendues pour fixer au 20 Décembre, 1890 (1^{er} Janvier, 1891), la mise en application des dispositions de l'Arrangement et des Annexes qui en font partie.

Fait double à Constantinople, le 6 (18) Décembre, 1890 (1306).

No. 34.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 17, 1891.

CONSUL at Suakin telegraphs the following:—

"Teb has been occupied. No resistance offered. Advance will be made to-morrow."

No. 35.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 20, 1891.

THE Sirdar has arrived at Suakin. He informs me by telegraph that everything is proceeding satisfactorily, and that in all probability Tokar will be occupied to-day with slight opposition, if any.

No. 36.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 21, 1891.

CONSUL at Suakin telegraphs as follows:—

"Colonel Smith reports, Tokar was occupied on the 19th after a severe engagement.

"Osman Digna's force was of 2,000 men, with 2,000 in reserve; he has been utterly defeated, all the principal Emirs have been killed and 700 Dervishes. Our losses are one English officer (Captain Barrow), four native officers, and twelve men killed and forty-two wounded. Osman Digna has fled with thirty horsemen. Afrit has been occupied by Colonel Holled Smith.

No. 37.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 21, 1891, 6:20 P.M.

I HAVE to instruct you to convey the congratulations of Her Majesty's Government to the Khedive on the gallantry and steadiness shown by His Highness' troops in the severe hand-to-hand fighting, reported by Colonel Holled Smith to have taken place at Tokar.

No. 38.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 22, 1891, 2:30 P.M.

YOUR telegram No. 31* respecting the appointment of a Procureur-Général.

The Egyptian Government will make a great mistake if they meet the action of the French Government, however unreasonable it may be, by retaliatory measures.

French opinion will only be exasperated, not frightened, by anything Egypt can do, and a war of annoyance will be the result.

Recent events should in no way diminish any consideration which can be shown to the French Government in the matter of appointments.

No. 39.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 23, 1891.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 12.

I am requested by His Highness the Khedive to convey his best thanks to your Lordship.

No. 40.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 23, 1891.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 13 of the 22nd instant.

The appointment of two Inspectors to the Museum is the only immediate issue. Please refer to my telegram No. 2 of the 9th January and to your Lordship's reply of the 10th ultimo. I am now in some doubt as to what course I should pursue.

Two Frenchmen have been proposed by the French, who urge that if Grébaut chooses his own subordinates the system will work better. There is some truth in this statement. A competent Belgian is, on the other hand, available, and to nominate him would be perfectly reasonable; I do not, however, doubt that the French would be greatly irritated by his nomination.

As the Englishmen in the Egyptian Council look to me for guidance, I cannot well stand outside the whole question, and it is impossible to foresee what the Egyptian Ministers may do if they are left to decide the matter wholly by themselves. They are just as likely as not to nominate no Frenchman to either of the places which would, I think, be an unwise step to take.

What would your Lordship like me to do under these circumstances?

When I telegraphed to your Lordship on the 19th my idea had been to let the matter stand over for the present, and, perhaps, ultimately, to give the two Frenchmen as one concession in exchange for the conversion economies. The French are certain

* Printed in "Egypt: Judicial Reforms."

to want something in exchange when they yield on this latter point, as they eventually must do; and it seems rather a pity that a concession should be made to them without something in return being obtained.

No. 41.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 14, 1891.

WITH reference to my No. 118 of the 2nd April of last year, transmitting to your Lordship copy of a Report on the frontier province of Egypt addressed by Sir Francis Grenfell to the Minister for War, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a second Report on the same subject, embodying the result of Sir Francis Grenfell's observations during his recent visit to the frontier. It is satisfactory to note that most of the suggestions made by General Grenfell last year have been already carried out, and that, on the whole, a general improvement is apparent.

With regard to Sir Francis Grenfell's remarks and suggestions concerning the inequality of the assessment of the land tax, I have the honour to report that this question is already under the consideration of a Commission appointed for the purpose, and that there is some reason to hope that next year measures will be taken which will go far to remedy the present defects in the system.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to Mustapha Pasha Fehmy.

*Head-quarters, Egyptian Army, War Office,
Cairo, February 3, 1891.*

Excellency,

WITH reference to my Report of the 26th March, 1890, on the civil administration of the frontier Moudirieh, I have the honour to lay before your Excellency a few further remarks dealing with the same subject, being the result of observations made during the recent visit of His Highness the Khedive to the frontier.

A full Report was submitted by Wodehouse Pasha to His Highness the Khedive on his arrival on the frontier dealing with the present state of the province. I propose, therefore, in the present Report to refer merely to the remarks I had the honour to submit to your Excellency last year, noting the action taken on the various points which were at that time brought to the notice of His Highness' Government, and submitting for consideration a few further suggestions which, if complied with, will, I feel sure, lead to the increased prosperity and welfare of the frontier province.

The system followed in last year's Report in enumerating the subjects under various sub-headings will be adhered to.

(A.)—*Land Tax.*

There are in the Moudirieh "kharadji" lands to the extent of 61,089 feddans, the land tax on which amounts to £ E. 48,040.

Of "ouchouri" lands there are 9,288 feddans, the tax on which amounts to £ E. 2,575. As previously noticed, the land tax in the Edfu, Assuan, and Kenuz districts varies from P. T. 1 to P. T. 116 per feddan, and the ouchouri from P. T. 16 to P. T. 74; while in the Halfa district the land tax varies from P. T. 18 to P. T. 233, and the ouchouri from about P. T. 13 to P. T. 58.

A certain amount of cultivable land is left uncultivated owing to a very large proportion of the male population leaving their homes to take service in Lower Egypt. On inquiry, it has been found that the tenants of these lands prefer to retain rather than to cede them, and make no difficulty regarding the payment of the land tax.

I may remark that His Highness the Khedive was particularly struck, in his recent visit to the frontier, with the poor appearance of the inhabitants, and I would

again repeat the statement in last year's Report that the assessment of the land tax is undoubtedly very unequal; I would therefore still urge the necessity of readjusting this assessment as soon as the Government are in a position to do so, by the appointment of a Commission for this purpose.

(B.)—*Government Lands.*

In the year 1890, 477 feddans of cultivable land and 16,476 dirah of building land were sold for £ E. 1,132, being an increase of £ E. 200 over the estimated value.

The case of the village of Fateerah to which I referred last year is still unsettled, the Sheikhs having refused to pay the tax on the 98 feddans of waste land. None of the villages are prepared to rent this land, and the Finance Department is unwilling to reduce the tax.

This would be dealt with by the Commission referred to above.

(C.)—*Sharaki Lands.*

There is still a considerable quantity of "sharaki" land in the Mudirieh.

I referred last year to the large quantity of uncultivated land at Redesieh belonging to the Daira Sanieh; much of this land is now rented by Sheikh Silwawi, who has placed it under cultivation with a profitable result.

(D.)—*Irrigation.*

The irrigation has been much improved during the year 1889-90. Most of the canals have been widened and deepened, the work being supervised by the various local officials, by whom payment was made. This system appears to give general satisfaction to the inhabitants:—

1. The alterations proposed for the Deberra Canal are almost completed.
2. The construction of a new canal at Dakkah is found to be not feasible by the irrigation engineers.
3. The repairs of the various stone spurs have been carried out, and the construction of a spur connecting the river bank north of the town of Assuan with a natural line of rocks in the river has already had good results, a deposit of alluvial soil having thus been formed to the north, while the harbour opposite the town has been thereby deepened. It is believed that if the spur be enlarged and extended the depth of water in the vicinity of the town will increase considerably, and a greatly improved harbour be obtained; the danger of the bank on which the barracks stands giving way would be also considerably lessened.

(E.)—*Crops and Harvest Prospects.*

The crops this year have been unusually good throughout the province, but the price of grain in the Mudirieh is low owing to the fact that there are few wealthy merchants, that the expense of transport north is considerable, and that the contractors who supply grain for the army can do so at a low rate, in consequence there is no export trade and little local commerce.

The date harvest is also good, and the recent census shows an augmentation of some 33,521 trees. The tax on date palms in the Halfa and Kenuz districts is P T. 1½, and in the Assouan and Edfu districts P T. 2½ per tree.

It is believed that the next date harvests are not likely to be so good, as locusts have destroyed many of the young saplings, moreover, it may be remarked that it was the custom to import young trees from the Sukkot and Mahass districts, which came quicker to maturity, and produced a date exceptionally adapted for transport and commerce, but as these districts are now outside the sphere of Government administration, it is possible that the quality of the date may deteriorate.

There is a considerable quantity of good land to the rear of the Halfa village in the Khor Mussa plain, which is left uncultivated owing to the difficulty of the water supply. I am confident that if Government could pecuniarily assist the villagers to sink Sakiyeh wells, a large amount of land could be speedily put under cultivation with most beneficial results to the villagers.

(F.)—*Wakfs Administration.*

The Wakfs Administration has undergone considerable improvement during the year 1890, and the causes of complaints referred to last year have now been removed.

The Mosque at Assuan has been greatly improved; the ancient Mosque of Saidna Hussein at Wady Halfa has been restored, and the foundation of the new Mosque at Tewfikieh (Dabarossa) has been laid, round which many houses have already sprung up; the rents of these houses are gathered by this Administration. These improvements appear to have given general satisfaction to the inhabitants.

His Highness the Khedive has most generously subscribed a sum of £ E. 50 towards the construction of a new Mosque at Korosko.

(G.)—*Legal Administration.*

Several important points regarding the legal administration of the frontier are under the consideration of His Highness' Government; it is not, therefore, necessary to touch upon them here, but it will be a great advantage to have a settlement of the legal administration on the lines agreed to by his Excellency Fakhri Pasha, Mr. Justice Scott, and Wodehouse Pasha.

The total number of civil prisoners confined in the new prison at Assuan amounted in the year 1890 to some 2,195; of these, 1,788 were confined for "contraventions," for which the maximum punishment is seven days; there were 407 cases of small "délits" with terms of imprisonment varying from seven to thirty days.

The only crime of importance was the murder which occurred at Silwa in August last; the murderers were arrested and duly convicted.

Wodehouse Pasha is of opinion that the removal of the Mehekemeh Ahlich from Esneh to Assuan would be of considerable benefit.

(H.)—*Sheep and Tobacco Tax.*

The sheep tax has now been abolished and the cultivation of tobacco is prohibited.

The revenue obtained on the boat tax has increased £ E. 115 this year.

(I.)—*Sale of Salt and Nitre.*

Two salt depôts south of Assuan have been established, while north of Assuan the system of obliging the natives to purchase salt has been abolished. Contraband trade in salt has also been strictly watched.

The sale of salt in 1890 amounted to £ E. 1,331, and that of nitre to £ E. 385.

(K.)—*Arrears of Taxes.*

The arrears of taxes at the end of 1890 amounted to—

Edfu and Assuan districts, £ E. 729; Halfa and Kenuz districts, £ E. 2,199.

A request has recently been submitted to the Government that the "taksit," or system of paying by instalments, may be altered; if this is approved, Wodehouse Pasha seems confident that the measure will greatly assist the inhabitants in the payment of their taxes.

(L.)—*Public Security.*

The police system continues to work well, but it is desirable to augment the present force by one sergeant and ten men for service between Edfu and Assuan. There are at present some seventy-nine non-commissioned officers and men and six officers, or roughly, a proportion of one policeman to 2,000 inhabitants. These abnormally small requirements are, of course, in a great measure due to the preponderating military force on the frontier.

The number of Gaffirs has been reduced to 868, or one Gaffir to 173 inhabitants; they are regularly paid.

(M.)—Relief of Refugees and Destitute Arabs.

The number of refugees from the Soudan has diminished considerably during the year 1890; there are still, however, a large number of destitute women and children in Tewfikieh for whom Government relief is a necessity. A sum of £ E. 1,100 was expended on this account in 1890.

Owing to much rain having fallen in the Eastern Desert many of the destitute Bisharin Arabs, who were granted support from the Government, have returned to their homes.

The Settlement at Debera is in a flourishing condition, and the refugees in that district are contented and prospering.

(N.)—Medical and Sanitary Administration.

In my Report last year I recommended the establishment of a civil hospital at Assuan, His Highness' Government accorded a sum of £ E. 320 for this purpose, and the construction of the hospital is now nearly completed. A further sum of £ E. 350 has been granted for the building of civil hospitals at Tewfikieh and Edfu, which has been commenced.

The assistance given to the civil population by the medical officers in the four districts of Halfa, Korosko, Assuan, and Edfu is greatly appreciated.

The vaccination of all children is carefully supervised.

(O.)—New Institutions.

The Assuan School is much appreciated: there are at present seventy-nine pupils, of whom fifty-nine are paying and the remainder non-paying. The Minister of Public Instruction has approved of the admission of an increased number of non-paying pupils up to 40 per cent.

The American Mission School at Assuan contains some seventy pupils, of whom fifty-four are paying; the majority of these are Copts.

A school is now in course of construction at Edfu, the necessary sum having been obtained by voluntary subscription, while the teachers will be supplied by the Minister of Public Instruction.

The public offices at Edfu which I characterized last year as discreditable and unsanitary, have now been completely renewed at a cost of £ E. 170, and are in all respects satisfactory.

The general aspect of Assuan has been greatly improved, streets have been widened, inhabitants are housing themselves better, and the whole town presents an appearance of increased prosperity and cleanliness. When money is available I am of opinion that the safety of the town would be rendered more secure at the time of high Nile by building a strong wall along the river bank in front of the town.

A nilometre of a metre gauge has been constructed at a cost of £ E. 100.

The Government has also accorded a sum of £ E. 800 for the construction of a new Mubafzeh, the present buildings being ill adapted for the purpose besides being of an abnormally high rental.

The appearance of Korosko has also greatly improved owing in a large measure to the indefatigable energy of the Commandant Kaimakam Aly Bey Haidar. The police-station, Merkaz offices, and Mehekemeh Sharia have been completed, and a new post-office and prison have been built.

The village of Dabarossa has increased considerably in size, and is now known as "Tewfikieh." The police and Merkez offices, the Mehekemeh Sharia and the post-office have all been completed.

The civil prison at Assuan has been completed, and has now accommodation for 250 prisoners, but this being considerably in excess of the requirements of the frontier, notification has been made to this effect to the Ministry of the Interior with a view to interning prisoners of other Mudiriehs at Assuan, should the accommodation in the various State prisons be restricted. If 100 convicts were sent up from Cairo they could be most usefully employed on all Government works, thereby lessening the cost of works approved for the year. There is room at present for 100 convicts from the north.

(P.)—*Horse Breeding.*

A sum of £ E. 80 was granted last year, at my request, for the purchase of an Arab stallion; this horse has already covered some thirty-six mares, and good results are anticipated. A similar attempt might also be made to improve the breed in donkeys, for which a sum of £ E. 50 is requested.

(Q.)—*Officials.*

The majority of suggestions in last year's Report regarding officials have received the favourable consideration of the Government, with the result that increased efficiency has been obtained.

The leave Regulations are, however, still a source of complaint, for, although the Government has authorized that the leave of Government officials should begin to count from the date of their arrival or departure from Assuan, I am of opinion that a further modification of the Regulations might be made, provided that such a modification might be made applicable to all Mudirieh's south of Assiout.

I would also again urge that the travelling rates of civil and military officials be assimilated, and that civilian officials be permitted to travel at quarters rates.

(R.)—*Feeling of the Inhabitants.*

The general feeling and conduct of the inhabitants appears to be gradually improving. I attribute this to the head-quarters of the Frontier Governorat being at Assuan instead of at Esneh, as before, and to the increased supervision consequent on the Governorship being vested in the person of the Military Commandant. I feel sure that the recent visit of His Highness the Khedive will go far towards improving the feelings of loyalty in this province, and the enthusiastic receptions accorded everywhere are indicative of the genuine appreciation by the inhabitants of His Highness the Khedive's presence amongst them.

(S.)—*Trade with the Soudan and Trade in general.*

A restricted trade with the Soudan was permitted for a short time last year, but it was found that the merchants' expectations were not so fully realized as they anticipated, and, moreover, in a military point of view, I have always held the opinion that the small amount of individual profit resulting from trade with the Soudan in its present unsettled state in no way compensated for the military risks incurred by permitting a restricted trade, in which it is almost impossible to prevent contraband goods finding their way into the Soudan. For these reasons trade with the Soudan from the frontier has been temporarily suspended, as the merchants will not risk their goods, with the result that the richer merchants in Assuan, Derawi, Edfu, and Esneh have resorted considerably to agriculture. The Arabs, it is true, are at some loss, as their carrying trade is for a time suspended; but as most of the important tribes are subsidized by the Government, I am of opinion that their pecuniary loss is owing rather to the present unsatisfactory state of the Soudan than to the loss of the meagre carrying trade which such a restricted commerce would admit.

(T.)—*Occupation of Sarras and Events in the Soudan.*

In accordance with my suggestion of last year, the post of Sarras has been removed about a mile north of its original position, which has considerably better defensive advantages, and is now connected with Halfa by a railway and telephone.

The inhabitants of the country as far south as Semneh are now practically under the Frontier Governorat, though, owing to the devastation of their country, they do not at present pay taxes.

The main Dervish out-post is at Suarda, some 90 miles south of Sarras, but their patrols proceed sometimes as far north as Akasheh.

The grain and date crops in the Soudan are reported to be exceptionally good this year, and the state of famine may be said to have completely passed away. The Eastern Desert is reported to be quite free of the enemy.

Generally, during the past year, I am of opinion that the civil administration of the frontier has steadily improved; the condition of the inhabitants is satisfactory, and throughout the province there is undoubted evidence of contentment and loyalty to the Government of His Highness the Khedive, and this improvement I attribute to the

good government of Wodehouse Pasha, Governor, Mahir Bey, Sub-Governor, and to the zeal and honesty of the Egyptian Government officials who work under them.

(Signed) H. GRENFELL, *Major-General,
Sirdar.*

No. 42.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 15, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, reporting on the general state of affairs in that district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, February 6, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report that since the occupation of Handoub, the authorities have succeeded in effecting the capture of several prominent Dervishes and slave-dealers.

On the 1st instant, at Tamai, the native cavalry captured Seyyid Omar Kafsa, an Ashraff, and one of the Khalifa's Ameeris.

On the 4th instant the Egyptian gun-boat "Adgemi" returned from Duroor and Royayyah with Omar Hamed Lahai (Sheikh of the Gidelaiabs), Mohammed Tahir-el-Ameen, a Fadlab Sheikh, and fifteen others, Jaaleens and Berberines. Omar Hamed Lahai was the most conspicuous slave-dealer in the district.

The immediate result of the action taken recently at Handoub and elsewhere has been to encourage the peasants to cast aside their fear and come in freely with their flocks from Erkoweit and Sinkat. Provisions have cheapened accordingly. Osman Digna left Tokar about three weeks ago, accompanied by about 350 men. Of these, 300 have proceeded south to attack the Beni Amers, while Osman Digna himself has taken up his station at Adoubena on the mainland, opposite Agig, 85 miles south of Suakin.

The Arabs around are keenly desirous of the re-establishment of settled government in this district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. D. BARNHAM.

No. 43.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 24, 1890, 2.15 P.M.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 36 of the 23rd instant, I think the Egyptian Government might nominate one Frenchman now as Inspector to the Museum, and leave the second appointment open for the present.

No. 44.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 24, 1891.

MY telegram No. 36, Confidential, of the 23rd instant.

Messrs. Wallis and MacGregor, two members of the Monuments Committee who are now in Cairo, have written to me, strongly advocating that one of the Inspectorships should be given to the Belgian.

The Marquis of Salisbury to the Earl of Lytton.

(No. 58A.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 26, 1891.

THE French Ambassador yesterday asked me if I had anything to say to him with respect to Egypt, and referred to the excitement which the introduction of the Judicial Reforms had created in certain circles in Paris. I replied that I had nothing to add to what I had said to him before. The very vigorous protest which had been delivered by the French Consul made it rather difficult to take any measures for satisfying the wishes of the French Government on the subject of Egyptian appointments; but I had pointed out to Sir Evelyn Baring that the distribution of official positions under the Egyptian Government, so far as they were confided to Europeans, ought to be conducted without any reference whatever to differences of nationality, and should be purely based upon the fitness of the persons who were selected. I added that I was convinced that there was no truth whatever in the idea which had been put forward that Sir Evelyn Baring, in the recommendations that he had made, was guided in the slightest degree by an inclination to be unfavourable to the claims of Frenchmen. He was well aware that it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government that all the just claims of France should receive ample and ungrudging recognition; and his own natural disposition would lead him to give effect to that view, even if he had not been instructed to do so.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 45*.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 3, 1891.

A QUESTION will be asked in the House of Commons to-morrow as to whether the military authorities at Suakin have issued any Proclamation indicating the intentions of the Egyptian Government in regard to the tribes; also whether any prisoners have been captured, and, if so, in what manner they have been dealt with, and whether any terms have been made with the tribes in the neighbourhood of Suakin and Tokar with the view of resisting any advance that may be made from the direction of Kassala.

No. 46.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, March 4, 1891.

NEITHER the Military authorities here nor myself have any definite information respecting the subjects of the questions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 16.

I have communicated with the Sirdar by telegraph, asking for information on each point in question.

No. 47.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 7, 9 P.M.)

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 7, 1891, 8.25 P.M.

YOUR No. 16.

Grenfell's Proclamation states Egyptian Government reassumed authority over Eastern Soudan, and calls on all tribes to expel Dervishes from their country. General amnesty granted except to notorious slave-dealers. Just government will be established. No intention of retiring from Tokar province. (Proclamation ends.)

Some tribes subsidized, but no definite arrangements for future will be made till after Grenfell has returned here. 231 prisoners released; 300 including families considered dangerous and detained for the present. Grenfell has visited Sinkat (and) found all quiet, and population rejoiced at re-establishment of Government, while country is now quite clear of Dervishes.

No. 48.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, March 7, 1891.

MY telegram to your Lordship No. 42 of yesterday's date.

A further advance of the Egyptian troops need not be the least apprehended.

No. 49.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 25, 1891.

YOUR Lordship may well imagine that as soon as I heard, as reported in my despatch to your Lordship No. 52 of the 12th instant, that M. de Nélidow had alluded at the Sublime Porte to Egypt, regarding which his Government might change its present attitude, I was desirous to ascertain the meaning and purpose of this, as I was greatly puzzled by this expression, and so were some of my colleagues.

Some days after that, my Russian colleague spoke to me of the position made as regards Egypt by the Sultan's Firman as to the Khedive's power to contract autonomous commercial arrangements with different Powers: he told me he had studied this question fully for his own Government, and showed himself thoroughly conversant with the views of Her Majesty's Government as conveyed to Mr. Portal (probably in your Lordship's despatch of the 29th July, 1890, No. 29, Commercial).

Upon this his Excellency observed, "The Governments which adopt this view (that of Her Majesty's Government on this point), that Egypt can refuse to their imports most-favoured-nation treatment, even though Turkey was bound by ancient Treaties prior to 1873, and not terminable, would find to their cost that they were weakening their own position in Turkey by this."

I subsequently heard that the Russian Ambassador had presented to the Sublime Porte a written Memorandum with reference to Egypt.

My impression from all this was, that the subject taken up by M. de Nélidow with regard to Russia's attitude towards Egypt arose from the Porte's anxiety that our views as regards Egyptian commercial autonomy should not prevail amongst European Powers.

Subsequently, I ascertained some confirmation of this: the Ambassador had spoken to Saïd Pasha, and, with a view to avoid being misunderstood, he sent his Excellency a written *pro-memoria*, or a written account of what he had said. In this his Excellency stated that a year ago he had been asked by the Sublime Porte to beg of his Government to refrain from entering on commercial arrangements with Egypt: he then went on to review the position of that vassal province, and concluded with a threat that, if the views of the Imperial Government were disregarded by the Porte in other quarters, Russia would adopt a different line of policy as regards Egypt.

No doubt his Excellency was actuated in this by the noise made lately in Paris in the press against us on the subject of Egypt, and by his constant and ever recurring wish to accuse the Grand Vizier at the Palace of pro-English sympathies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 50.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 26, 1891.

IN connection with the question of the wording of Article XXVI of the new projected Treaty with Turkey regulating its application to the vassal provinces of Egypt and Bulgaria, and more especially with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 13, Commercial, of the 30th January, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of paragraph F of the Protocol signed by the Italian and Turkish Delegates bearing on the point.

This has been furnished to Mr. Law confidentially by one of the Italian Delegates, but will no doubt interest your Lordship at this moment, when the commercial position of Egypt is becoming so important a question.

A copy sent to Sir E. Baring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Paragraph F of Protocol signed by Italian and Turkish Delegates

LE Traité signé à la date de ce jour, et les dépositions de ce Protocole, seront appliqués dans toutes les possessions de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan situées en Europe, en Asie, et en Afrique.

En ce qui concerne la Principauté vassale de Bulgarie et d'Égypte, toute différence qui, après accord établi dans les limites des Traités et des Firmans Impériaux entre les Agents du Gouvernement Italien et l'Administration Locale, résulterait pour le Tarif Général faisant partie du présent Traité, sera communiquée au Gouvernement Ottoman.

Il est bien entendu qu'à l'arrivée dans les autres parties de l'Empire de marchandises expédiées d'Égypte munies de Raftiehs conformément à l'Article IX, et dont les droits de douane seraient, par suite des modifications consenties, inférieurs à ceux portés sur le Tarif Général, la différence en plus sera acquittée à la Douane du lieu de destination.

(Signé) A. DI BESIO.
SILVIO CARCANO.
ARTIN DADIAN.
B. COUYOUMGIAN.

No. 51.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 28, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of telegrams which I have received from Sir F. Grenfell from Tokar to the Khedive and from Consul Barnham at Suakin, adding further information respecting the state of affairs in that district.

It is satisfactory to note that not only has the success of the Egyptian expedition been welcomed by the people, but that no local tribesmen have been found among those killed in Osman Digna's force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to His Highness the Khedive.

(Telegraphic.)

Tokar, February 25, 1891.

WOUNDED doing well; all troops in huts in Digna's camp, which covers 4 square miles. Seven guns, many rifles, large quantities of ammunition, lead, and powder taken.

There are many miles of cultivable ground round Tokar now partially cultivated with cotton and "dhurra" (Indian corn): this land now, with Government re-established, will be very valuable, without any extensive irrigation works.

Osman 100 miles on Kassala road with only a few Baggara, mostly wounded, coming in [*sic*].

General rejoicing at re-establishment of your Highness' Government.

Your Highness' gracious message communicated to troops. No sick in camp. Commence strong fort at once.

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

(Telegraphic.)

Suakin, February 27, 1891.

SIRDAR writes that no tribesmen of the Eastern Soudan were found among the dead.

The Friendlies with a small flying column are trying to capture Osman.

No. 52.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord.

Cairo, March 2, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith two despatches which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, giving an account of the recent operations in connection with the advance of the Egyptian troops to Tokar. At the same time, I inclose copy of a telegram from Sir F. Grenfell, giving explanations respecting the unexpected strength of the Dervish force which opposed the Egyptian advance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, February 19, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a record of the chief incidents which have occurred up to date in connection with the present advance to Tokar.

1. When, on the 8th instant, the authority for this movement was received from Cairo, preparations entailing little or no expense were already far advanced.

Occupation of Agig Saghair.

Among these, I may mention the occupation of the port of Agig Saghair by Othman Bey, Sheikh of the Artagas, an old servant of the Government. Agig Saghair is distant 28 miles from Tokar, and 18 miles from the island bearing the same name. It has wells, and is a favourite pasturage of the Arab shepherds.

It was intended by the Governor-General that, during the expedition, it should serve as a port of refuge for non-combatants.

Preparations for Expedition.

2. On the receipt of the authority for the advance to and occupation of Tokar camels were collected, and the services of the following vessels secured for transport:—

Transport.

- | | |
|--|--|
| (1.) Her Majesty's ship "Dolphin" | } by special authority from the Commander-in-chief at Malta. |
| (2.) Her Majesty's ship "Sandfly" | |
| (3.) Khedivial gun-boat "Mukhbar." | |
| (4.) Khedivial gun-boat "Adjemi." | |
| (5.) Steam-ship "Castledale," a discharged collier, specially chartered. | |

Detail of Expeditionary Force.

3. The expeditionary force, all arms included, numbered nearly 2,000 men, and consisted of the 4th Battalion (Egyptian), 11th and 12th Battalions (Soudanese), about 150 Egyptian cavalry, about thirty native cavalry, two large Krupp guns, and two mountain guns.

The force was commanded by Colonel Holled Smith (Governor-General, R.S.L.), with Lieutenant-Colonel Settle as Chief of the Staff. The entire force had been dispatched by midday, the 14th instant.

Trinkitat Port of Disembarkation.

4. Adopting the course pursued in all former campaigns, Trinkitat, 40 miles south of Suakin, was selected as the port of disembarkation and base of operations.

It had been in contemplation to effect a landing at a point behind Ras Makdeh, a little to the north of Trinkitat, and a special survey was made with that object under an Engineer officer. The idea was abandoned because, although there was firmer marching ground from the moment of landing at this point, steamers could not anchor sufficiently near to allow of disembarkation without great inconvenience. Trinkitat Harbour, on the other hand, affords excellent anchorage close into shore.

Garrison of Suakin during Expedition.

5. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Coles Bey, arrived on the 14th instant to garrison Suakin during the absence of the expeditionary force. The 13th Battalion, coming from Kenah, will embark at Kosseir on the 20th instant for Suakin.

The Friendlies.

6. Distinct from the force operating from Trinkitat, the Governor-General decided as in former campaigns to utilize the services of Friendly tribesmen, who, being placed under the orders of Mr. A. B. Wylde, were to proceed south via Khors Wintri, Ghob, and Sindarab to Tokar, with the object of cutting off the retreat of the Dervishes to the mountains.

These Friendly Arabs whom I saw assembled outside the Shaata Gate previous to departure were collected mainly from sub-tribes of the Hadendowa family, such as the Samarars, Hassanabs, Mahmondabs. They then numbered about 480, and were mostly men of splendid physique, and well armed with Remington rifles and spears. They were to have been reinforced by others, at various points along the line of march, the following of Sheikhs, who have sent in offers of service to the Governor-General since the occupation of Handoub. Among these may be mentioned the Willyliab Hadendowas from Sinkat, the Turgui and Meershabbs from Erkowit. It was hoped that a fairly large and useful auxiliary force would reach the Tokar district.

6. When, early on the morning of the 15th instant, the Friendlies were about to commence the march thus planned, news arrived that Osman Digna had quitted Tokar, and had been seen on the previous day at Terowi, 11 miles from Suakin, with a force which apparently amounted to 400 foot and less than 100 horse.

It was said that he intended to attack our newly acquired position at Handoub.

This information as to the presence of Osman Digna with the Dervish force was repeatedly confirmed during the next twenty-four hours by stragglers who professed to have seen him, but their statements as to the strength of his force were ludicrously at variance.

7. Uncertain as to this point, and perhaps influenced by the fact that part of his force of Friendlies had deserted, Mr. Wylde retired to Handoub, where he arrived on the forenoon of the 15th instant with only 330 followers. The position was strengthened in preparation for an attack, but none took place.

Osman Digna retired from Terowi to Tamai, 16 miles south of Suakin, and at midday on the 16th instant it was known here that he had quitted Tamai on his return to Tokar.

During his stay in Terowi, his Dervishes made a raid within the line of forts outside Suakin, killing three women, and wounding seven (men, women, and children).

I must close this despatch abruptly, as the mail is leaving.

As soon as official tidings arrive from Tokar I will communicate them to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, February 21, 1891.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Colonel Holled Smith occupied Tokar on the 19th instant after a severe engagement.

The Governor-General informs me that Osman Digna brought into action a force of 2,000 men, with 2,000 in reserve, and that after obstinate fighting the Dervish force was crushed, 700 Dervishes and all the principal Ameeris having been killed.

The casualties in the Egyptian army were:—

Killed, Captain Barrow (Brigade officer), four native officers, and twelve men.

Captain Beech (20th Hussars) was slightly wounded, and forty-two men.

Osman Digna with thirty horsemen fled in the direction of Temrin (not marked on Map), but it is hoped that with the assistance of the Friendly levies his capture will be effected.

At the close of the battle the Governor-General advanced to Afafite, the Dervish head-quarters, and occupied that place.

Although the Dervish force was far more numerous than we had supposed, I think it very probable that the reserve of 2,000 men, of which mention is made by the Governor-General, were men levied by compulsion and unreliable. But it is evident that the expeditionary force has performed a brilliant feat, which, followed up by permanent occupation of the district, will cause Osman Digna to despair of retaining any hold on the Eastern Soudan, and the Arabs to flock into Tokar freely, to place themselves under the protection of the Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

P.S.—Major-General Haig, R.E., who was present as a spectator at the battle of Tokar, gives me the following details:—

The battle took place within what is known as the Old Mamourieh, site of the old town of Tokar, commencing about 10 A.M. and lasting about one hour and a-half. Osman Digna was not actually present, but looking on at a distance. The troops, both Egyptian and Black, behaved with remarkable steadiness. The firing appears to have been terrible, it being calculated that about 60,000 cartridges were expended by the troops.

The Governor-General, leading his force, entered the Old Mamourieh without having seen a sign of the enemy, but no sooner were the troops drawn up than the Arabs charged from the thick bush in front, and were met by steady and destructive fire. When the enemy retired the troops halted for a short rest, then advanced to Afafite. This place, which is on rising ground, is covered by a line of huts about 2 miles long. The people submitted immediately, and the Governor-General established his head-quarters on the spot. A fort is being erected there.

H. D. B.

Inclosure 3 in No. 52.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to War Office, Cairo.

(Telegraphic.)

Suakin, March 1, 1891.

AFTER careful inquiry from prisoners and deserters, we have elicited following fact accounting for strength of Dervish attacking force on the 19th being so largely increased from previous estimates.

When Holled Smith proposed *coup de main* on Tokar, Osman Digna, with the majority of his force at Habab, hearing of the capture of Handoub and Tamai, left Afafite with his force intending to recapture Handoub. On the way he obtained considerable reinforcements, but before striking Handoub heard of force landing at Trinkitat. He thereupon returned, by forced marches, to Afafite, collecting all Dervish posts and Baggara, Jaalin, Denagla, and hill tribesmen.

On arrival at Afafite, Osman Digna used the strongest measures to force every one to join him, and executed some important Sheikhs who were suspected of being anxious to join Government. He thus added considerably to his force with willing and unwilling men. This accounts for force of 2,000 which was found at Tokar

The reserves were composed mainly of native Arabs and prisoners, who were mainly utilized to show on hills.

I consider nothing could be more satisfactory than this utter defeat of Osman Digna after he had made supreme effort to collect every available man.

The result is, that almost all his Baggaras and Jaalin have been killed, and only a few robbers remain, who are being hunted down by Friendlies.

No. 53.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 2, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which has been received at the Egyptian head-quarters from General Grenfell with regard to the Tokar expedition.

I venture to call your Lordship's attention to the concluding sentence of the telegram respecting the connection of the Italians with the Dervish leaders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to War Office, Cairo.

(Telegraphic.)

Tokar, February 28, 1891.

I VISITED Akik with cavalry yesterday, and found Dervish Treasury at Adobana had been taken by Adub Bey and the Arab police, according to orders from here.

Eleven merchants from Massowah with much contraband; also thirty-seven camels, which Osman Digna had sent for goods; also correspondence, showing connection of Italians with Dervish leaders found there.

No. 54.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 57. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 9, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Confidential Memorandum which I have received from General Sir Francis Grenfell, calling attention to indications obtained by him of encouragement given to the Dervishes and to the Slave Trade by Italian officers, and deprecating any acknowledgment of an Italian Protectorate over the Ras Kassar-Massowah "hinterland."

The information contained in this paper may, in my opinion, be usefully noted with a view to possible future discussions with the Italian Government, but under present circumstances, more especially as that Government now appears averse rather than otherwise to intervention in the affairs of the Eastern Soudan, there is, I think, nothing to be gained by taking any action upon it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to Sir E. Baring.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Afakit, March 3, 1891.

AS the Egyptian Government has resumed its rule over the Eastern Soudan, and as only an imaginary line drawn from Ras Kassar to the west divides it from territory which the Italians claim as their Protectorate, numerous local questions will arise

between the two Governments. I have therefore made inquiry here as to the attitude of the Italians towards the Dervishes.

There is no doubt that the Italian policy in the past has been to fraternize with Osman Digna and the Tokar Dervishes, with the view of securing the trade via Taklai. A letter from an Italian officer at Taklai was read publicly by Osman Digna at one of his meetings of Notables and merchants, offering to provide supplies to the Dervish force, and a large amount of grain subsequently arrived at Tokar from Massowah (see Inclosure 1).

On our taking the Dervish post at Adobana, we found about 200 packages with eleven Massowah merchants, and thirty-seven camels came in next morning with a Dervish guard. All these were seized as contraband, and I have used the dhurra as rations for this force.

As there may be protests from the Italian Government, I think it would be of advantage if the facts were made known at the Foreign Office.

The goods were actually under a Dervish guard and a Dervish escort accompanied the camels, the goods captured being fair spoil of war. The next day a noted slave-dealer and a number of slaves were captured on their way to Taklai, probably in exchange for the goods which had arrived from Tokar.

The whole of the correspondence found has not yet been translated, but on one of the Dervishes a letter was found written by the Emir Khalifa Mohammed from Tokar to Captain Buffone, the Italian officer in the Habab country, informing him of the flight of Osman Digna.

I have sent no proclamation to the Beni Amer tribe in order to avoid complications, but, as a Custom-house has now been established at Akik, I have written a letter to the northern Sheikhs to say that the Egyptian Government has reoccupied Tokar, and that the post of Akik is opened for trade; but, at the same time, it would be most dangerous to acknowledge the Italian Protectorate over the Beni Amer tribe, as the port of Akik, which will now be a most valuable one to the Egyptian Government is in the Beni Amer territory.

It is a much better post than Taklai, and will be the direct trade route to Jeddah and Egypt.

I think that, for the present, the most politic course to pursue will be, to avoid if possible local disputes with the Italians, and not to make any attempt to detach the Beni Amer tribe. At the same time, if the northern Sheikhs of the tribe come in and desire recognition, some small subsidy might be granted, as the country of this tribe runs up to the Khor Baraka, on the right flank of any Dervish advance from Kassala. It is thus of the utmost importance that the Egyptian Government should be on good terms with it.

I trust, therefore, that no acknowledgment of the Italian Protectorate over the Ras Kassar-Massowah "hinterland," be made, and that affairs be left in their present undefined state.

I inclose Report, drawn up by my Intelligence Officer here, for your information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. GRENFELL, *Sirdar*.

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

Circumstances connected with the taking of the Dervish Post of Adobana, near Akik.

AMONGST the letters found at Adobana, after the flight of the Dervishes, was one from Khalifa Mahommed Hamid to a certain Captain Buffone, and to be handed to him in Habab:—

"I beg to inform you that the Government troops left Suakin on Thursday, 10th, and have taken away the government from Osman Digma (*i.e.*, Osman is no longer Governor). Osman Digma and some of his people have fled from Tokar and have gone to Kassala; also those who were with me fled away during the night, and Adobana is now in the hands of the Government."

The second letter is from the same to Meki Hadad Hassan, at Habab, saying Tokar has been taken, and giving some names of the killed and wounded, who were the writer's friends.

Two of the principal merchants at Tokar, viz., Ali Shawish and Omar Towakili (a Syrian), state that some two months ago an Italian was sent by the Italian authorities at Massowah to Mersa Taklai. On the arrival of the Italian at Taklai he

wrote to Osman Digna, at Tokar, to the effect that Italy had opened Taklai to Osman and his people, and that everything should be provided by Italy through Taklai, provided that Osman would get nothing through Suakin.

Osman discussed the matter with his Emirs, who urged that this was only the Italian plan of taking Tokar. Osman, however, replied that, as the Italians had submitted to his orders and communicated with him on free trade, he would not prevent it now. In consequence, Italian merchants brought 2,500 bags of grain to Taklai, of which 800 were brought to Tokar, some remaining at Taklai and Adobana. Cotton stuffs also came by the same merchants. The reopening of Akik put a stop to the Taklai trade.

The official letters which passed between Osman and the Italians were in Arabic.

I also beg to report that the Mamoor of Akik, Abub Bey, has succeeded in capturing a celebrated slave-dealer named Ibrahim Sadalla, with thirty-two slaves, whom he intended to send to Jeddah, by Taklai.

I beg to submit the above facts as distinct evidence of the existence of relations between the Italians and Dervishes, so often reported by me in previous letters.

(Signed) **HOLLED SMITH, Colonel.**

No. 55.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)

Sir,

War Office, March 18, 1891.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to forward, for the perusal of the Marquis of Salisbury, a copy of a despatch that has been received from the General Officer commanding in Egypt, with reference to recent events in the Soudan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **RALPH THOMPSON.**

Inclosure in No. 55.

Major-General Walker to Mr. Stanhope.

Sir,

Cairo, February 24, 1891.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 4th instant, and your answer thereto of the 7th instant, I have the honour to forward the following brief summary of recent events in the Eastern Soudan, for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

1. The necessity of occupying a more advanced position than the outlying forts of Suakin has been long advocated by my predecessor, Sir James Donner, on both military and commercial grounds. The closing of the gates of Suakin, and the consequent stopping of trade, was a measure which doubtless paralyzed, to a certain extent, the activity of the Dervishes, but also pressed equally hard on the well-affected tribes in the neighbourhood.

2. On the 26th January, 1891, the Governor-General of the Red Sea littoral reported that a Dervish raiding party had been repulsed by the cavalry, and pursued with considerable loss as far as Handoub. Colonel Holled Smith further adds that Handoub is unbearable, and a nest of slave-traders and robbers.

On the 27th January the Dervishes assumed a defiant attitude; and, fearing loss of prestige, Colonel Holled Smith attacked and dispersed them with the cavalry and 11th (Soudanese) battalion, the latter bivouacking at Handoub. On the 29th and 30th January, Colonel Holled Smith proposed to advance against the Dervish force from Akik Sogheir with the infantry, re-embarking, and meeting the cavalry and transport) which would proceed thither by land) at Trinkitat, for a subsequent advance on Tokar.

Having in view the nature of the country, and the character of the enemy, I expressed myself as strongly against any division of the small force at Colonel Holled Smith's disposal, and he was directed to make no further advance without orders, and to report the best arrangements for the occupation of Handoub, which latter was affected by the conversion of the existing Beit-el-Mal (or Treasury) into an impregnable stone block-house, capable of accommodating fifty men. It was further reported that Tokar was very weakly held, and that between Tokar and Tamai there was only

one small post (subsequently captured on the 2nd February). It was stated that Osman Digna, with a force of some 300 men, was in the Adobuna country collecting taxes.

3. After consultation with Sir Evelyn Baring and Sir F. Grenfell, I considered myself justified in recommending the occupation of Tokar, as tending not only to free Suakin from the constant annoyances to which that town is subjected by the presence of the Dervishes in the neighbourhood, but also to materially assist in the subsequent pacification of that part of the Soudan.

4. On receipt of telegraphic sanction from you, Colonel Holled Smith was given permission to occupy Tokar, proceeding by sea via Trinkitat. He was instructed to take with him not less than 100 cavalry and 1,500 infantry, with two field and two mountain guns; to leave at least half battalion at El Teb and on no account to advance beyond Tokar.

On the 9th February Colonel Holled Smith wired that he expected to be concentrated at Trinkitat on the 13th, and on the 15th that place was occupied without opposition, and the disembarkation of stores completed. Osman Digna, on the 15th, was stated to be at Tamai with some 500 men.

5. On the 16th Colonel Holled Smith advanced from Trinkitat with the 4th, 11th, and 12th battalions and one squadron of cavalry, and turning the southern extremity of the morass by a long and arduous march, occupied El Teb, where he formed a zereba and a depôt of provisions. On the 18th his advance was retarded by a severe sand storm, but on the 19th he marched from El Teb, and after one hour and-a-quarter's severe fighting, occupied Tokar. His losses were: killed, Captain H. L. Barrow, South Lancashire Regiment; and twelve privates. Wounded: Captain J. R. Beech, C.M.G., 20th Hussars (slightly, and since returned to duty); and four native officers and forty-two privates. The enemy's forces were estimated at 4,000, of whom 2,000, led by Osman Naib, were in the attacking line; the remainder were in second line. His losses are stated to be: Osman Naib and 700 men killed, together with many of the principal Emirs. Osman Digna fled in the direction of Tanerin. The Egyptian troops then proceeded to occupy the village and wells of Afafit, 4 miles beyond Tokar. I much regret the death of Captain Barrow, who was shot dead while gallantly performing his duties as staff officer to the officer commanding the expedition.

7. To summarize: The large numbers collected by Osman Digna for this action are curiously at variance with the reports previously received by me, and may be perhaps accounted for by (1) the great difficulty of obtaining really accurate information in the present unsettled state of the Eastern Soudan; (2) the delays necessarily imposed upon Colonel Holled Smith by the passage of the morass near Trinkitat and the sand storm of the 18th, which enabled Osman Digna to collect far larger forces than he would have, had the advance been quicker, been able to do.

8. I am of opinion that the Dervish fighting force in the Eastern Soudan may be considered to be entirely broken up and dispersed, and that the occupation of Tokar and Handoub will completely change the state of affairs previously existing in the vicinity of Suakin.

9. It would appear that the activity of Osman Digna is still undiminished, and that the Dervish power of rapid concentration and movement has proved to be no less than it was in 1884-85.

I append a rough sketch of the country in the neighbourhood of Tokar, and a statement showing the present distribution of troops in the Eastern Soudan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. WALKER, Major-General,
Commanding in Egypt.

No. 56.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, March 19, 1891.

THE Egyptian War Office has received the following telegram from the Governor of Suakin:—

“On account of the hostility of the tribes on the route, Osman Digna's followers

refuse to go to Berber. It is reported that Osman Digna is therefore moving slowly in the direction of Kassala."

I venture to suggest that this news might be communicated to Rome.

No. 57.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 23. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, March 20, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report, in connection with the question of the commercial autonomy of Egypt, that great pressure is being brought by the Russian and French Embassies to induce the Ottoman Government to communicate by telegraph with that of the Khedive in support of the view of their Governments that their old Treaties with Turkey are still binding on Egypt.

The Russian Ambassador refuses to admit the right claimed by Egypt to regulate unilaterally the importation into Egypt of foreign goods from a country between whose Government and that of Egypt no special Commercial Convention under the Firmans has been concluded.

Disregard of these remonstrances, says his Excellency, will entail serious consequences upon Turkey.

I have communicated the sense of this telegram to Sir E. Baring.

No. 58.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 58.)
My Lord,

Cairo, March 10, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Barnham at Suakin, dated the 5th March, 1891, giving further information as to the position of the Government as regards the natives around Tokar, and of the escape of Osman Digna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, March 5, 1891.

ACCORDING to the most recent information received by me from Tokar, there appears to be no hope of effecting the capture of Osman Digna. He was last heard of on the 24th ultimo, travelling up the Wadi Langheb with a few followers.

The Tokar people are returning to their cultivation, and as soon as the construction of the forts is commenced, the Arabs will have their minds at rest, and know that the occupation is intended to be permanent.

Sheikhs from the neighbourhood have submitted in large numbers who, I conclude, took no part in the battle, for I am informed that no tribesmen were found among the dead. Osman Digna's following was confined to Baggaras and Jaalins, and probably was really not so numerous as was stated immediately after the event. His prestige is gone, and the Arabs, who will only go where self-interest leads, will rally to the Government.

The Sirdar, with Colonel Holled Smith and staff, have left Tokar on their return to Suakin.

The 4th, 11th, and 12th Battalions, with some cavalry, remain for the present at Tokar.

The Soudan Trading Company is making arrangements to cultivate cotton at Tokar during the coming season.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. BARNHAM.

No. 59.

Major-General Walker to Mr. Stanhope.—(Received at the Foreign Office, March 26.)

Sir,

Cairo, March 5, 1891.

IN continuation of my letter No. 522 of the 24th February, 1891, I have the honour to state, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that Sir Francis Grenfell reports, in a telegram of the 25th February, that his troops are huddled in Osman Digna's camp, that their general health is good, and that the wounded are doing well. Seven guns and a large number of rifles with ammunition were found in the camp.

2. There is a large tract of land in the neighbourhood of Tokar, which at present bears a certain amount of cotton, and which might, without any considerable expenditure on irrigation works, be most valuable. A strong defensive work has been commenced. The local Sheiks are stated to be tendering their allegiance, and general satisfaction is expressed at the prospect of the Egyptian Government being once more established in the Eastern Soudan.

3. The discrepancy between the intelligence received and the numbers actually collected by Osman Digna is accounted for by the Sirdar as follows: At the time of the proposed *coup de main* on Tokar, Osman Digna was at Habab; hearing, on his return, of the capture of Handoub, he left for that place with all the available forces, receiving considerable reinforcements *en route*. Being informed of the landing of Egyptian troops at Trinkitat, he at once returned to Afaft by forced marches, collecting every available man *en route*. He apparently displayed the greatest energy in assembling his forces. Sheikhs suspected of sympathizing with Government were executed, while, by continuously beating the "noggara," he brought many of the half-hearted or unwilling to his standard. His reserves consisted of local Arabs, while prisoners were used to line the hills, and thus produce an impression of strength. The fighting portion of Osman Digna's force, viz., the Jaalin and Baggara contingent, would now appear to be entirely dispersed.

4. On the 26th February the Sirdar reports that he had visited Akik, and found that the Arab police had occupied the Beit-el-Mal at Adobana. Eleven merchants from Massowah, with a considerable amount of contraband and thirty-seven camels, which Osman Digna had sent to fetch the goods, were found in Akik, as also some correspondence relative to communications between the Dervish leaders and the Italians.

On the 28th February Sir F. Grenfell visited Temerin with the cavalry, and bivouacked in the neighbourhood. He proposes to build a small fort here, to be held by irregular troops.

As cultivation ceases about 5 miles from this place, and does not reappear till in the immediate vicinity of Kassala, it is obvious that Temerin is a place of very considerable strategical importance. A deserter states that Osman Digna, with few people and little food, has gone into the Shebodanab country with the probable intention of proceeding to Berber. Many of his Emirs have already deserted him and gone to Kassala.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. WALKER.

No. 60.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 99. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 22, 1891.

IN my despatch No. 67 of the 25th ultimo, I repeated to your Lordship that the Russian Ambassador had made a communication to the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to the views of his Government as to the position of Egypt in the matter of making autonomous commercial arrangements.

I have now the honour to inclose a copy of a Memorandum giving the substance of the verbal reply given by the Sublime Porte to his Excellency, which shows how disinclined the Sublime Porte is to interfere in the quarrel got up by Russia and France against the Khedivial Government, and how determined it is not to interfere with the existing Firmans.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 60.

Memorandum.

LE Gouvernement Khédivial ne saurait agir contrairement aux prescriptions des Firmans Impériaux.

Celles des dispositions des Traités de Commerce conclus entre le Gouvernement Impérial et les Puissances que l'Égypte doit observer, y sont toujours en vigueur.

S'il surgissait à l'avenir quelque divergence à cet égard, il est évident que la Sublime Porte s'appliquerait à la résoudre.

No. 61.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 17, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a Memorandum sent by the Intelligence Department, Egyptian army, with regard to recent information received from Suakin and Wady Halfa.

The reported explosion in the arsenal at Omdurman will probably tend still further to delay any intended advance of the Dervishes on the Egyptian frontiers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Memorandum.

THE following telegrams have been received from the Governor-General at Suakin:—

"Mohamed Karrai and Gwelaïor, the only rebels left in the neighbourhood of Suakin, have now come in and tendered their submission to the Government at Suakin. Osman is reported beyond Odeb, nine days' from Tokar, possibly moving slowly. Friendly Arabs promise to follow and attack. Country perfectly quiet; all Sheikhs assisting Government."

Another telegram has also been received from Wodehouse Pasha, to the effect that information has reached Halfa that an explosion occurred upwards of a month ago in the arsenal at Omdurman, which resulted in the loss of 100 lives and large quantities of ammunition.

(Signed)

F. R. WINGATE,
A.A.G., Intelligence.

March 16, 1891.

No. 62.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

Sir,

Admiralty, March 31, 1891.

I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the perusal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extract of a letter from Captain Custance, of Her Majesty's ship "Phaeton," to the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, respecting the battle of Tokar.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. D. AWDRY.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Captain Custance to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Hoskins.

(Extract.)

"Phaeton," February 27, 1891.

HAVING previously embarked his Excellency Sir Francis Grenfell, Colonel R. B. Lane, Major Maxwell, Captain Palmer, and three servants, I put to sea in the "Phaeton," with the "Sandfly" in company, at 6 A.M. on the 22nd instant, arrived at Trinkitat at 11 A.M. on the same day, and found there the "Dolphin."

On the following day I disembarked, with Sir Francis Grenfell and his staff, and proceeded to the front, where I rode over the field of battle of the 19th instant, and afterwards proceeded to Affait, a very large village, with a population numbering several thousands, which had been the head-quarters of Osman Digna in these parts.

I was astonished at the large amount of cultivation in the surrounding country, which makes it a place of very great importance, and is entirely due to the plentiful supply of water.

This oasis in the desert has served as a base of operations against Suakin, and its capture will prevent any further attacks, except by parties in comparatively small numbers, as any enemy advancing from either Kassala or Berber will now have to carry all his supplies with him.

On the 24th instant I was present at a review of the expeditionary force by his Excellency, and was much impressed with the martial bearing of the men and their workmanlike appearance.

It is quite evident that these Egyptian troops have been formed into excellent soldiers, and that they have acquired such confidence in themselves that they are masters of the situation. It is a very remarkable transformation. I venture to doubt if English troops could have done what these men have achieved. It is certain that they would never have done it so cheaply.

At the conclusion of the inspection the troops were formed up into square and were addressed by the Sirdar, after which his Excellency turned round to me, as the Senior Naval Officer, and, in the most handsome manner, publicly, and in the presence of the army, thanked the officers and men of the navy for their assistance, and desired me to convey his acknowledgments to you.

No. 63.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 28, 1891.

IN obedience to your Lordship's telegraphic instructions dated the 21st instant, on the subject of warning the Porte as to the risk it would incur by listening to the dangerous suggestions of Russia and France, and by attempting to go back on the Firmans, and restrict Egyptian commercial autonomy, I have thought it most conducive towards producing the desired effect, if I did not speak in that sense to the Grand Vizier myself, but get some of my colleagues to warn his Highness, and this has been done, and I trust effectually, at any rate more so than it could have been done on so delicate a subject as Egypt by myself personally.

As a direct appeal to Kiamil Pasha from myself it might have been misconstrued by the Sultan when reported to him by his Grand Vizier, and have produced a different effect from the one which was intended.

The enmity of the Russian and French Embassies against his Highness is again hard at work at the Palace.

From my despatch No. 99 of the 22nd instant, your Lordship will have seen the reply on this subject given by the Porte to M. Nelidoff, which, by its vagueness, is all that we can expect at this moment, and takes its *locus standi* on the Firmans.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 7.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 29, 1891.

WITH reference to my Financial Report of this day's date, I take this opportunity of submitting to your Lordship some further remarks of a more general character on the present situation of affairs in Egypt. It would appear, in fact, desirable to take stock of what has been done since the British occupation in 1882, and also of what remains to be done, before it can be said that the foundations for future good government in Egypt are laid.

Machinery of Government in Egypt.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the general confusion which existed in Egypt at the time of the British occupation in 1882. The Arabi rebellion had not only for the time being destroyed all legally constituted authority; it had also widened the breach which had for a long time past existed between the population and the dominant race, and had awakened antipathies which, even after a lapse of nine years, are still alive, however much they may appear to the casual observer to slumber. The country was burthened with an enormous debt. The limit of taxation had been reached. The reforms, begun with a very fair prospect of success at the time of the Anglo-French Control, had in great part been swept away. The work had to be recommenced. The most arbitrary and oppressive features of the old régime had reappeared. The country was governed by the *courbash*. No system of justice worthy of the name existed. Corruption was universal. Glaring defects existed in every branch of the administrative system. Trade was depressed. There was no army. Whilst, on the one hand, there was an almost complete want of capable native administrators, on the other hand the Egyptian governing class and the people of Egypt generally had not as yet learnt the benefits which might accrue to them from well-directed European endeavours to improve the condition of the country.

The attempts made during the reign of Ismail Pasha to introduce European civilization at an all too rapid rate into Egypt had resulted in this: that the condition of the people was certainly no better, and in many respects was probably worse, than when Mehemet Ali, calling to his aid a few talented Europeans—principally Frenchmen—made some tentative moves in the direction of reform.

On the other hand, a number of exotic institutions and foreign administrative formulæ had been introduced, many of which were in advance of the conditions and requirements of the country. In many cases all the outward and visible paraphernalia of a highly civilized form of government existed, whilst the administration was in practice conducted on principles wholly at variance with those which it was presumed to follow.

"Egypt," Mr. Cave wrote very truly in 1876, "may be said to be in a transition state, and she suffers from the defects of the system out of which she is passing, as well as from those of the system into which she is attempting to enter. She suffers from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance of the East, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilization of the West." ("Egypt No. 7, 1876.")

In addition to these difficulties, which were inherent in the situation, others of a temporary and accidental character were not wanting. Of these, the principal were that the country suffered in 1882 from a severe epidemic of cholera, and that the mutinous army of Arabi had burnt down a portion of the principal commercial city of Egypt, and thus left heavy claims for indemnities to be added to the debt which already existed.

Considerable as the difficulties were, the obstacles which lay in the path of the Egyptian reformer in 1882—provided always that his aspirations were moderate and were limited to the introduction of the most commonplace requirements of civilization—were far from being insurmountable. The country enjoys great natural advantages. The revenue is not wanting in elasticity. The essential administrative requirements of the people are few and simple. The real difficulty of the situation consisted, not in indicating the nature of the reforms required, or the methods by which effect could be

given to them, but in the peculiar conditions under which the reforms had to be carried out.

So far as I know, no parallel can be found to the form of government which existed in 1882, and which still exists in Egypt. It was nominally, and in some respects really, a despotism. The abuse of personal power had, in fact, brought the country to the verge of ruin. But when once the work of reform was begun, it was discovered that a number of ingenious and, in some cases, necessary checks, which had been originally devised with a view to preventing a bad Government from moving in a vicious direction, served merely to hamper the movements of an improved Government in the direction of reform. A perfect network of cords, some of which were none the less efficacious because they were almost invisible save to the eye of the trained diplomatist, had been bound round the nominally despotic Ruler of Egypt, and although experience had shown that these cords were powerless to prevent much of the harm which may result from a bad despotic rule, they were extremely powerful to prevent whatever good is to be obtained from the exercise of a wiser and more benign despotism. Power, whether legislative or executive, was disseminated and dispersed to an extent unknown, I believe, in any other country in the world.

In the first place, the sovereign rights of the Sultan had, of course, to be scrupulously respected. In the second place, no important law could be made binding on all residents in Egypt without the consent of all the Powers of Europe. Hence arose the necessity for frequent recourse to a form of legislation of the most cumbersome description, that is to say, legislation by diplomacy.

The financial engagements taken by the Egyptian Government brought most of the reforms which were proposed in the fiscal system more or less within the domain of international negotiation.

The Commissioners of the Debt, the Railway Board, the Administrations of the *Daira* and of the Domains, and the Quarantine Board were all international bodies possessing well-defined and considerable powers.

In respect to the administration of the law, no less than four separate jurisdictions existed. These were:—

1. The Mixed Courts, whose jurisdiction extended over all civil cases in which Europeans were concerned, and whose judgments carried all the weight belonging to an institution sanctioned by the united Powers of Europe.
2. The various Consular Courts, which administered justice in criminal cases whenever a European was the accused party.
3. The Native Courts, which decided cases, whether civil or criminal, between native and native.
4. The *Mehkemeh*, which decided all questions connected with the personal status of natives according to the *Sheriât*, or religious law of Islam.

It was one of the primary conditions of Egyptian reform that the whole of the complicated and cumbersome machinery which I have very briefly described above should remain intact. Whatever partial success has been attained in the way of reforming the Egyptian administration has been achieved, not in virtue of the system, but in spite of it. It should, however, be added that, in spite of the clash of political interests, which are presumed, often on very insufficient grounds, to be antagonistic to each other, the grave theoretical defects of the system have not unfrequently been in practice mitigated by the moderation and good sense of the individuals charged with the direction of the various institutions which collectively make up that singularly anomalous and confused body termed the Government of Egypt.

With two exceptions the machinery for governing Egypt remains the same now as it was previous to the British occupation of the country.

The first of these exceptions is that, on the 1st May, 1883, a Legislative Council was instituted, whose functions were strictly limited to the discussion of such matters as lay outside the domain of international arrangements. It may well be that the elected members of this Council are, in reality, more or less the nominees of the Government of the day. It is also certain that it would be extremely unadvisable for the Government always to follow the advice of the Council. The facts brought to your Lordship's notice in my despatch of the 19th June, 1890 ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 144), are a sufficient proof of the accuracy of this statement. The rights of the Council have, however, been most carefully respected by the Khedive, and the advice, on any proposed measure, which that body has from time to time tendered to the Egyptian Government has often been followed with advantage to the country.

As education advances, and independence of character is developed, the influence of the Council may not improbably increase.

The other exception to which I have alluded above is that, on the 31st January, 1889, a Decree was issued, with the assent of the Powers, conferring on the Egyptian Government the right to make bye-laws on a variety of subjects applicable to all residents in Egypt, irrespective of their nationality. Before these bye-laws come into force they must be submitted to the General Assembly of the Mixed Courts, whose function it is to certify, *inter alia*, that the new enactments contain nothing "contraire au texte des Traités et Conventions."

The rights conferred by the Capitulations on foreigners resident in the East are jealously guarded by the Powers. Apart, however, from the strictly European point of view of this subject, it would not, I venture to think, be advisable in Egyptian interests that any great or sudden relaxation of those rights should take place, even supposing such a course to be possible. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that a tendency is sometimes shown to push too far the legitimate rights conferred by the Capitulations, and also that an extreme stringency in the interpretation of the Capitulations is calculated to hamper the Egyptian Government in the honest endeavours made of late years to reform the administration. The latitude given by the Decree to which I have alluded above has already enabled the Egyptian Government to legislate usefully on certain minor matters, which are, nevertheless, of some importance, inasmuch as they concern the everyday life of the population. It will be time for the Egyptian Government to consider whether they can usefully apply to the Powers for any further latitude in the direction of legislation when experience has shown that the rights already conferred have been judiciously employed to the benefit of all classes of the population.

Having now described the machinery of the Government, I propose to give a summary both of what has been done, and of what remains to be done, in Egypt.

The three most crying abuses in Egypt at the time of the British occupation were the employment of the *corvée*, the use of the *courbash*, and administrative corruption.

The Corvée.

"Previous to 1883," Sir Colin Moncrieff writes to me, "the whole of the earth-work in the clearance and repairs of canals and embankments was effected by the forced, unpaid, unfed labour of the peasantry. In 1884 this labour amounted to 85,000 men working for sixty days.

"In 1890, for the first time perhaps in all history, there was no *corvée* in Egypt."

On no subject has the cordial co-operation of the Egyptian Government, whether under the Ministry of Nubar Pasha or of Riaz Pasha, and the English officials in the service of the Khedive, been more marked than in connection with this beneficent reform, which may now, after encountering many obstacles, be considered as an accomplished fact.

The Courbash.

On the 16th January, 1883, a Circular was addressed to the various local authorities in Egypt "à l'effet d'interdire l'usage de la bastonnade." Vigorous measures were at the same time taken to enforce obedience to the Circular.

There were not wanting persons, at the time this Circular was issued and for some while afterwards, who, looking to the fact that Egypt had been heretofore almost exclusively governed by the use of the *courbash*, considered its total and immediate abolition somewhat rash. Others, again, who could certainly not be accused of any sympathy for oppressive forms of government, thought that, for certain offences, corporal punishment, under proper legal and medical supervision, might advantageously be substituted for imprisonment. There was, without doubt, some force in these arguments.

A very restricted and legal use of the *courbash* would, in my own opinion, have been unobjectionable had it not been for the risk which would have been run that a permission of this sort would, under the circumstances which at the time existed in Egypt, have perpetuated its unrestricted and illegal employment. That risk was so great that I doubt whether anything short of the bold measure of reform adopted under Lord Dufferin's auspices would have produced the desired effect.

Torture, and notably the use of the *courbash*, was, until a few years ago, more especially employed in Egypt in the collection of taxes, and with a view to extorting evidence from reluctant witnesses or accused persons. I think I may say with

confidence that it has entirely ceased in so far as the collection of taxes is concerned. On the second point I can speak with a less degree of confidence. Only two years ago a number of facts were brought to my notice which left no doubt on my mind that torture, sometimes of the most cruel description, was still being occasionally used to extort evidence, notably before the Special Commissions which had been instituted to suppress brigandage. The suppression of the Special Commissions of Brigandage—whose proceedings were in many cases contrary to the most elementary principles, not only of law, but of natural justice—produced the result of checking these abuses. Latterly I have not heard of any cases of torture. I am not, however, prepared to state confidently that the use of the *courbash* and other forms of torture have altogether disappeared. I may, however, say that cases of torture are now of very rare occurrence, and that, if practised at all, it is done secretly and with every precaution against discovery. A well-informed European wrote to me but a short time ago, "I now never hear of the *courbash*."

Of the many abuses, now partially abolished, which would tend to reappear should the influence at present exercised by the British Government in Egypt be diminished, I know of none whose reappearance may be predicted with a greater degree of probability than that now under discussion.

Corruption.

When I first came to Egypt fourteen years ago administrative corruption was almost universal. It could be no matter for surprise, and scarcely, indeed, a matter for just blame, that a large number of Egyptian officials were corrupt. The treatment which they received at the hands of the Government was, in fact, almost prohibitive of integrity in the performance of official duties. The scale of salaries, more especially in the subordinate Departments, was very low, and, moreover, it often occurred that for many months at a time no salaries were paid at all. Tenure of office was also very precarious, with the result that Egyptian officials were under a strong temptation to make as much money as possible out of their office whilst it lasted.

One of the first results of the Commission of Inquiry which sat in 1878 was to insure the regular payment of salaries; but I doubt whether, even now, some of the subordinate officials are sufficiently well paid to afford adequate protection against temptation to increase their incomes by illicit means.

It is, of course, very difficult to speak with confidence on a matter of this sort, in respect to which it is not possible to obtain any precise or conclusive evidence. It is, I conceive, certain that administrative corruption has not altogether disappeared, but I have no doubt whatever that it has been greatly diminished. A trustworthy informant, who has exceptionally good opportunities for forming an opinion on this subject, writes to me: "I think corruption is not one-fourth so great or extensive as formerly." It can scarcely be expected to disappear altogether until, by the growth of education and by a gradual elevation of the standard of public morality in Egypt, bribery is no longer considered a venial offence. I fear that this is the light in which it is still regarded by some sections of Egyptian society.

A great many circumstances have contributed to diminish corrupt practices. The more orderly and lawful form of government which has been gradually introduced into the country has greatly lessened both the occasion and the facility for bribery. The system now universally adopted of inviting tenders for supplies required by the Government and for public works which have to be executed has also acted in the same direction. The facts reported to your Lordship in Mr. Clarke's despatch of the 4th July, 1889 ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 47), and others of a similar nature, show that the Egyptian Government has not hesitated to bring delinquents, however highly placed, to justice when the occasion for doing so arose. The fact that a number of high-minded and vigilant Europeans of various nationalities now occupy posts of importance in the Egyptian service has also materially lessened the opportunities for bribery, and increased the chances of discovery.

My belief is that the natives themselves are inclined to exaggerate the extent to which bribery still exists. It may be confidently stated that a very general suspicion of bribery will for a considerable time survive its complete disappearance. The practice of bribery was but recently so universal that the people are naturally slow to realize the fact that a change is gradually taking place. I have no doubt that a large number of persons whose petitions are rejected by the Government, and of suitors who lose their causes in the Law Courts, attribute their want of success, not

to the weakness of their cause, but to some illicit action which has been exerted to their detriment. I have also little doubt that their suspicions in a great many cases are unfounded.

Finance.

The summary which I have already given of the accounts of the past and the estimates of the current year are sufficient to show that the general financial situation is satisfactory. Egyptian stocks have now taken rank as first class securities in the markets of Europe.

The accounts of the Egyptian Treasury, which were formerly in a state of the utmost confusion, are now in perfect order. This important reform, the accomplishment of which was an absolutely essential preliminary before further improvements in the fiscal system could be undertaken, was mainly due to the steady industry and perseverance of Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, now Accountant-General at the Admiralty.

Sir Edgar Vincent, amongst other important services which he rendered to Egypt, placed the currency, which was formerly in a chaotic condition, on a sound footing.

In 1884 the Powers assented in principle to the application of the house tax, the licence tax, and the stamp duty to Europeans resident in Egypt. After negotiations which lasted many years the house tax and the professional tax are now applicable to Europeans and natives alike. A distinction which was certainly unjust to the latter has, therefore, at last disappeared. The stamp duty, however, is still only paid by natives.

Many other useful financial reforms, besides those which I have indicated above, have been carried into execution. But the main question remains to be answered, whether the population generally has obtained any considerable relief from fiscal burdens during the last few years.

During the last two years taxation to the extent of about 650,000*l.* a-year has been remitted. The abolition of the *corvée* cost 400,000*l.* The balance of 250,000*l.* is accounted for by the abolition of the weighing dues, the tax on sheep and goats, the partial abolition of the professional tax, and some other minor measures.

This constitutes a very sensible relief to the population. On the other hand, it has to be borne in mind that some additional taxation has been imposed.

The tobacco duty, the incidence of which was until recently very much lower than in other countries, has been raised. Leaving out of account the year 1890, which, for the reasons I have already stated, was an exceptional year, I find that the revenue from tobacco amounted to £ E. 441,000 in 1889 as compared to £ E. 115,000 in 1881, an increase of £ E. 326,000. A portion of this increase is, I do not doubt, due to improved administration, notably the suppression of smuggling, but the greater portion of it must be due to an increase in the duty. Since 1889 the duty has been still further raised from P. T. 14 to P. T. 20 per kilog. The retail price of tobacco has not risen in anything like the same proportion as the increase of the duty. I conceive, however, that the profits of the traders in tobacco must have diminished.

It is, for many reasons, difficult to make an accurate calculation of the real extent to which taxation has been diminished. In the first place, it is impossible to state the amount which used to be illegally exacted from the people; it is certain that this amount must have been very considerable. In the second place, although the abolition of the *corvée* only cost the Government 400,000*l.* a-year, that figure certainly fails to represent the full measure of relief afforded to the population by the substitution of free for forced labour. Looking, however, to the whole of the facts, it may be said (1) that a considerable relief of taxation in the aggregate has been already effected; (2) that a readjustment of taxation, which has been very beneficial to the country, has been carried out on a large scale; (3) that there is now every prospect that further measures of fiscal relief will become practicable before long. Indeed, while this despatch was in course of preparation, I learnt that the Egyptian Government contemplates an immediate reduction of the land tax in Upper Egypt amounting to about £ E. 120,000 a-year.

Lastly—and this is, perhaps, the most important consideration of all—it cannot be doubted that the improvements in the system of irrigation have placed the people of Egypt in a far better position than heretofore to support the fiscal burthens imposed on them. The average yield of cotton during the five years subsequent to 1884 has been 15,000 tons a-year larger than that of the previous five years. This represents a value to the country of about 835,000*l.* a-year, exclusive of the value of cotton-seeds.

A great deal, however, still remains to be done in the way of fiscal reform.

Notably, reform in the assessment of the land revenue is greatly required. The present land registers are based, in regard to the quantity of land, upon the general survey of Egypt carried out by Mehemet Ali in 1813, and, in regard to the rate of taxation, upon the classification of lands carried out by Ismail Pasha in 1867. At the time when the settlement was made the land tax was assessed in an arbitrary and very unequal manner, and since that date the relative values of different districts have changed very considerably, partly owing to the extensive irrigation works which have recently been constructed, and partly owing to variations in the cultures practised in the country. The result is that the present assessment is very far from being proportionate to the value of the produce of the soil.

Apart from the general question of the inequality of the present assessment, there exist many cases of glaring injustice which call for immediate remedy. Until recently taxes were being demanded from lands which had, for one reason or another, become quite unfit for cultivation, and also for lands which had long since passed out of the possession of the original owners, having been, in some cases, taken, without compensation, for public works, and in other cases having simply disappeared either on account of the original measurement having been defective, or on account of the neighbouring proprietors having unjustly appropriated them. Measures are now being taken to grapple with some of the worst of these cases.

By a Decree of the 17th December, 1889, Commissions, known as "Tawalef" Commissions, were instituted in every province, to examine into claims of the above nature. By the provisions of this Decree lands which had been taken for public works in past times, lands which had been ruined by the drifting of the sand, or lands which had become waste owing to defects in the irrigation system of the district, were to be exempted from taxation from the date of the demand presented by the tax-payer. These Commissions are now at work, and have completed about half their labours. As was to be expected, the work was somewhat slow and unsatisfactory at first, but it is now proceeding with greater regularity, and it may be hoped that another six months will see it finished.

The final result will, without doubt, be that the amount now annually demanded by the Government on account of land revenue will be diminished, but it is not anticipated that there will be any considerable loss to the Treasury, for an allowance has been annually made in the Budget for irrecoverable taxes ("non-valeurs"), and it is thought that most of the "non-valeurs" were due to the fact that in practice the taxes due on the lands to which I have alluded above were not collected. The amount deducted from the estimate under the head of "Non-Valeurs" will now, it is hoped, be considerably diminished, whilst the tax-payers will be relieved from harassing and unjust demands.

The measure for the examination of "Tawalef" lands, and their exemption from taxation in the future, was, at the same time, rendered more complete by an attempt to liquidate the past. The arrears of land tax from 1880 to 1889 amounted to £ E. 1,137,000, showing an average of about £ E. 125,000 a-year. Commissions were appointed in 1890 to examine these arrears, and by the end of the year they had reported their decisions in regard to £ E. 935,000. They recommended the wiping out of a sum of £ E. 417,000, and of a further amount of £ E. 307,000, on account of "Tawalef" lands, subject to verification on the spot by "Tawalef" Commissions. £ E. 60,000 was found to be the subject of litigation now going on, and the balance of £ E. 151,000 was capable of being recovered, the amount being spread over a certain number of years. Arrears to the amount of £ E. 202,000 still remain to be examined, but in the course of a month or two the work should be finished.

There can be no doubt that these measures will remove many of the grievances of which complaint has very justly been heretofore made. They will not, however, remove all of them. The Decree of the 17th December, 1889, enumerated in very precise terms the species of land which might be exempted from taxation, and the Commissions have given a strict interpretation to its provisions. There does, undoubtedly, exist a good deal of land which is, for the moment, quite uncultivable, but which does not come within the terms of the Decree. Moreover, the very important question of the course to be taken in cases where an owner possesses less land than appears in his name in the village register has been left on one side.

Again, there are certain districts, especially in Upper Egypt, which have not hitherto benefited in an equal degree with the rest of the country from the various works carried out of late years by the Irrigation Department, and which at present bear considerably more than their fair share of taxation. These districts are well

known, and their case is deserving of immediate attention on the part of the Government. In so far as the resources of the Treasury will permit, relief should be given as soon as possible. There would be no need to wait for a general assessment before proceeding with a measure of this description, the expediency of which depends upon purely financial considerations. The parts of the country where relief is most required could easily be indicated, and when their condition was once remedied, the country could support with patience the time that must elapse before a general and equitable reassessment of the land tax can be accomplished.*

Trade and Customs Administration.

In writing to your Lordship a year ago I mentioned that the import trade showed a marked tendency to diminish. The reasons for this diminution were examined at length in a Memorandum prepared by Mr. Gorst, and inclosed in my despatch of the 20th February, 1890. (See "Egypt No. 1," 1890.)

Mr. Gorst came to the conclusion, in which I concurred, that the depression of trade was due to causes of a temporary nature. The trade statistics for the past year seem to point to the conclusion that this view of the case was correct. The value of the imports has risen from £ E. 7,021,100 in 1889 to £ E. 8,132,000 in 1890, an increase of £ E. 1,111,000. The recovery in 1890 seems to have been general. The value of the exports has slightly diminished. In 1889 it stood at £ E. 11,953,000. In 1890 it fell to £ E. 11,884,000, a diminution of £ E. 69,000.

It is difficult to institute any very valid comparison either between the trade or the Customs revenue of the year 1881, which immediately preceded the British occupation, and the trade and revenue of 1890.

In the first place, the trade of 1881 largely exceeded that of any preceding year. The Customs revenue was £ E. 135,000 in excess of that of 1879.

In the second place, the Soudan markets were in 1881 open to Egypt. There are no statistics to show the value of this trade, but it is estimated at about £ E. 600,000 a-year. The annual loss to the Customs revenue by the closing of the Soudan markets cannot fall short of £ E. 50,000.

In the third place, the heavy fall in all prices since 1881 naturally affects the valuations. The difference on this account between 1881 and 1889 represents a loss of about £ E. 400,000 in values in the case of imports, and of £ E. 186,000 in the case of exports.

Under these circumstances it is satisfactory to note that, even exclusive of tobacco, there has been a slight increase in the Customs revenues since 1881. In that year the revenue amounted to £ E. 645,000; in 1890 it amounted to £ E. 652,000, an increase of £ E. 7,000.

The imports of cotton manufactures may be taken as a very fair gauge of the situation of the fellaheen, who are the great consumers of these goods. The quantity imported in 1890 (about 30,000,000 lbs.) was equal to that imported in 1881, although the imports in the latter year comprised the quantities intended for consumption in the Soudan—a very large item. This and other similar facts seem to point to the conclusion that the loss sustained by the country owing to the reduced price of its produce has been to a great extent counterbalanced by the many measures taken to improve the position of the fellaheen.

Not the least important of the reforms introduced of recent years has been the introduction of a new Code of Customs Regulations. So late as 1884 the Customs law consisted of a miscellaneous collection of Regulations, very confused and incomplete in form, many of which had been pronounced by the Mixed Tribunals to be invalid, because they had not been communicated to the Powers, or because they were only applicable at Constantinople.

The new Regulations have been of great assistance to the Customs Department. They are, however, as yet only applicable to the subjects of Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, and the United States of America. Until recently the new Regulations were also applicable to Greek subjects, but the Convention of 1884 with Greece expired on the 20th March, 1890, and has not as yet been renewed.

A very important change was made in 1890 in the collection of the duties on the articles of native production exchanged between Egypt and Turkey. Under the old system the Turkish Customs collected the import duty on articles of Turkish manu-

* As I have already mentioned, the land tax in Upper Egypt is about to be reduced by £ E. 120,000.

facture or production sent to Egypt, and the Egyptian Customs collected an equivalent duty on Egyptian articles sent to Turkish ports. The quantities of Turkish goods exported to Egypt being largely in excess of those sent in the opposite direction, this system deprived Egypt of a very large amount of duty, besides causing continual friction between the two Administrations, owing to irregularities in the certificates accompanying the goods.

Last year, after some protracted negotiations, the Porte consented to the abolition of this system.

For the future duty will be levied at the port of disembarkation.

The additional revenue which will thus be secured to the Egyptian Customs is estimated at £ E. 60,000 a-year.

The Egyptian Government has recently availed itself of the rights conferred on the Khedive by the Firmans of the Sultan to conclude separate Commercial Conventions with Austria, Great Britain, and Portugal; negotiations with the other Powers are proceeding.

It is probable that eventually a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty will be imposed on all imports. In the meanwhile, the existing régime has been prolonged in order to give time for the negotiations to proceed.

Amongst minor questions I may mention that it has recently been decided to grant a drawback, amounting to 50 per cent. of the duty originally paid, on imported tobacco which is re-exported in the shape of cigarettes. It is for many reasons important to encourage the export trade in cigarettes. The recent suppression of tobacco cultivation in Egypt will probably tend to improve the quality of exported cigarettes, as a practice had grown up of mixing the finer qualities of imported tobacco with the very inferior tobacco grown in Egypt.

On the whole, the history of the Customs Department during the last few years shows a creditable record of steady and unostentatious progress.

Railways.

The Railways, Domains, and Daira are "Mixed" Administrations, that is to say that they are under the control of Boards, whose special powers and functions differ in each case, but all of which possess this attribute in common, that the English, French, and Egyptian elements are represented in the governing body.

This form of administration is open to obvious objections. Amongst others, it may be observed that English and French administrative systems differ in many respects. Each system, I do not doubt, has certain merits and demerits peculiar to itself. The attempt to combine the principles of each system in one Administration is liable to lead to confusion. This and other objections to the system may, however, be mitigated in practice by a happy choice of individuals.

For some while past I have not heard of any friction on the Railway Board or in the other two "Mixed" Administrations. The English, French, and Egyptian Representatives in the governing bodies appear to co-operate cordially with each other in the pursuit of a common object.

During the three years 1879-81, both inclusive, which preceded the British occupation, the average annual receipts from the railways amounted to £ E. 1,179,000. During the three years 1888-90, both inclusive, they amounted to £ E. 1,327,000. The average increase has, therefore, been £ E. 148,000. The mileage open to traffic was practically the same during the two periods under comparison. The daily number of trains carrying passengers was thirty-eight in 1881. It is now ninety-two. The number of stations has been increased from 101 to 156. The number of passengers conveyed in 1881 was 3,599,000; in 1890 it was 4,696,000, thus showing an increase of 1,097,000. No very important changes have been in the tariff for passengers during the period under consideration. In 1889, however, the rates for first and second class passengers were increased by 10 per cent. On the other hand, return tickets at a reduction of 25 per cent. of the fare both ways are now issued at all stations for first, second, and third class passengers. The present rates are unquestionably high, and I understand that the Railway Board contemplates submitting proposals to the Government shortly with a view to their reduction.

The average annual total weight of goods carried during the three years ending in 1881 was 1,058,000 tons. During the last three years it has been 1,514,000 tons, thus showing an average increase of 456,000 tons.

In 1881 the working expenses of the railways only amounted to 36 per cent. of the gross receipts. Everything was sacrificed in order temporarily to increase the

revenues pledged to the payment of the interest on debt. From 1870 to 1883 no new rails, locomotives, carriages, or waggons were purchased. The maintenance of the railways had, indeed, been so much neglected that in the opinion of experts they were within a measurable distance of being unfit for traffic.

The expenses have now been increased to 44 per cent. of the gross receipts. 340 miles of new rails have been purchased, and large additions have been made to the rolling stock. The process of reconstruction and repair is being steadily continued, but it will be still some years before the railways can be placed in a state of thorough efficiency.

Amongst minor reforms in this Department I may mention that a complete set of semaphore signals has been purchased for every station on the line. In 1881 the greater number of stations were entirely unprovided with signals. Several small extensions have already been made, and others are in the course of construction. The most important of these is the prolongation of the Upper Egypt line from Assiout to Girgeh, a distance of 78 miles. This line will be finished in 1892. It is to be hoped that it will be eventually prolonged to Luxor.

The question of making a line to join Keneh, which is situated on the Nile, with the port of Kosseir, on the Red Sea, is under consideration. The line may be useful to the pilgrims proceeding to Mecca. A certain quantity of agricultural produce may also pass down it. But I should greatly doubt whether it can ever become the main route for quick mails and passengers to and from the far East.

Two very important railway bridges are now being built, one at Cairo, and the other at Mansourah, on the Damietta branch of the Nile.

The progress made in this branch of the Administration during the last few years is satisfactory, and reflects credit on the Railway Board.

Telegraphs.

The Telegraph Administration is under the general direction of the Railway Board.

Until quite recently the telegraph system of Egypt was worked at a loss. In 1890, however, financial equilibrium was for the first time attained. The revenue and the expenditure each amounted to about £ E. 35,000.

In spite of the loss of the Soudan traffic, which was considerable, the number of telegrams sent has increased from 688,000 in 1882, to 820,000 in 1890, an increase of about 20 per cent.

In 1881 the tariff for telegrams was based upon a series of zones, a telegram being charged according to the number of zones through which it passed. Thus a telegram from Alexandria to Wady Halfa passed through four zones, and, if consisting of not more than ten words, cost 20 piastres.

In 1887 a first reform of the tariff was made by suppressing the zones, and introducing an uniform tariff of P. T. 5 for a telegram of ten words for the whole of Egypt.

The results obtained by this change, coupled with the success attending the reduction of the postal charges, led to the recent adoption of a rate of P. T. 2 for a telegram of eight words. This is as low a rate as any existing in Europe.

This reduction has already led to such a large increase in the number of telegrams that it is not improbable that no loss of revenue will occur even during the current year.

The Port of Alexandria.

The Port of Alexandria is administered by an English Controller, under the general supervision of the Railway Board.

The trade of Alexandria has greatly increased during the last nine years. In 1881, 1,252,000 tons of shipping cleared from the port. In 1890 this figure had risen to 1,692,000 tons, an increase of 440,000 tons, or 35 per cent. The number of steamers has increased from 1,073 to 1,137. The number of sailing-vessels has, on the other hand, diminished from 1,323 to 883. British tonnage has fallen from 48 per cent. of the total figure in 1881 to 45 per cent. in 1890. The fall is due to a diminution in the number of Peninsular and Oriental steamers calling at the port.

The revenue derived from port, quay dues, &c., has increased from £ E. 58,000 in 1881 to £ E. 95,000 in 1890, an increase of £ E. 37,000. A portion of this increase is due to the growth of trade. But the greater portion is due to the fact that in 1885

the Custom-house was transferred to the new quays, and that extensive warehouse accommodation was provided.

The cost of the new buildings was £ E. 60,000. Before this transfer was made a large part of the quay dues on imported goods could not be collected.

Up to the present time great inconvenience has been caused owing to ships being unable to enter Alexandria Harbour by night. Works are now in progress, and will shortly be completed, which will enable ships to enter at all hours and in all weathers.

A variety of minor and very useful reforms have been carried out under the direction and generally on the initiative of the Controller of the Port.

The Domains Administration.

One of the main difficulties which confronted the Commissioners of the Domains at the outset of their work was that the estates, which had accumulated in the hands of the late Khedive, were so large as to be almost unmanageable. They were constantly—and very properly—pressed by the Egyptian Government to sell a portion of the estates. The difficulties in the way of sale were, however, very great, for the real market value of the whole estate was considerably less than the amount (8,500,000*l.*) of the mortgage secured upon it, and it was clear that the security of the bondholders would be seriously impaired unless each separate parcel of land were sold at a price representing its proportionate value to the total amount of the whole loan. Eventually an arrangement was made under which pensions, as well as a considerable portion of the large allowances paid to the Khedivial family, were commuted for land, the Government undertaking to make good in the case of each commutation the difference between the sum at which the land was taken over by the pensioner and the amount inscribed in the Domains registers as its selling price. This difference amounted to as much as 20 per cent. The arrangement was profitable to the Egyptian Treasury, and was also beneficial to the country, as it placed the land again in circulation.

Under this system about 124,000 acres of land have been disposed of, with the result that the capital of the Domains debt has been reduced from 8,500,000*l.* to 5,045,000*l.*, a reduction of nearly 3,500,000*l.*

The money which the Egyptian Government borrowed to be used with this object being now exhausted, commutations of pensions have ceased, and sales to ordinary purchasers only take place.

Last year the French Government stipulated in connection with the conversion operations that the sales of Daira and Domains land should not exceed £ E. 600,000 in any one year. The objects of making this stipulation were presumably political, but it will not in practice affect the rapidity of the sales, for it will probably not be either possible or desirable to sell more than £ E. 600,000 worth of land in any one year.

The estates have now been reduced to about 304,000 acres, of which 71,000 are farmed directly by the Domains Administration, 188,000 are leased, and 45,000 are waste lands.

The deficit of the Domains, which has to be made good by the Government, has steadily diminished. In 1883 it amounted to £ E. 173,000. In 1885, owing to the abnormally low price of cotton, it rose to as high as £ E. 275,000. Last year it was only £ E. 113,000.

During this period cotton has fallen 11 per cent. in price, cotton-seed 24 per cent., wheat 7 per cent., barley 24 per cent., and beans 6 per cent. The reduction of the deficit can, therefore, only be due to improved administration.

During the last eight years the Domains Administration has constructed 337 miles of road. These roads, though chiefly used for the transport of the Domains farm produce, are also open to the public. The economy of transport by cart, in preference to the use of camels, is being recognized by other proprietors, and the number of carts belonging to the villages which make use of the Domains roads is steadily increasing.

For some years past cotton-seed has been carefully selected in the field from the finest plants, precaution being taken that the different varieties are picked and ginned separately. The result has been a decided improvement in the regularity of the staple, a quality which is, I believe, highly valued by spinners. Attention is now being given to the selection of wheat and barley seed, and trials of crossing different varieties of

wheat are being made this year with a view to producing a wheat richer in gluten than the present varieties of Egyptian wheat.

The reclamation of waste lands, and the improvement of cultivated land in places where an adequate supply of manure is not available, have been carried out on a large scale.

I have been shown statistics from which it appears, to quote an example, that on one farm the yield of wheat per acre has risen during the last three years from 13 to 20 $\frac{3}{4}$ bushels, of barley from 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ to 14 $\frac{1}{4}$ bushels, of beans from 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ to 12 $\frac{1}{4}$, and of cotton from 146 to 287 lbs. This result is principally due to improved drainage, and it is certain that when the drainage works which are now being carried out by the Irrigation Department are completed similar results will be obtained over a further considerable area of the Domains estates.

Not the least useful work performed by the Domains Commissioners is the stimulus which they have given to the introduction of agricultural machinery into the country.

They have now thirty-eight reaping-machines at work. It has been found that a machine will reap the same area per diem as twenty-one men, at less than half the cost of hand labour.

The system at present generally adopted in Egypt of separating the grain from the straw by means of rollers drawn by oxen is not only a very slow process, but, in the case of wheat, renders the grain so foul that its value in European markets is greatly diminished. Many attempts have been made to introduce threshing-machinery into Egypt, but these have hitherto always failed, owing to the difficulty of obtaining a machine capable of threshing out the grain and at the same time converting the straw into the very fine chaff which the Egyptian farmer is accustomed to use as cattle fodder. The difficulty has now, I am informed, been overcome. Last year the Commissioners of the Domains obtained a machine from an English manufacturer which has so far fulfilled the required conditions. It is intended to make a further trial on a more extended scale during next harvest, and if this is successful it may be hoped that the use of threshers will gradually become general, and thus the value of the cereal crop of the country be enhanced.

In conclusion, I may remark that the Tewfida Hanem Loan, the interest and sinking fund on which constitutes an annual charge of £ E. 20,000 on the Domains estate, will all be paid off in 1892. The Powers have already given their consent to the conversion of the Domanial Loan. When it takes place the charge on the Domains estates will be considerably diminished. There is, therefore, every prospect that before long the income of the estate will balance the expenditure. The heavy charge thrown on the Government during the last twelve years will then disappear.

I am glad to be able to make these remarks, as I have occasionally observed a disposition in Egypt to underrate the value of the work performed by the Domains Commissioners. Mistakes may very possibly have been committed. It is also more than probable that, if the large estates administered by the Domains Commissioners were held in small plots by private individuals, the collective net yield of the whole of the small estates would be larger than that which is at present obtained. The objections to State management, and especially to international State management, in a case of this sort are obvious. They are, however, to some extent, counterbalanced by the fact that the Domains Commissioners are able and willing to make improvements of the nature of those to which I have alluded above, which would be beyond the resources of private individuals.

On the whole, my conviction is that the Commissioners have performed the very difficult duties assigned to them in a manner which has not only been beneficial to the special interests which they represent, but which has also been of considerable service to the country in general.

The Daïra Administration.

The principal product of the Domains estates is cotton. The Daïra Administration, on the other hand, is a large producer and manufacturer of sugar.

A great improvement has taken place since certain important changes were made in 1886 in the personnel of the Administration. (See "Egypt No. 2, 1887," p. 56.)

A comparison between the years 1885 and 1890 gives the following results:—

The agricultural conditions of the year 1885 were exceptionally favourable. 1,006,000 cantars* of sugar were produced. The agricultural conditions of 1890 were

* 1 cantar = 100·8 lbs.

relatively unfavourable owing to the partial failure of the Nile flood during the previous year. Only 864,000 cantars of sugar were produced. The average price of sugar was 2 per cent. higher in 1885 than in 1890. In spite of these unfavourable circumstances, the deficit, which has to be made good by the Government, and which, in 1885, amounted to £ E. 210,000, was reduced in 1890 to £ E. 80,000, a reduction of £ E. 130,000. It is anticipated that the accounts of 1891, which depend on the results of the crop of 1890, will show complete equilibrium between revenue and expenditure.

This improvement is attributable to better administration, earlier planting, more careful culture, and better fabrication. In 1885 the canes crushed from the Daïra cultures yielded only 241 cantars per acre. In 1890 the yield amounted to 361 cantars. In 1885 the percentage of all classes of sugar obtained from the canes was 8.75. In 1890 the percentage had risen to 9.38. I am informed that about two-thirds of this improvement is due to the agricultural and one-third to the industrial operations of the Daïra.

During recent years the Daïra administration has steadily reduced the area of land under direct culture, and has proportionately extended the area of land let to tenants. In 1885 the Administration cultivated 60,694 acres of land on its own account. In 1890 it only cultivated 14,066 acres. The rent-roll now represents about nineteen-twentieths of the agricultural revenue of the Daïra. To attain this result the Daïra Administration has been obliged to prepare for its tenants all lands devoted to sugar-cane, and to advance them the seed-plants. By adopting this procedure the number of persons in a position to rent the lands has been increased, and the tenants are no longer obliged to borrow money from usurers. The result has been that the average of the Daïra rents in 1890 is about the same as in 1885, notwithstanding a fall in the price of cereals and a reduction of 20 per cent. (representing about 50,000*l.* a-year) in the price paid to the tenants for the canes delivered by them to the Daïra factories.

The result of the conversion operations of last year was to reduce the outstanding Daïra capital from 8,587,000*l.* to 7,300,000*l.* An annual economy of 50,000*l.* was effected, but although this constitutes a real saving to the Egyptian Treasury, it does not affect the accounts of the Daïra, as the money still has to be paid to the Commissioners of the Debt.

It has to be borne in mind that in former days the private estates of the ex-Khedive were served with water often to the detriment of private individuals. Now the distribution is, very properly, made without favour. The result, however, is that, from this point of view, the Daïra estates, which belonged to the ex-Khedive, are in a somewhat worse position than was formerly the case. If, however, a "barrage" is eventually constructed south of Assouan, the Daïra lands situated in the Fayoum will be greatly benefited.

The form of administration adopted in the case of the Daïra differs in many important particulars from that of the Domains, but the essential defects of principle are very similar. The facts which I have given above are, however, sufficient to show that, in spite of the defects of the system, a degree of progress has been made which reflects credit on the Council of Direction. The fact that the operations of the Daïra are partly agricultural and partly manufacturing has led to a natural division of labour between the English and French Controllers. The former supervises more especially the administrative, the latter the manufacturing, portion of the undertaking.

I should add that, for many obvious reasons, notably that in this case the State owns some large and valuable factories, the total liquidation of the Daïra debt, even should it ever take place, will require much more time than the liquidation of the Domains. There is, however, a considerable quantity of Daïra land which might advantageously be sold, more especially if the system of irrigation in the Fayoum is improved. The Administration is now endeavouring to let farms on long leases, a portion of the purchase-money being paid with the rent, so that, at the expiry of the lease, the land becomes the property of the tenant.

It is greatly to be hoped that, if this system proves successful, it will be extended.

Irrigation.

In 1882 the position as regards irrigation was somewhat as follows:—

The large "barrage" or dam, which had been constructed at the apex of the Delta at a cost of some 2,000,000*l.*, cracked shortly after its completion. From 1867 to

1883 it remained practically useless. The great network of canals continued to be cleared year after year to a depth of about 20 feet below the soil, and for half of each year the *corvée* was constantly employed on them.

The Egyptian Government had entered into a contract with a private Company to irrigate the Province of Behera by a system of pumps at an annual cost of from 50,000*l.* to 60,000*l.*, and they were about to come to similar arrangements for the rest of the Delta at an initial cost of 700,000*l.*, and an annual cost of 250,000*l.* It required no ordinary amount of courage and confidence in scientific methods on the part of the English engineers to abandon the costly and inefficient system of pumping, which was warmly supported by all the local authorities, and to fall back on the use of the "barrage," in which no confidence was entertained.

Continuous irrigation, like that of Lower Egypt, requires to be accompanied by drainage, otherwise the land becomes soured and water-logged. No attention had been paid to this important subject.

The irrigation system of Upper Egypt had been almost entirely neglected.

I now propose to describe very briefly what has been already done, and what further work remains to be accomplished.

In the first place, the "barrage" has been completed and placed in a condition to fulfil its original purpose. From up-stream of it are derived three main trunk canals, which irrigate the whole Delta, and three smaller canals, which irrigate all the country north-east of Cairo and to the south of Zagazig. The outlay on the "barrage" since 1884 has been 460,000*l.*

Of the three trunk canals, that on the west, which had been neglected and completely filled in with sand, has been restored. It is to be hoped that the pumps, to which I have already alluded, will never be used again.

The Tewfikieh Canal, which supplies water to the Eastern Delta, has been entirely made since 1886 at a cost of 372,000*l.*

Practically, the whole summer supply of the Nile is deviated by the "barrage" into these canals, and none flows uselessly into the sea. The value of the work is this, that so long as there is water in the Nile it is under control. However low the river may fall, the water will get on to the fields, and the great cotton crop will be secured. In former days, during low Nile the canals were left high and dry. Whatever water there was flowed out uselessly into the sea.

The "barrage" has not much increased the area of cultivation, but it has very largely increased that of land bearing double crops, that is to say, the area producing cotton. I have already mentioned that the value of the cotton crop has increased on an average by 835,000*l.* a-year.

As the abstraction of water renders river navigation impossible during four or five months every year, two main canals have been selected, one of them roughly parallel to each of the branches of the Nile, fitted with locks and rendered navigable. These works, which are not yet quite finished, will enable laden boats to pass freely between Cairo and Alexandria on the one side, and Cairo and Damietta on the other side, at all seasons of the year. Other locks have been built and obstructions removed, so that a great impulse has been given to navigation throughout the whole Delta.

New miles of drainage arteries have been opened out year by year. Large tracks have been reclaimed from injury by salt, and now yield good crops. In the Estimates for the current year provision is made for an expenditure of 140,000*l.* on drainage works in Lower Egypt. No part of the work performed by the Irrigation Department is more appreciated than this.

Unfortunately, the system of revenue statistics is so defective as to render it impossible to say what lands have been reclaimed. The mileage of drains is not less than 1,500. The cultivated and revenue-paying area of Egypt is about 5,000,000 acres. The lagoons situated along the north of the Delta cover an area of about 1,280,000 acres. It is probable that, in consequence of the drainage operations, at least one-half of this land will in a very few years be reclaimed and cultivated.

Owing to the total neglect of the irrigation system of Upper Egypt, an annual loss of revenue to the extent of 38,000*l.* in average years formerly took place. This loss was due to the Nile flood not attaining all the fields situated in the upper provinces. In exceptional years the loss has been much greater than 38,000*l.* Thus, after the very deficient flood of 1877, it amounted to no less than 1,112,000*l.*; after 1888 it was about 300,000*l.* If such was the loss of revenue alone, it may be imagined what a heavy calamity was inflicted on the cultivators. In 1878, as I well remember, the misery of the population of Upper Egypt was extreme, and the number of deaths

from starvation very great. Colonel Ross, who has studied this subject very closely, has shown that even in these deficient years there was water enough in the river if it could have been got on to the land. He has proved that by a judicious system of canals, sluices, syphons, escapes, weirs, &c., it may be arranged that, even in the worst years, the whole Nile Valley shall receive its share of mud-charged water. This involves the construction of no great work like the "barrage" (the cost of the most expensive does not exceed 45,000*l.*), but of a great number of works costing from 5,000*l.* to 15,000*l.*, each requiring very careful designing, and built often in remote spots where construction of any kind is difficult. These works have now been going on for more than a year. It is anticipated that they will be finished in 1893. The total outlay will be about 600,000*l.* When the works now in progress are finished, it may be confidently hoped that the lands of Upper Egypt will yield their full crop, however deficient the Nile flood may be.

Intimately connected with the question of increasing the productive powers of the country is the further question of the means by which the produce shall be conveyed to market. Until recently it would have been impossible to have taken a cart-load of agricultural produce from any one centre of population to another in the Delta. Comparatively few of the canals were adapted for boats, and the one means of transporting cotton to the railway station or to the river was by camels, which, however well adapted for carrying burdens on the firm sand of the desert, are not suitable for the rich alluvial soil and wet fields of the Nile Valley. All this is now being changed. Under the impulse given by Riaz Pasha, to whose personal influence and exertions this important reform is principally due, a whole network of serviceable roads is being formed, sufficiently adapted for the dry climate of Egypt. The use of wheeled transport is now becoming common. The money necessary to the construction of these roads was provided by means of a tax, never exceeding 4 to 5 piastres per acre, and paid for one year only. It was very willingly accepted by the people.

I need hardly add that, in addition to the works constructed with a view to increase the supply of water, attention has been paid to its distribution. In former times very great abuses occurred in connection with this subject. The water is now distributed on just and scientific principles.

Independently of the technical duties performed by the officers of the Irrigation Department, the constant presence in the provinces of a few cultivated Europeans, who are now thoroughly well acquainted with the country and its language, has been of great general utility. They inspire confidence among the people, who speak to them with freedom on matters in which they are interested. Without doubt, also, their presence acts to some extent as a check to prevent any return to the abuses of the past.

I turn from the work which has already been done to that which remains to be accomplished. There is abundance to do in carrying out year by year a number of minor and unpretending, but nevertheless solid, reforms. Besides these, a very large irrigation question remains to be settled. The restoration of the "barrage" placed at the disposal of the Irrigation Department all the water of the low Nile, but the increase in the area requiring irrigation outruns the increase in the water available, and it has now become necessary to look for means of storing the surplus volume of the flood, and using it when the river is low. There are two ways in which this may be done. The first, which has become connected in the public mind with the name of an American gentleman, Mr. Cope Whitehouse, is to divert a portion of the flood into a great natural depression existing west of the Nile Valley, and there to form a storage reservoir to be drawn upon as the water in the river decreases. This project has been examined and found feasible, but the expense, probably about 1,500,000*l.*, is against it. An alternative project is to pond up the river above Assouan. This project is being studied at present. There can hardly be any further extension of the cotton cultivation until one or other of these schemes is adopted.

Of all the various reforms carried out during the last few years in Egypt none have been so fully appreciated by the people generally as those made in the system of irrigation. The changes are of a nature which affect every class of the population, and admit of being readily understood by all. I may add that, although it is, in my opinion, essential that the Irrigation Department should remain under European supervision for some long time to come, not the least of the services rendered by Sir Colin Moncrieff and his assistants has been that a capable staff of native engineers is gradually being trained under their direction. A good many of the least capable officials were weeded out a few years ago. I hear very good accounts of the younger

men, who are now, year by year, entering the Egyptian service. I should add that the total number of Englishmen employed, both in the superior and subordinate branches of the Irrigation Department, is only seventeen.

Army.

On the 19th September, 1882, a Khedivial Decree containing a single brief Article appeared in the "Official Journal." "*Considérant la rébellion militaire,*" it was said, "*l'armée Égyptienne est dissoute.*" A new army had to be created.

I need not recount the various steps taken in the process of military reconstruction, nor need I describe the present organization of the Egyptian army in detail. It will be sufficient for me to say that it now consists of about 13,000 officers and men, including non-combatants.

A few years ago a very general impression existed that the Egyptian fellaheen could not be made into good soldiers. This conclusion was, perhaps, somewhat too hastily drawn from recent events. However repugnant military service generally was to the fellaheen in the days of Mehemet Ali,* that very remarkable man succeeded, with the help of a few talented French officers, in creating an Egyptian army which, on many notable occasions, afforded abundant proof of its valour and efficiency in the field. This work has now been reaccomplished, although on a smaller scale. Disloyalty to the Khedive, which had its origin far more in the unjust treatment received by the army before the accession of the present Khedive than in the quasi-national aspirations with which the Arabi movement was at one time associated, has disappeared. The Egyptian troops, both black and fellaheen, have, during the last year or two, won several well-fought battles against a courageous and determined enemy.

The reasons for the great change which has been effected, not only in the organization, but in the spirit, of the army are sufficiently obvious. The officers and men are now well treated and adequately paid. Original appointments and promotions are regulated on just principles. Discipline is preserved. Military service is no longer regarded with the repugnance which was formerly the case. The Black battalions, five in number, are recruited by voluntary enlistment, and a certain number of volunteers are annually enrolled in the fellaheen regiments. The grave abuses which existed in the recruiting service, and which are described in Surgeon-Major Rogers' Memorandum of the 28th June, 1890 ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 154), have been abolished. The result is that the men have confidence in their officers, and the officers have confidence in their men.

Without wishing in any way to disparage the qualities of the many capable Egyptian officers now in the service of the Khedive, it is impossible to be blind to the facts, first, that the high state of efficiency to which the Egyptian army has at present attained is mainly due to the presence in its midst of a small and well-selected corps of English officers; and, secondly, that the control of these officers over their men depends in a very great degree on the maintenance of British influence in Egypt. Whether, should that influence be diminished, the control of the English officers could be effectively maintained in the face of any political or religious ferment, is a question which I will not now attempt to discuss, and on which, indeed, I should hesitate to hazard any very decided opinion.

The Egyptian army is barely of sufficient strength even for the purely defensive purposes for which it is intended. It is especially weak in cavalry. The frontier, both at Wady Halfa and in the direction of Suakin, has to be strongly guarded in view of the threats of Dervish invasion which are of constant recurrence. Adequate garrisons have to be provided at Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere. Financial considerations have, however, so far prevented any increase. Proposals were recently made to the French Government with a view to employing a portion of the economies resulting from the conversion of the debt to an increase both of the army and of the police, which latter force is also much too weak for the requirements of the service. These proposals were, however, not favourably received, and others were substituted in their place.

I take this opportunity of explaining a point which is sometimes not sufficiently understood, namely, the very peculiar difficulties which the Egyptian Treasury has to encounter whenever it is proposed that fresh expenditure of any kind should be incurred.

* Sir John Bowring, in a Report addressed to Lord Palmerston in 1839, dwelt at length on this point. "The sufferings," he said, "which the fellahs sometimes inflict on themselves in order to avoid the conscription are incredible." (Report on Egypt and Candia, p. 10.) Sir John Bowring's Report is to this day one of the most useful and exhaustive accounts of modern Egypt that has ever been written.

The London Convention, to which the Powers adhered on the 17th March, 1885 ("Egypt No. 6, 1885"), fixed the administrative expenditure of the Egyptian Government at a certain figure. Any surplus which accrued after payment of the interest on the debt, and after provision had been made for the administrative expenditure as thus limited, was to be divided between the Egyptian Treasury and the Commissioners of the Debt. The result of adopting this very cumbersome method for insuring economy is that if, for instance, the Egyptian Government wishes to abolish a tax yielding 50,000*l.* a-year, its abolition costs the Treasury 50,000*l.*, and no more. If, on the other hand, the Government wishes to increase its expenditure by 50,000*l.* it must raise double this sum in order to make good the amount, for the expenditure can only be taken from the half-surplus at the disposal of the Treasury.

When this arrangement was made there were, in addition to the usual difficulties of making any financial forecast, further special difficulties attending the situation at the moment. Notably the future course of events in the Soudan, on which the amount of Egyptian military expenditure greatly depended, was altogether uncertain. The result was that the army expenditure was greatly under-estimated.

The difficulty to which I have alluded above, and which is due not to the real necessities of the financial situation, but to an artificial arrangement made several years ago under financial circumstances very different from those which exist at present, meets the Egyptian Government at every turn. It will become more and more felt as the prosperity of the country advances, and the new wants which necessarily accompany the introduction of a civilized form of government are developed. Whether the question be regarded from the point of view of the bondholders or of the Egyptian tax-payers, by far the best arrangement would be to devote a certain fixed sum annually to a sinking fund, so as to provide for the gradual extinction of the debt, and to allow the Egyptian Government to dispose freely of any surplus remaining over after the interest and the sinking fund on the debt had been paid.

The Soudan.

The abandonment of the Soudan, which became a military necessity after the destruction of General Hicks' army in 1883, has been in some respects disadvantageous, and in others advantageous, to the interests of Egypt.

The disadvantages have been twofold. In the first place, the Soudan trade, which, as I have already mentioned, was considerable, has been lost. In the second place, the Egyptian frontier, which was necessarily withdrawn to a line much nearer the seat of Government than was formerly the case, has been exposed, and still is exposed, to a series of attacks from the Dervishes. To these disadvantages I may perhaps add another which concerns the civilized world in general rather than Egypt in particular. The abandonment of the Soudan has undoubtedly greatly increased the difficulties of combating slavery, and has, in fact, given of necessity a considerable stimulus to the Slave Trade.

The advantage has been that the Egyptian Government, when once free from the charge and responsibility of governing the Soudan, was able to devote all its energies to the development of Egypt proper, and to the reform of the Egyptian administration. When Ismail Pasha extended his dominions to the Equatorial Lakes, he attempted a task which was wholly beyond the military and financial resources, as well as the administrative capacity, of the Egyptian Government as it then existed. Moreover, he attempted it at a time when the condition of Egypt proper, far from improving, was steadily deteriorating under the influence of an oppressive and wasteful system of government. The abandonment of the Soudan enabled the Egyptian Government to recommence work at the point where, without doubt, the ex-Khedive should have begun. The reform of the Egyptian administration was taken seriously in hand, and after a painful period of transition the Soudan was neglected.

Opinions may differ as to whether the advantages are of a nature to counter-balance the disadvantages. For my own part I may say that, looking at the matter from a purely practical point of view, and without in any way contesting the obvious but, as I think, inevitable demerits of the policy which was actually adopted, the partial rehabilitation of Egypt which has actually taken place would have been quite impossible if the Soudan question had not been boldly faced and decided in a sense favourable to abandonment. More than this, any attempt to regain possession of the Soudan with the resources at the disposal of the Egyptian Government in 1883 would not only have enormously increased the general confusion which then existed in the country, but would also most assuredly have ended in failure.

Looking at the question from the point of view of the interests of the inhabitants of the Soudan, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the side on which the balance of advantage lies. However bad the Egyptian administration of the Soudan may have been, it was incomparably better than anything which has succeeded it. The devastation a few miles south of Wady Halfa, of which I myself have been an eye-witness, gives a sufficiently clear indication of the nature of Dervish rule. The date trees, which form almost the only resource of the sparse and poverty-stricken population, have all been cut down, and years must elapse before they can again yield any fruit. For a long time the cultivation of the fields in the Soudan, save to some favoured tribes, was forbidden, with the result that all the horrors of a famine, consequent on a recent low Nile and a failure of rain, were greatly enhanced. The number of persons recently found by the English officers at Tokar who had been subjected to mutilation of the most cruel description* bears ample testimony to the savage barbarity of Dervish rule. I have not a shadow of doubt that the satisfaction shown by the population of Tokar when the place was recently reoccupied by Egyptian troops was perfectly genuine. Neither have I any doubt that, with the exception of the warlike tribe of Baggaras to which Khalifa Abdallah himself belongs, and who terrorize the remainder of the inhabitants, the whole population of the Soudan would gladly welcome the re-establishment of Egyptian rule.

Although this is unquestionably the case, there can be no question, for the present at all events, of undertaking the reconquest of the Soudan. The military and financial resources of the Egyptian Government are altogether inadequate to the accomplishment of such a task. The problem which the Egyptian Government has to solve in the next few years is to regain control over the Soudan, so far at least as Khartoum, without sacrificing other and more essential Egyptian interests. When the reforms recently inaugurated in Egypt have taken deeper root than at present, and notably when the fiscal burthens now borne by the people of Egypt have been still further reduced, it will be time to consider whether it is possible or desirable to take any active steps in the direction which I have indicated above. It would be altogether premature to consider it at present. In the meanwhile, it is just possible that some opportunity may occur for peaceable negotiation with the Dervish rulers. Should such an opportunity occur, the negotiations should be conducted through Mahomedan rather than through Christian agents. All attempts of this sort have, however, up to the present time, completely failed; and I think it is in the highest degree improbable that they will meet with a greater degree of success in the future than has been the case in the past. It is in the essence of the fanatical movement which has obtained ascendancy over the Soudan that its leaders should stand wholly aloof, not only from Christian, but from orthodox Mahomedan association.

In the meanwhile, so far as can be gathered from the rather imperfect accounts received from the Soudan, the general situation in that country is somewhat as follows:—

Mahdism has, without doubt, to some extent decayed. It has received a serious blow by reason of the defection of certain important tribes, notably the Jaalin. The prestige of the Khalifa, which suffered severely by reason of the defeat of the Dervish army at Toski, will, without doubt, be still further impaired by the blow recently inflicted at Tokar. At present, however, there does not appear to be much prospect of Dervish predominance being overthrown by reason of internal dissensions in the Soudan. The peaceably disposed portion of the inhabitants, though constituting by far the majority, will, I anticipate, by themselves be powerless to throw off the yoke of the Dervishes, however much they may wish to do so.

The Egyptian position, on the other hand, is as follows:—

In the Nile Valley, the Egyptian army occupies a position at Wady Halfa which, as I explained on the 11th December, 1889 ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 66), is one of exceptional strength for defensive purposes. In the Eastern Soudan the position has been greatly improved by the reoccupation of Tokar, which, as I explained in several recent despatches, was undertaken for purely local reasons, and was wholly unconnected with any general scheme having the reconquest of the Soudan for its object. Extensive tracts of desert now exist, both in the Nile Valley and in the neighbourhood of Suakin, between the Egyptian position and any spot at which it would be possible for a Dervish force to concentrate. The probability of constant harassing attacks from the Dervishes is, therefore, considerably diminished.

* One case is reported of a man who had lost both arms and both legs. It appears, moreover, that capital punishment was frequently inflicted for the most trivial offences, notably the smallest sign of disaffection to Mahdism.

These two defensive positions will be maintained. For the present, and, I may add, for some long time to come, it is neither possible nor desirable that the territory under the immediate rule of the Egyptian Government should be extended.

I add a few observations as regards the future administration of the Tokar district. The country is represented as fertile; indeed, it was mainly owing to its fertility that the necessity for reoccupying it was imposed on the Egyptian Government. It was from this district that the small body of Dervishes who until recently oppressed the indigenous tribes of the Eastern Soudan were able to draw supplies, and thus harass the garrison of Suakin and maintain their domination over the neighbouring country.

The spirit which animates the Egyptian Government at present is so different to that which existed a few years ago that, whatever form of administration he adopted, the risk that the misgovernment of former times would be reproduced is far less than is very frequently supposed. In order, however, to give some guarantee of efficient European control, the best plan for the present will be to place the English Commandant of the troops in civil and military command of the province, and to place under his orders a very few carefully selected native officials. The administrative wants of the district are very few and simple. An organization of this nature will, therefore, for the time being, be quite sufficient to meet them. It is similar to that which exists in the frontier province of the Nile Valley and which, as I reported to your Lordship on the 4th May, 1889 ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 10), has proved very successful. In this latter case a single English officer in the Egyptian army (Colonel Wodehouse) exercises a general supervision over the affairs of a province 200 miles or more in length, without the aid of a single European official. I see no reason why equally good results should not attend the adoption of a similar system at Tokar. There appears, indeed, to be a very fair prospect that, before long, the province will pay its expenses, and perhaps yield some surplus revenue, that the trade of Suakin will now revive,* that prosperity will gradually return to the people in the immediate neighbourhood, who are now heartily sick of Mahdism and anxious to assist in expelling the Dervishes, and that it will be possible to check somewhat more effectively than heretofore the active Trade in Slaves which, under the auspices of Dervish rule, had sprung up of late years along the Red Sea Littoral.

The Mixed Courts.

The Mixed Courts, which decide all civil suits in which one party to the action is an European subject, have now been in existence for sixteen years. During the last two or three years I think I have observed indications which tend to the conclusion that these Courts do not receive quite the same tribute of respect from the public as they formerly enjoyed. Complaints are made that the procedure is cumbersome and costly. Nevertheless, the Judges still enjoy a well-deserved reputation for impartiality and legal knowledge. It is, indeed, impossible to doubt the great services which they have rendered to the country; holding the even balance, which becomes their judicial attributes, they have at times—especially during the years which immediately followed the creation of the Courts—protected litigants against arbitrary proceedings on the part of the Egyptian Government, whilst at other times they have effectually protected the Egyptian Government against the excessive demands which are occasionally advanced by Europeans. From another point of view the action of these Courts has been of a very beneficial nature. Previous to their existence the only way of settling any disputed claims made by private individuals against the Egyptian Treasury was through the medium of diplomatic action. It is scarcely necessary to point out the objections to this mode of procedure. They are sufficiently obvious. Since the creation of the Mixed Courts diplomatic action in matters of this sort may be said practically to have ceased. The claimant can appeal to a properly constituted Tribunal with perfect confidence that he will receive strict and impartial justice. It is difficult to overrate the value of these services.

On the other hand, the general defects both in the substantive law administered by the Courts and in their constitution are sufficiently obvious.

As regards the first point, it may be said that although it was probably advisable to take the French Codes as a model on which to base the law of Egypt, a too servile copy was made of those Codes. They were not sufficiently adapted to the special requirements of Egypt. Some useful changes have, however, been made in the Codes

* Since the occupation of Tokar the Customs receipts for one consignment of goods sent to local merchants from Hodeidah reached 800*l.*, an amount unknown since 1882.

since their original enactment, whilst the wisdom and moderation of the Judges in the interpretation of the law has also tended to tide over the difficulties inherent in the first application of a highly civilized Code to a society in a very backward condition.

As regards the constitution of the Courts, it is manifestly open, perhaps in a somewhat special degree, to the objections which may be urged against most international institutions. There is always a danger of the Courts becoming a political rather than a judicial institution.

Another point of great importance is that the Courts are not, and cannot be, under any practical sort of surveillance or control. They occupy a position which I believe to be absolutely unique in the history of judicial institutions. Not only do the Judges interpret the law, but they decide what is the nature of their own powers. Should they act in a manner which may appear either to a minority of the Judges, or to the Egyptian Government, or to the well-informed public to be *ultra vires*, these latter are powerless to take any action in the matter. The Judges are, for all practical purposes, under no surveillance and no control. No Court of Cassation exists, and the difficulties in the way of forming one are very considerable. The Egyptian Government has no power to control the Courts. International control, which is the only other alternative, is also practically non-existent. There is not even any effective or well-informed body of public opinion in Egypt which can touch them. Technically speaking, an appeal lies to the united Powers of Europe, who can, if they choose, change the law or give precision to it in doubtful cases. But experience has shown both the tedious nature of this procedure and the difficulty of securing the requisite unanimity on matters which become the subject of united diplomatic action. I am far from saying that the large powers thus conferred on the Courts have so far been abused, but the objections to the present system, under which a very powerful Judicature has been created without any Legislature, are sufficiently obvious, and may at any time give rise to much trouble, more especially as there is rather a tendency to extend unduly the jurisdiction of the Courts. I mention these objections without, however, being able at present to indicate any practicable and at the same time unobjectionable remedy to them.

In February 1889 the powers of the Courts were renewed for a period of five years. Proposals involving certain changes in the law were at the same time made to the Powers. I will presently deal with the most important of these proposals, namely, the extension of the criminal jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. None of the proposals have as yet been accepted by all the Powers, neither does their immediate acceptance seem very probable.

When the present quinquennial period expires, that is to say, in February 1894, it is to be hoped that arrangements may be made which will justify both the Egyptian Government and the Powers in renewing the Courts. Whatever the theoretical and even practical defects of this institution may be, there is at present nothing in Egypt to take its place. It will take some long while before the Native Courts can be put on a footing calculated to inspire the thorough confidence of the public. A return, pure and simple, to the Consular jurisdiction which preceded the establishment of the Mixed Courts would cause the utmost confusion in all business transactions, and would be alike detrimental to the interests of Europeans and natives, more especially the former.

Before leaving this subject I may mention a point which, however, is only of interest to British subjects. Up to the present time French, Italian, and Arabic have been the only languages recognized by the Law Courts. In February 1889 the Egyptian Government issued a Circular to the Powers proposing to add English to the list of recognized judicial languages. Most of the Powers have adhered to this proposal. I believe that the assents of France and Greece are now alone wanting. If this change takes place, the consequence will be that it will be no longer necessary to translate into French or Italian any English documents deposited with the Mixed Courts. A good deal of trouble and expense will thus be saved. Otherwise I do not think that the change will produce any practical results. The Judges are, for the most part, more familiar with French or Italian than with English; the members of the Bar will, therefore, without doubt, continue to plead in one of the two former rather than in the latter language.

The Consular Courts.

When a subject of a European Power resident in Egypt is accused of any criminal offence, he is tried by his Consul according to the laws of his own country.

The question of abolishing the criminal jurisdiction of the Consular Courts, and allowing the Mixed Courts to try Europeans of all nationalities, has been frequently discussed. Two years ago the Egyptian Government submitted to the Powers certain proposals for conferring a very limited degree of criminal jurisdiction on the Mixed Courts. The negotiations have not, however, made much progress, neither do I anticipate any early settlement of the question.

If the change were made it would, in many respects, affect British subjects more than other nationalities. The English Consular Courts work very well. They possess ample powers. The Judges are trained lawyers. Jurymen possessing all the necessary qualifications can readily be found amongst the British residents in the principal towns. The Egyptian authorities never have any cause for complaint as to the manner in which justice is administered. If the Consular jurisdiction were abolished, British subjects would have to be tried by the Continental procedure, with which they are more or less unacquainted, and which, in the eyes of many competent English authorities, is open to many objections. So far, therefore, as the interests of British subjects are concerned, no change is either necessary or desirable. At the same time, I do not think that they would have any great cause of complaint if the change were made; neither, with the usual moderation and good sense which characterize the proceedings of the British colony in Egypt, has any complaint been made in anticipation of a change. Provided, therefore, that the reform be really in the interests of the foreign country in which they reside, I think that British subjects may, under some reasonable safeguards, be submitted to the criminal jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. The procedure, though not that with which they are familiar, or which they would probably prefer, is still one which is applied in many of the most civilized countries in Europe.

The Egyptian point of view is, of course, somewhat different. It would, without doubt, be convenient to the Egyptian authorities, more especially to the police, if, instead of having to deal with a number of different Consular Courts, each governed by different laws and procedure, the whole of the criminal jurisdiction applicable to Europeans could be unified. I do not doubt that the present system often leads to the escape of criminals whom it is in the interests alike of the Government and of the general community to punish. On the other hand, the change would cost a good deal of money, which the Egyptian Treasury can ill afford. Moreover, there is, in reality, only one very numerous European colony in Egypt. According to the last Census, out of 90,000 subjects of foreign Powers resident in Egypt, 37,000 were Greeks, and I may observe that I should think that this figure is an under-estimate. I have heard a good many complaints of the Greek Consular Courts in Egypt, but my personal knowledge of the facts is scarcely sufficient to justify me in expressing an opinion as to whether these complaints are well founded or the reverse. During the negotiations which took place last year in connection with a variety of subjects pending between the Greek and Egyptian Governments ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 98), the former undertook to establish a Tribunal in Alexandria furnished with more extensive powers than those possessed by the existing Tribunals. This would certainly be a desirable reform, for one of the chief causes of complaint at present is that great inconvenience is caused by the necessity of transferring all serious cases to Athens. Nothing, however, appears as yet to have been done in the matter.

It is, without doubt, greatly in the interests of the community in general, including the large numbers of respectable Greek subjects resident in Egypt, that the Greek Tribunals should be placed on a sound footing. It is to be hoped that the matter will receive the attention of the Greek Government.

If this were done I rather doubt whether it would be worth the while of the Egyptian Government either to undertake the difficult and tedious negotiations necessary to bring about a radical change in the present system, or to expend the money which would be required to effect the change.

On the whole, although the reform is a desirable one, I think its importance has, at times, been somewhat exaggerated.

There is a minor reform in connection with the Consular jurisdiction exercised in Egypt which, if possible, it would be desirable to carry into execution. At present, with the exception of the British Consular Courts, no foreign Consul has the power to oblige the attendance of one of his own nationality as a witness at the Court of another nationality. The result is that there is frequently a miscarriage of justice for want of evidence. I have frequently drawn attention to this point, and I have been given to understand that no objections would, in all probability, be urged against the principle of obliging the attendance of a witness; but, owing to the different customs which

prevail in respect to this subject in the several countries of Europe, there appear to be practical difficulties in the way of giving effect to the change which will probably prevent anything being done.

The Native Courts.

"The Native Courts," Lord Dufferin wrote on the 6th February, 1883 ("Egypt No. 6, 1883," p. 42), "were never more imbecile and corrupt than they are at present. . . . The chief requirement of Egypt is justice. . . . At this moment there is no real justice in this country. . . . What passes under that name is a mockery, both as regards the Tribunals themselves and the *corpus juris* they pretend to administer."

At the time Lord Dufferin wrote there existed a system of Courts throughout the country founded on French lines, but the Judges knew no law, and their pay was so small that corruption was almost necessary to their existence. To the poor man the law's delay amounted to a sheer denial of justice, and even when judgment was given it was almost impossible to obtain execution. On the criminal side of the Courts the arrears were scandalous, and the prisons were full of men who vainly clamoured for trial.

It was easy to improve on this disgraceful state of affairs. The present Courts were established in March 1884. The Mixed Tribunals had accustomed the country to the Continental system of law and procedure. The few Egyptian lawyers who had learnt any law had studied in France. It was therefore thought desirable to base the new system on a French model. Codes were published in Arabic which established substantive law of a nature clear and concise, although perhaps too European in kind, and which also bound the Courts to follow certain strict rules of procedure. The scale of salaries of the new Judges was fixed at a rate which was sufficiently high to lift them out of the necessity of corruption. Unfortunately, the Judges were not always selected by merit. The Tribunals still suffer from a badly-directed choice of men at their foundation. The difficulties arising from the absence of any large number of competent Egyptian Judges is greatly enhanced owing to the adoption of a system which imposes an unnecessarily large quorum of Judges, both in the Courts of First Instance and in the Court of Appeal.

This system, which is singularly ill-adapted to the circumstances at present existing in Egypt, will, I trust, shortly be changed.

In spite of many drawbacks, the new Tribunals are a great advance on their predecessors. The work done has quadrupled in the last six years; there are few arrears; decisions are not only taken, but executed. Mistakes may, of course, have been committed, but I believe them to be generally due to ignorance and inexperience. I have not heard of any well-established charge of corruption.

The new Courts exercise their powers with great caution. They demur about proofs, they reject confessions, and rarely punish when there is any possibility of the innocence of the accused. Their anxiety to protect the innocent seems, without doubt, strange to the officials trained under the old régime, who used to seize men under slight suspicion, to take presumption of guilt as sufficient evidence, to force confessions by torture, and to inflict speedy punishments, which were effectual in striking terror.

The old system must often have punished the innocent, but it also deterred people from crime.

At present it frequently happens that the Tribunal, though not satisfied of the innocence of the accused, is not, on the other hand, legally convinced of his guilt. He is, in consequence, released, and returns in triumph to his village to wreak vengeance on those who denounced him.

So little confident were the Egyptian Government in the efficient working of the Tribunals that, very shortly after their establishment, Special Commissions of Brigandage were created, which, until their abolition in July 1889, practically took all the important criminal work out of the hands of the ordinary Tribunals. In other words, during this period an elaborate and highly civilized system of justice existed in appearance, whereas, in reality, the system, in so far as criminal justice was concerned, was entirely superseded by the Commissions of Brigandage, in whose proceedings the worst features of the old régime were reproduced.

In the course of the summer of 1889 M. le Grelle, the Belgian Procureur-Général of the Egyptian Government, brought facts to my notice which showed that the proceedings of the Commissions had been of the most arbitrary and illegal description. Capital punishment had in many cases been inflicted, and some 800

people had been thrown into prison on evidence which was often manifestly insufficient. Torture was frequently employed to extract confessions. It can scarcely be doubted that some, at least, of the accused persons were wholly innocent of the crimes for which they were condemned. Rather than to have continued this system, it would have been preferable to have faced the subject boldly, to have proclaimed martial law, and to have allowed criminal justice to be administered by courts-martial presided over by English officers. There would, at least, then have been some guarantee that the proceedings would have been conducted with ordinary humanity, and that the decisions would have been dictated by the first principles of natural justice.

The remonstrances which, under your Lordship's instructions, I addressed to the Egyptian Government on this subject brought about the suppression of the Commissions of Brigandage. After an examination of the cases already adjudged, the Khedive's prerogative of mercy was wisely exercised on behalf of some of those who had been condemned by the Commissions. From that time forth some adequate guarantee has been afforded that accused persons would not any longer be condemned for crimes for which they are innocent.

It soon, however, became apparent that in escaping one evil another very serious danger had been incurred. In 1886 the total number of cases of serious crime committed in Egypt amounted to 1,284. In 1889 they amounted to 2,405, an increase of nearly 100 per cent. In 1886 the number of murders reported throughout the country amounted to 164. In 1889 they amounted to 281; and I am informed that in 1890 the number was no less than 488. The judicial statistics for 1890 afford further and abundant proof of the shortcomings of the present system. Out of 6,550 alleged "crimes"* sent by the police for investigation, 2,360 were rejected by the "Parquet" as constituting no offence at all; more than one-fourth of the cases, where a real crime has been committed, remain in suspense owing to a complete want of evidence. As regards "délits" (misdemeanours), 32,574 were sent forward, and 13,350 were rejected as constituting no offence. These figures point either to a weak police, a weak "Parquet," or weak "Juges d'Instruction." A very large number of persons must have been needlessly imprisoned. When the cases admitted by the "Parquet" were brought before the Tribunals, only 2,270 of those accused of "crimes" were found guilty, whilst 2,200 were acquitted. As regards those accused of misdemeanours, 19,360 were found guilty, and 12,243 were acquitted.†

With every desire to interfere as little as possible with the liberty of action of the Egyptian Government in matters of internal administration, it became clearer every day that the state of things which I have described above could not be allowed to last. It is inconceivable that there should only be two alternative methods of dealing with this question, viz., either a return to all the abominations of the Commissions of Brigandage, or the continuance of a system of justice so lax as to allow serious crime on a large scale to continue unpunished. The want of public security constituted, in fact, a serious blot on the administration of the country, and, after a long and patient trial, it had become abundantly clear that the Egyptian Government was unable to deal with the very considerable difficulties of the situation without European assistance. It was under these circumstances that, with your Lordship's approval, I moved the Egyptian Government to appoint Mr. Scott to the post of Judicial Adviser. This proposal encountered a certain amount of opposition, but it was warmly supported by His Highness the Khedive. Mr. Scott has therefore been appointed. As I write, he is, I regret to say, obliged to absent himself from the country for a very short while, but, on his return to Egypt, I trust the matter of judicial and police reform will be seriously taken in hand. The work of reform will, without doubt, take time, and will very possibly encounter a certain amount of opposition. In this case, I do not, however, hesitate to recommend that Mr. Scott should receive the strongest support from Her Majesty's Government.

I will not attempt at present to state in what degree responsibility for the present state of things lies respectively with the Executive or Judicial authorities, neither will I describe in any detail the reforms which it would appear necessary to introduce; but I may make a few general observations on the latter of these two subjects.

The main faults of the new Tribunals are those inherent in a new system which is somewhat in advance of the civilization of the country, and has not been subjected to steady and enlightened supervision. The police fail to detect crime because the people

* I use the word "crime" here in its technical French sense, that is to say, in the meaning of a felony, as opposed to a "délit," misdemeanour).

† I may mention that, in England, fully 75 per cent. of the persons sent for trial are convicted.

generally, and the village watchmen in particular, do not denounce offences with any readiness, and do not furnish evidence in support of the charges which they make. They do not understand the public duty which lies upon every one to do his best to maintain order and repress crime.

In connection with this subject I may mention that the village Sheikhs, who were formerly made responsible for everything that occurred in the neighbourhood of their villages, and on whose active co-operation a great deal depends, now occupy a very different position to that which they held a few years ago. They used to prepare the lists of men who were to work for the *corvée*. They practically chose the recruits for the army. They had a very considerable hand in the assessment of some, at least, of the taxes. They enjoyed various valuable privileges. There can be no doubt that they frequently abused their power.

All this is now changed. The *corvée* is abolished; the village Sheikhs have little or nothing to do with the selection of recruits for the army, or with the assessment of the taxes. Their privileges, which were often exercised to the detriment of the rest of the population, have been greatly curtailed. The people are, therefore, to a great extent, freed from the tyranny of the Sheikhs, which was formerly very oppressive. On the other hand, the Sheikhs do not possess the same authority as heretofore, and the position of the Sheikhs, being less lucrative than formerly, is also less sought after.

The diminished authority now exercised by the Sheikhs undoubtedly increases the difficulties attendant on the discovery of crime. Nothing is, however, so difficult as to reform abuses and, at the same time, to maintain the advantages which are occasionally to be found even in the worst systems of government.

These arguments point to the desirability of reorganizing the service of village watchmen, improving the position of the Sheikhs, and at the same time imposing a certain degree of responsibility on them. It is also necessary to simplify and expedite the procedure of the Tribunals, to increase their number, and improve the personnel, to diminish the quorum of Judges, and, above all things, to insure a greater degree of co-operation than at present exists between the police and the members of the "Parquet."

The "Mehkemeh Sheraieh."

The "Mehkemeh Sheraieh" is the term applied to the Courts which deal with all questions relating to personal status, such as marriage and divorce, guardianship, testamentary succession, &c. They answer, in fact, to a great extent, to the Court of Probate and Divorce in England.

The jurisprudence of these Courts is based on the "Sharaa," or Sacred Law of Islam, which, although in practice somewhat modified to meet the requirements of the present century, is in theory immutable.

I have heard many complaints, which I believe to be well founded, of the manner in which justice is administered in these Courts. It is much to be desired that the Egyptian Government should take the matter in hand with a view to improving the system without in any way violating religious principles or customs which are revered by all classes of Mahomedans. The subject is, however, one as to which the interference of any European, or, indeed, of any Christian, is undesirable and impossible.

There is, however, one important portion of the work performed by this Administration which does not, so far as I am aware, touch any religious principle, and which more especially calls for the attention of the Egyptian Government. Great inconvenience results from the fact that mortgages and transfers of property are registered partly by the Mixed Courts, and partly by the "Mehkemeh Sheraieh." In the interests of both Europeans and natives it is very much to be desired that there should be only one office of registration. The Judges of the Mixed Courts wish to absorb the native registration offices, and to have complete control over the whole of the registration in the country. The Egyptian Government, on the other hand, wishes to absorb the registration offices at present under the control of the Mixed Courts, and to place the whole of the registration under the control of the "Mehkemeh Sheraieh." To this procedure the Judges of the Mixed Courts not unnaturally demur, for it cannot be doubted that the native registration offices are at present conducted in a very inefficient manner. Thus, matters are for the moment brought to a deadlock, though I trust that before long the subject will be reconsidered with a view to arriving, if possible, at some workable compromise. The best solution, without doubt, would be to improve the native registration offices to such an extent as would

eventually enable them to undertake the whole work of registration in the country. A reform of this sort would undoubtedly take time, and, moreover, there are very considerable difficulties in the way of effecting it. No improvement is possible unless the work of registration is, to a greater extent than at present, placed under European control; whilst, at the same time, any proposal to extend European control in this direction would probably encounter a good deal of native opposition.

The Administration of the "Wakfs."

This Administration disposes of a large revenue, amounting, I believe, to about 130,000*l.* a-year, derived from various religious endowments. The money is intended to be spent on the maintenance and repair of mosques, almshouses, and other objects of public interest. Something has, I understand, recently been done in the way of getting the accounts of this Administration into order, but I occasionally hear complaints of the way it is conducted. I am not sufficiently well acquainted with the subject to say how far these complaints are justified. The remarks I have made in the case of the "Mehkemeh Sheraieh," as regards the undesirability of any European interference, apply equally to the case of the "Wakf" Administration.

The Interior.

A very few English officers are employed in the police. The discipline, drill, clothing, and equipment of the force has been greatly improved. In all these respects it is, I believe, now everything that could be wished.

I have already dealt with the question of the detection of crime in my remarks on the Native Courts. I can only repeat that this is at present the weakest part of the whole Egyptian administrative system. The police are under the orders of the Mudirs (Governors of provinces)

If the progress in this department has not been altogether satisfactory, it should in fairness be remembered that its reform presents very exceptional difficulties. The older native officials, whilst unable to maintain their authority by a resort to the illicit and oppressive practices of former days, are unable to adapt themselves easily to the forms and proceedings consequent on the introduction of a new order of things. This is one of the main reasons for much of the confusion which unquestionably exists at present. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Egyptian Government will recognize how much remains to be done in the Department of the Interior, and notably that, in conjunction with the reforms about to be undertaken in the Law Courts, they will seriously undertake the improvement of the police system. The two subjects are intimately connected. The Departments of Justice and of the Interior should cordially co-operate. Reform in the former without reform in the latter cannot be productive of really satisfactory results. The Law Courts cannot do their part in suppressing crime without the aid of a more efficient police than that which at present exists.

Prisons.

Mr. Beaman, who, with Colonel Chermiside, was deputed by Lord Dufferin to inquire into the state of the Egyptian prisons in December 1882, wrote as follows:—

"It may safely be stated that no Report can convey the feeblest impression of the hopeless misery of the mass of the prisoners, who live for months like wild beasts, without change of clothing, half-starved, ignorant of the fate of their families, and bewailing their own." ("Egypt No. 5, 1883," p. 10.)

Reform in the Department has been attended with great difficulties owing to the very larger number of prisoners, mostly confined for short periods, and the difficulty of providing adequate prison accommodation for them.

The figures for the year 1890 will give some idea of the numbers of prisoners with whom the Prisons Department has to deal. On the 1st January, 1890, there were 6,747 individuals (men and women) in prison. There were 57,288 admissions to prison in the course of the year; 58,123 persons were discharged, leaving 5,912 in confinement on the 1st January, 1891. Of those who passed through the prisons, 7,058 were accused persons who were eventually acquitted and discharged after imprisonment lasting on an average from twenty to twenty-five days.

When the reform of the prison administration commenced, adequate accommodation for this large number of prisoners was altogether wanting. The provincial prisons at Chebin, Damanhour, Benha, Mansourah, Fayoum, Beni Souef, Keneh, and

Assouan have now been partially rebuilt, and considerable additions made to them. An excellent convict prison has been built at Ghizeh, close to Cairo, capable of containing 700 prisoners. It was constructed by convict labour, and only cost 5,000*l*. The convicts are employed in various industries, principally weaving and spinning. Rope-making will be shortly introduced. Similar prisons are in course of construction at Assiout and Chebin-el-Kom. When these are finished, sufficient prison accommodation will have been provided for all prisoners sentenced to over two months' imprisonment. The smaller provincial prisons will then only be used for short term prisoners and for those awaiting trial. Whether these latter will be overcrowded or not will depend on the working the Native Courts of Justice.

The out-door work of the large convict establishment at Tourah has enormously increased during the last two years. In 1890, 59,000 cubic metres of stone were supplied to the Public Works Department. Arrangements have now been made to obtain the metal required for the Cairo roads from Tourah. An iron foundry, as well as blacksmiths' and carpenters' shops, have been established and are kept fully employed. The doors, windows, and iron-work for the new Ghizeh prison were all made at Tourah. A bakery has also been established, which supplies bread for the prisoners, as well as for several almshouses.

I have visited most of the prisons in Egypt. Many of them are still greatly overcrowded, but, although a great deal still remains to be done before this Department can be said to be in a thoroughly satisfactory condition, there can be no doubt that the improvement in the condition of the prisoners is very marked, and that the progress already made reflects great credit on the present Director-General (Dr. Crookshank).

The system which exists in Egypt of making the friends of the prisoners provide for their subsistence whilst in prison is obviously open to great objections, but financial considerations have so far prevented this charge from being taken over by the State.

Education.

I need not dwell on the very special importance which attaches itself to this subject in Egypt. If ever a policy of "Egypt for the Egyptians" in the truest and only practicable sense of the term is to be carried into execution, it can only be by gradually educating the rising generation of Egyptians to a standard which will enable them to occupy, with advantage to their country, the numerous administrative posts now held by Europeans. More than this, if the Mahommedans, who constitute the majority of the population of Egypt, wish to hold their own against their Christian fellow-countrymen, they will, in the long run, only be able to do so if they keep on a level with their competitors in their standard of education. Protective measures, such as those adopted against Syrians last year, and about which, under your Lordship's instructions, I addressed some remonstrances to the Egyptian Government, will be of little avail.

During the early years of the British occupation the operations of the Educational Department were greatly crippled for want of funds, but latterly more money has been available, and considerable progress has been made.

In 1882 European education was mainly conducted through the medium of the French language. Since that time no effort whatever has been made to diminish French instruction. On the contrary, the number of French teachers in the schools is now greater than it was at the time of the British occupation. But, side by side with French instruction, more attention has been paid to English education, which had previously been greatly neglected. The number of pupils learning English in the Government schools has been nearly doubled, but they are still barely half as numerous as those learning French.

The Educational Department is under the direction of an Egyptian Minister, who, in 1888, very wisely called to his aid two European Inspectors (one English and one French) and a small number of European teachers (English, French, and Swiss). The presence of these gentlemen has been of the utmost service to the cause of education.

During the last few years the signs of educational progress in Egypt have been unmistakable and in every way hopeful for the future. The administrative efforts of the Ministry of Public Instruction have become more earnest and enlightened, while the public mind has been slowly but surely changing its point of view on the subject of education.

Public schools in Egypt may be classified in three groups:—

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1. The "Government" schools, the expenses of which are defrayed out of the Budget of the Ministry of Public Instruction.

2. The "National" schools, which are provided for out of the revenue derived from the "Ras-el-Wadi" domains.*

3. The "Wakf" schools, which are supported by the special Department charged with the administration of Mahommedan religious endowments ("Wakfs").

In December 1887 the Ministry of Public Instruction had under its direction only twelve schools. The amount allowed for the maintenance and administration of these schools was £ E. 68,000 a-year.

In 1888 and 1889 the "National" and "Wakf" schools, neither of which had achieved any great measure of educational success, were transferred to the Ministry of Public Instruction. At the same time, the Government grant was increased. A Training College for native teachers of English was formed. The Girls' School at Cairo was entirely reorganized. A new Technical School was established at Mansourah.

The Ministry of Public Instruction now disposes of a Budget amounting to £ E. 107,000 a-year. It has forty-seven schools and colleges under its direction, namely, twenty-nine primary schools, eight intermediate schools, a girls' school, three training colleges for teachers of Arabic, English, and French respectively, a College of Agriculture, a College of Engineering, a School of Law, and a School of Medicine. The attendance has increased from 1,919 pupils in 1887 to 7,307 in 1890.

Attached to all the mosques of the country are large numbers of little schools ("katatib"), in which the Koran is learnt by heart, and an irreducible minimum of reading and writing is taught. The schools of this type have not yet been taken in hand by the Ministry of Public Instruction, but it is to be hoped that they will all gradually come under its control.

In a country where school attendance is at present in no way compulsory, the very considerable increase of numbers in the public schools is sufficient evidence of the greater importance now attached by the native public to education. Other evidence, pointing in the same direction, is forthcoming. The inhabitants even of remote villages now petition the Ministry of Public Instruction to be provided with a school.†

Moreover, the growing popularity of education is attested by the increasing willingness to pay school fees which is displayed on the part of parents. In 1881 only 30 per cent. of the school attendance consisted of paying pupils. The receipts on account of school fees amounted to £ E. 2,323. In 1890, 62 per cent. of the total attendance of 7,307 consisted of paying pupils, and the receipts reached £ E. 19,038.

No less significant are the improvements made in the methods of instruction. The skilful methods and direct personal influence of the new teachers who have been introduced into the Educational Department have been steadily raising the general level of the schools, in spite of the numerous difficulties which have been encountered. Whilst there has been an increasingly strict supervision of the teachers of Arabic and the Koran, the study of European languages has been placed on a new basis. Previously, pupils were allowed to waste their time and addle their brains by attempting the study of an impossible number of languages. They are now allowed their choice of English or French as the exclusive language to be studied, in addition to Arabic and Turkish, throughout the whole curriculum of the primary and intermediate schools. A reform of this kind naturally met, in the first instance, with strong opposition. It has, however, produced the most salutary effect. I trust that the time-honoured methods adopted in Egypt of loading the memory without exercising the mind have now been finally abandoned. English and French are no longer treated merely as additional subjects of linguistic study. The European language is gradually becoming the medium of instruction for a wide range of subjects, such as arithmetic, geography, history, science, &c. It is not too much to say that if the reorganization of the course of study which has recently been effected is allowed a fair trial, the whole character of public education in Egypt will be gradually transformed, and it may be hoped that a body of well-educated Egyptians will eventually be trained who will be capable of administering the country efficiently with little or no European assistance.

For the present all that can be said is that a commencement has been made in the work of educational reform. In spite, however, of the progress which has been

* These domains were at one time private property, the revenues of which have been placed in trust by the original owners, to be applied to educational purposes.

† During the autumn of 1889, in the course of a trip up the Nile, I visited many out-of-the-way villages in which the presence of a European is of rare occurrence. No request was more frequently made to me than that I should urge the Government to establish a school in the village.

already made, no part of the educational system can as yet be said to be in a thoroughly satisfactory condition. Moreover, school discipline hardly exists. An adequate Inspectorate should be created. The Civil Service Permanent Commission should be reconstituted. The entire syllabus of studies requires recasting. A thorough-going system of examination should be introduced. Books should be published specially adapted for Egyptian schools. At least one European teacher should be appointed to each of the intermediate schools. The School of Law is in a most unsatisfactory condition. It should be placed under the charge of a competent European, preferentially a Frenchman, to whom an English subordinate possessing legal training should be attached, not with a view to teaching English law, but in order to give instruction in Roman law to those young Egyptians who know English but do not know French. Female education and the teaching of the blind also require more attention than they at present receive. There is an almost total want of premises specially constructed for scholastic purposes. The sanitary condition of those which exist is often very defective. These are some of the matters which most urgently call for reform. I trust they will receive at the hands of the Egyptian Government the attention which they deserve, and that the necessity for taking a new departure in Egyptian educational work will be adequately recognized.

Last year the Egyptian Government expressed a wish, which in this case was entirely spontaneous on their part, to secure the services of an English expert in agricultural matters, with a view to affording instruction in agriculture.

An Agricultural College has therefore now been created, at which a course of lectures on various subjects of a scientific as well as of a practical nature are given. About sixty students have been admitted. It has been found necessary to refuse a large number of applications for admission. A garden and farm of 300 acres are attached to the College. Experiments with artificial manures and different varieties of crops have been started. European agricultural implements, such as ploughs, scythes, and reapers, have been introduced for trial.

Butter is being made on the European system, and sold for 10 piastres a pound, the price of native butter being 3 piastres a pound.

Mr. Wallace, the Principal of the College, is endeavouring to introduce potato cultivation into Egypt, with a view to the supply of foreign markets. A large quantity of the best seed has been imported and distributed to cultivators. Onions are already exported in considerable quantities. It is very possible that a lucrative trade in potatoes may gradually spring up.

This College is of too recent creation to judge of whether it will prove of real utility to the country; it is also somewhat crippled for want of funds. A fair start, however, appears to have been made.

Besides the schools which I have already mentioned, there exist in Egypt a number of European, American, Jewish, and Coptic schools which are in no way under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Instruction. The education afforded in many of these schools is of a very superior description. It has sometimes been suggested that, in view of the great need of education in Egypt, and of the limited number of Government schools, it would be desirable for the Government to give grants in aid to these schools. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this course, but the difficulties, except, perhaps, in so far as the Coptic schools are concerned, appear to me to be insurmountable. Almost all the European and American schools are, in a greater or less degree, tinged with a desire to effect converts to the Christian religion. It is scarcely reasonable to expect that, under these circumstances, they should be supported by a Mahomedan Government. Moreover, if the latter were to give any pecuniary support, it could only be on the condition that in each case a very strict conscience clause should be enacted, and a sufficient degree of Government control established to insure its execution. The managers of the European schools would certainly object to provisions of this nature, and, for my own part, I cannot help thinking that they will perform more useful work if they continue to act, as at present, independently of either Government control or Government support.

The case of the Coptic schools is somewhat different. There are said to be about 500,000 Copts in Egypt. They pay taxes equally with their Mahomedan fellow-countrymen, with whom, I may remark incidentally, they generally live in perfect harmony. I think it is well worthy of the consideration of the Egyptian Government whether something more than at present might not and ought not to be done for Coptic education. At present the Copts are for the most practically excluded from the Government schools, as the reading of the Koran is obligatory in those schools. I have been sometimes informed that this is necessary, as a thorough knowledge of Arabic

cannot be attained without a study of the Koran. I am not qualified to express an opinion on this subject. I cannot, however, help thinking that the necessity is somewhat exaggerated, and that means might be found for providing adequate instruction for the Copts without in any way offending their religious feelings.

The Employment of Europeans.

On the 24th November, 1886, I addressed a despatch to the late Earl of Iddesleigh ("Egypt No. 6, 1887") in which full details were given as to the number, nationalities, and salaries of the Europeans in the service of the Egyptian Government. I do not think that any general Return of the number of Europeans employed has been prepared since that time, but on the 26th January, 1890, I addressed to your Lordship a despatch ("Egypt No. 2, 1890," p. 95) showing the number of English officials of all sorts employed in Egypt. In 1886 there were 427 Englishmen employed; their aggregate salaries amounted to £ E. 161,000 a-year. In 1890 the number was 336; the aggregate salaries amounted to £ E. 150,317. In four years a reduction of 91 in point of numbers and of £ E. 10,723 a-year in point of salaries has therefore been effected.

A bald statement of the figures gives, however, a very incomplete idea of the real facts of the case.

In the figures which I have given above, all the "Mixed Administrations" ("Caisse de la Dette," Mixed Tribunals, Railways, &c.) are included. These Administrations are international. They are not especially English, neither is the appointment of Europeans to them in any way connected with the special position now occupied by Her Majesty's Government in Egypt. Eleven superior English officials and thirty-nine subordinates (mostly engine-drivers, &c.) are employed in these Administrations, at a cost of £ E. 27,192 a-year.*

The army also is included in the total given above. There are sixty-nine English officers and thirty-three English non-commissioned officers employed in the Egyptian army, at a total annual cost of £ E. 49,188 a-year.

If the Mixed Administrations and the army be deducted there remain 183 English employes, who receive in all £ E. 71,787 a-year. Of this number, 144 are classed as "subordinate appointments." These latter consist for the most part of coastguardsmen (21), engineers employed on board the Khedivial steamers (36), lighthouse keepers (20), and a few police constables (most of the European police being Italian or Austrian).

If the "subordinate appointments," whose aggregate salaries amount to £ E. 34,037 a-year, be deducted, there remains a residue of thirty-nine high English officials, whose aggregate salaries amount to £ E. 37,700 a-year.

Roughly speaking, it may be said that, in cases where Europeans are employed under the purely native (i.e., non-international) portion of the Administration, the superior posts are generally, but by no means exclusively, held by Englishmen.

On the other hand, the very large majority of the European subordinate appointments are held by other European nationalities, notably French and Italian. The number of Europeans holding subordinate appointments would certainly appear to be excessive, and I trust that, as time goes on, it will be possible gradually to increase the number of natives holding such appointments. It has always been the very wise policy of the English Heads of the various Administrations to discourage the employment of European subordinates, whether English or of other nationalities, and I am strongly of opinion that this policy should be continued.

When allusion is made to the English influence now exerted over the Egyptian Administration, what is really meant, therefore, is that thirty-nine Englishmen, holding superior appointments, at a cost of £ E. 37,700 a-year, are employed. These form, in fact, the backbone of the Egyptian Civil Administration. They consisted in January 1890 of two officials employed in the Financial Department, three in the Customs and Coastguard, one in the Post Office, who, however, is subordinate to an Egyptian chief, one in the Administration of the Postal Steamers, three in the Lighthouses, eight in the Police, nine in the Public Works Department, one in the Prison Department, three in the Native Courts of Justice, and eight in the Sanitary Depart-

* The Mixed Administrations (exclusive of the "Caisse de la Dette Publique," which is included under the Ministry of Finance in my despatch of the 24th November, 1886) employed, in 1886, 147 Frenchmen, 161 Italians, and 124 Europeans of other (non-English) nationalities, at a total cost of about £ E. 115,000 a-year. Except in the case of the Railways, where a few Englishmen are employed, by far the greater part of the staff of the Mixed Administrations is French and Italian.

ment. Since this Return was made up, a Judicial Adviser, one Judge, and an English official in charge of the branch of the Financial Department which deals with the direct revenues, have been added.

The number appears to me to be exceedingly small when the amount of work to be done is considered. Indeed, it is a constant source of astonishment to me that so much has been already done with such a very inadequate European staff. As to the amount of the salaries, it cannot be doubted that it is well worth the while of the Egyptian tax-payers to secure the services of these thirty-nine officials at a cost of £ E. 37,700 a-year.

I cannot speak too highly of the services rendered by this small body of English officials. They have all occupied positions of much difficulty. Many of them have had to conduct a large part of their business in a very difficult Oriental language. All have had generally to use French, rather than English, as the medium of communication with those who speak any European language. Their efforts to effect reforms have been but too frequently met with active hostility or passive obstruction. They have had to guide and persuade rather than to command, and they have had to rely far more on their powers of persuasion than on any diplomatic support which, as the Representative of Her Majesty's Government, I have been able to afford to them. It is, in fact, only on very rare occasions, and generally in a very mild form, that that support has been accorded to them. They have had to display a large amount of tact, judgment, knowledge of the world, elasticity of mind, and resource in adapting themselves to a condition of society and to administrative systems to which they had not been previously accustomed. That they should have generally displayed these qualities in an eminent degree is all the more remarkable in that the Departmental training in England or in India, which most of them had previously received, necessitates the exercise of these qualities in a far less degree than is required in Egypt.

These difficulties have, however, been successfully overcome. In spite of some shortcomings, I believe that the services rendered by the English officials to the cause of good government in Egypt are being daily more and more recognized, especially by the poorer classes of the population.

But, however eminent these services may be, it is impossible not to understand, and even to sympathize with, the reluctance shown by the governing classes of Egypt generally to employ Europeans in the Egyptian service. A portion of that reluctance is, without doubt, due to the fact that, under the somewhat levelling action of European influence, the excessive privileges formerly enjoyed by the upper classes of the country are rapidly disappearing. But it is permissible to attribute another portion, for which greater sympathy may be felt, to a very natural and patriotic desire that the country should be exclusively governed by Egyptians rather than by aliens. More than this, the objects pursued by European reformers, however wisely they may modify their systems of administration to suit the requirements of the country, are often of a nature to be imperfectly understood by an Oriental people. Again, however good the ultimate results may be, the immediate result of attempting to reform a bad system of government is often to render confusion, for the time being, worse confounded, or at all events to appear to the casual observer to do so.

However this may be, it is an undoubted truth, which no one who is acquainted with the facts of the case, and who regards the question in a spirit of impartiality, will attempt to deny, that for the present a certain amount of European guidance and assistance is absolutely essential to the good government of Egypt. Moreover, it is a truth which no true friend of Egypt or the Egyptians will attempt to conceal. But it is an unpleasant truth; neither need it be a matter for surprise, and still less for anger, that it should sometimes not be fully recognized. It is, however, most desirable that it should be recognized. In its full and unreserved recognition lies the best hope, not only of improving the moral and material condition of the people of Egypt, but also of eventually substituting Egyptian for European agency in the administration of the country. The more tardily the principle is recognized and applied in practice, the longer will the inevitable period of transition last, and the longer will be the delay incurred before the objects to which I have alluded above will be attained. Egypt is now, to the very great advantage of its people, launched on the path of European progress and civilization. To turn back is no longer possible, neither, if it were possible, would it be desirable.

Instead of viewing European assistance askance, it would be far wiser for the Egyptian Government to frankly admit its necessity, and to profit by it to the fullest extent. The improvement in those branches of the Administration in which English influence has been predominant—as, for instance, the army and the Public Works

Department—as compared with those in which no such predominance has existed, is too marked to admit of any doubt as to the results which would ensue from the adoption of a policy of this nature. It is no exaggeration to say that in every Department of the Egyptian Administration—except, of course, those which deal with religious questions—some European guidance and assistance is, for the time being, absolutely essential to the welfare of the country. That assistance need be, and should be, extremely limited in degree, but the difference between a total absence of European supervision and a very slight amount of such supervision is very great.

As each Department becomes organized, and as the standard of the Egyptians, both in point of character and education, is gradually raised, it will, I trust, be possible, not only to substitute Egyptian, in the place of European, subordinate agency, but also to confide the supreme direction of several Departments, in which European influence is now predominant, to Egyptian hands. This is the policy which has already been pursued in two important branches of the Administration. The Post Office and the Accounts branch of the Financial Department were organized under English auspices. Both of these Departments are now, I am glad to say, under the direction of very competent Egyptians.* A similar policy should, as I venture to think, be very gradually and tentatively pursued in other branches of the Administration, as opportunities occur. It is, indeed, the sole policy which will enable Egypt to pass without any violent shock from the imperfect system under which the country was, until very recently, governed, to a new system, under which provision will be made for the welfare and prosperity of the whole population.

A cognate matter, on which I may here offer some remarks, is the employment of European capital in Egypt. There can be no question, in dealing with this subject, on which side the balance of advantage really lies. Egypt possesses a large external debt. A country in such a situation possesses a special interest in increasing its exports. The best method for attaining this object is to attract European capital with a view to developing the resources of the country. The Egyptian Government, however, frequently displays a reluctance to admit European capital into the country, neither can this reluctance be any matter for surprise. The contracts made in past times with Europeans were often of the most one-sided description. The concessions granted to them have formed the subject of numerous law-suits, frequently resulting in large sums having to be paid by the Egyptian Treasury. The privileges enjoyed by Europeans hamper the Egyptian Government to such an extent that Egyptian Ministers are naturally somewhat unwilling to widen the field of European commercial enterprise. Until of recent years Egypt has certainly not seen the most favourable side of European intervention and co-operation. A prejudice, which is certainly not unnatural, has, therefore, been created against the employment both of Europeans and of European capital. It is to be hoped that under the influence of the many high-minded and capable Europeans of various nationalities now employed in Egypt, and in view of the fact that, with the assistance of European officials in the Egyptian service, contracts are now drawn and concessions made with much greater care and precision than was formerly the case, these opinions will undergo a gradual change. In the meanwhile, although the benefits of introducing European capital into the country are unquestionable, this phase of Egyptian opinion should, I venture to think, be treated with the utmost patience and with every regard to the fact that the Egyptian Treasury has passed through a somewhat bitter experience on this subject.

Medical and Sanitary Administration.

In the purely medical branches of this Administration considerable progress has been made.

"The organization of the Medical Department," Sir Guyer Hunter wrote in August 1883, "is in a most primitive condition, and many of its officers are quite incompetent." ("Commercial No. 29, 1883.") Nothing could be worse than the condition of the hospitals at that time. In 1884 they were inspected by Dr. Sandwith. A very few extracts from his Report will be sufficient to show the state of things which then existed. The Benha hospital, he said, "smelt horribly. There is a very insufficient supply of air and light in the wards." "The so-called hospital at Shibeen is a disgrace to any country." "The Assiout hospital has always been described to me as a bad one, but it is decidedly worse than anything I anticipated." "The Damietta hospital is in a deplorable state."

* I use the term "Egyptians" in the only practical sense in which, as it appears to me, it admits of being used, that is to say, as including members of all the African and Asiatic races who are resident in Egypt.

All this has now been changed. The hospitals, most of which I have myself visited, are clean, properly equipped with beds, bedding, and clothing, and supplied with medicines, appliances, and instruments. The out-patient department, which did not exist under the old régime, has now assumed large proportions. At the Cairo hospital alone over 110,000 cases were treated last year. Six trained English nurses have been attached to the principal hospital in Cairo, to the great advantage of that institution, and also to the benefit of the native nurses and pupils, whom they train and educate by example and precept. It is much to be desired that nurses should be appointed to some of the other principal hospitals in Egypt. Dispensaries, where the poor can obtain gratuitous treatment, have been opened in thirteen towns. They have been fairly successful, but it is difficult to obtain competent doctors to conduct them.

The Lunatic Asylum in its former condition was described by a competent authority as "a den to shudder at, where the wretched inmates used to be chained to the walls, never leaving their cells till they were carried out dead." It is now in perfect order, and is provided with padded rooms, workshops, and gardens.

During the period from 1884 to 1886 a great number of employés, including several of the higher functionaries of the Medical Department, were dismissed. This drastic measure, which naturally caused a good deal of discontent at the time it was adopted, was absolutely necessary in order to purify the service. For the last few years dismissals have been rare, but I fear that a good deal of corruption still exists in this Department.

In order to meet the outbreaks of epidemic disease, such as small-pox and typhus, which constantly recur in Egypt, flying hospitals were organized in 1885, and have since that time continued to be employed. In 1889 the number of patients treated in these hospitals was 2,543, amongst whom 545 deaths occurred.

Considerable progress has been made in the Veterinary Department since 1886, when it was placed in charge of a competent English veterinary surgeon.

The butchers' shops, dairies, slaughter-houses, cattle stalls, &c., have been regularly inspected and controlled, their owners being compelled or induced to maintain them in a satisfactory sanitary condition. Several outbreaks of pleuro-pneumonia and other epizootic diseases have been stamped out.

The registration of births and deaths—a branch of the Department over which a very competent German physician presides—has been greatly improved. So far as regards the large towns, the records may be regarded as fairly correct, but in most of the villages the figures must be taken as merely approximate, whilst in many cases they are totally erroneous. The first essential condition to a knowledge of vital statistics, namely, the preparation of an accurate census, is wanting. The census taken some ten years ago is of little value.

The Medical Department has suffered greatly from the want of an efficient staff of doctors. There are, I am glad to say, a certain number of really competent native doctors, but their number is too few to perform all the work that has to be done. On the other hand, the employment of a large number of European doctors in the Government service is objectionable on financial and on other sufficiently obvious grounds. By far the best plan would be to give young native medical students a thoroughly good training under European supervision, and then to provide a very limited staff of European Inspectors, who should move about the country and see that the hospital and other work is being carried on satisfactorily.

The education given at the School of Medicine in Cairo was somewhat improved last year by the introduction, to a very limited extent, of the European element amongst the professorial staff, but it is still far from being perfect. As regards inspection, only one European Inspector is at present employed. The appointment of one or more Inspectors would be of great benefit to the country, but the not unnatural reluctance of the Egyptian Ministry to increase the number of European employés in the country has so far prevented the adoption of this measure.

Turning from the purely medical to the sanitary portion of the work performed by this Department, I regret to state that my Report must be much less favourable.

Some little progress has indeed been made. An English sanitary engineer was attached to the Department in 1886, who has done all that was possible with the very limited means at his disposal. A pneumatic system of carts for emptying cesspits has been introduced into Cairo, and has been instrumental in removing large quantities of matter outside the city limits without causing a nuisance. The cleaning and the watering of the streets of Cairo have also been improved. Except, however, these minor reforms, it cannot be said that any progress has been made.

In 1883 Sir Guyer Hunter prepared a full Report on the sanitary condition of

Egypt. ("Commercial No. 38, 1883," p. 35.) Since that time I regret to say that little or nothing has been done towards remedying the grave defects which were pointed out by Sir Guyer Hunter. In spite of the somewhat optimistic reports from the various local authorities which are from time to time published in the "Official Journal," sanitary matters throughout Egypt remain for the most part in the same condition as in 1883. The Nile and the canals are still polluted by the contents of drains from mosques and private houses, as well as by the refuse from slaughter-houses, tanneries, rag-depôts, and other insalubrious establishments. Nearly every village has two or more stagnant ponds in its immediate vicinity, of which the waters become putrid during the summer months, but which are, nevertheless, used for drinking purposes. Public latrines have not been established in any of the towns or villages. Not a single town has been provided with sewers. The cemeteries are for the most part in their original unhygienic condition.

The main reason for the absence of progress in connection with this subject has, of course, been want of money. Sanitary reform is expensive, and the resources up to the present time at the disposal of the Egyptian Government have not been sufficient to admit of the question being taken seriously in hand. It has, therefore, had to stand over until other equally essential, but generally less expensive, reforms have been accomplished.

There is, however, some hope that the sanitation of Cairo, which is a matter calling for the most urgent attention of the Government, will shortly be taken in hand. The present state of affairs in connection with this subject is briefly as follows:—

Until recently a system of so-called sewers, which were, however, in reality nothing but elongated cesspools, existed in a portion of Cairo. They were very defective in every way. Their course could be traced by the numerous cases of typhoid fever which occurred in the neighbouring houses. Acting on the advice of the Sanitary Department, the Government decided to close these sewers. The result has been so far satisfactory that since the sewers were closed typhoid fever has entirely disappeared from those quarters of the town in which it was previously most prevalent. On the other hand, considerable inconvenience has been caused to the inhabitants of Cairo in general, for, inasmuch as no means exist for carrying off the rain-water, the streets become almost impassable when a heavy fall of rain occurs. The inconvenience is not so great as it would be in most other countries, as it is only during a very short period of the year that any rain falls in Cairo. Such, however, as it is, it has given rise to loud and very natural complaints.

The only way to remedy this evil is to construct a system of sewers on scientific principles. An eminent English engineer, Mr. Baldwin Latham, was specially deputed some little while ago to report fully on this subject. The plan which Mr. Latham framed, and which, I do not doubt, is very well calculated to attain the object in view, would cost about 700,000*l*. I trust that the Egyptian Government will before long be able to make arrangements for carrying Mr. Latham's plan into execution.

Public Works (exclusive of Irrigation).

This branch of the Public Works Department has for many years past been mainly conducted by French officials. No change has in this respect been made since the British occupation of the country in 1882. I have already mentioned that, however inconvenient and objectionable the dual system of administration may be in principle, the good sense of the individuals concerned often enables it to work fairly well in practice. Such is the case in the branch of the Administration now under discussion. Sir Colin Scott Moncreiff writes to me:—

"I am glad to say that not once since my connection with the Public Works Ministry can I recall an instance of a difficulty arising between the French and English engineers on what may be called national grounds. Politics have made no entrance here. On the contrary, I have had uniformly the cordial and loyal support of M. Barois (at present the Head of this branch of the Administration), M. Grand Bey, and the other French engineers."

There exists at present in Egypt only one Municipality, that of Alexandria. The Municipal Board is composed, in about equal proportions, of members nominated by the Government, and of others elected by the tax-payers from amongst the leading European and native residents in the town. It is to be hoped that this experiment in local self-government will prove a success, but the Municipality is of too recent creation to judge as yet of the results which will be attained.

With this exception, the watering, sweeping, paving,* and (except in Cairo) the lighting of all the towns in Egypt is performed by the Public Works Department, who are also charged with the construction and maintenance of by far the greater portion of the public buildings in the country, such as hospitals, Courts of Justice, schools, post-offices, &c.

The Department has been a good deal crippled for want of funds. At the same time a certain amount of progress has been made. At Alexandria a serviceable Custom-house and a suitable building for the use of the Mixed Courts have been erected. Cairo has been provided with a new Post Office, a Public Debt Office, and Medical Schools. A new public market, which is much required, is also in course of construction. When there has been money to spare, preference has generally been given to hospitals. The large hospitals at Cairo and Alexandria have been almost rebuilt. The hospitals at Zagazig and Mansourah have been greatly improved. A new hospital has been built at Port Said.

Numerous small buildings, generally for the police, have been erected all over the country.

Some progress has been made in the direction of lighting and watering the streets of some of the provincial towns, but they are still, without exception, unpaved.

A supply of good drinking water free of charge to the poor of the provincial towns, especially those, like Tantah and Zagazig, which are removed from the Nile and depend on canals of which the summer supply is uncertain and bad, is very much required. This subject, which presents many difficulties, has been frequently under the consideration of the Public Works Department, and I understand that a commencement of reform in this direction will shortly be made by supplying the town of Assiout with good water.

A local Committee exists in each town, which decides on a general plan to be pursued year after year in the extension and improvement of the streets. When this plan has been approved by the Government, all householders are obliged to conform to it, and only to build on certain lines. This system is by degrees introducing regularity into the native towns, and enabling fresh air to penetrate into many an offensive corner. Excellent maps of most of the principal towns of Egypt have been prepared and lithographed.

I have already spoken of sanitation in dealing with the Medical Department. I will here only add that an attempt was made some years ago to introduce something like order into the sewerage system of Alexandria; it had to be abandoned, as it was found impossible to carry it into execution without infringing the legal rights of the European residents. It is especially in matters of this sort that the rights conferred by the Capitulations hamper well-intentioned efforts at reform, and act in a manner which is in reality detrimental to the true interests of Europeans and natives alike.

Before leaving this subject I may add that I hope at some future time it may be possible to convert the whole of the ground inclosed by the road well known to residents of Cairo as the "Ghezireh Drive" into a people's park. The adoption of this measure would, I believe, be a great boon to all classes of the inhabitants of Cairo. For the present, however, there are, without doubt, many more essential objects to which the limited funds at the disposal of the Public Works Department may more suitably be applied. Indeed, I conceive that there is already a tendency—which is very properly resisted by the officials of the Department—to devote an undue proportion of the money available to the improvement of the capital, to the detriment of the provincial towns, whose interests, though equally deserving, are brought somewhat less prominently to the notice of the Government.

Post Office.

The reform of the postal system, which was commenced under English auspices, has been continued under the able direction of Saba Pasha, who was appointed Director-General of the Post Office in January 1887.

In 1888 the postage on newspapers and other printed matter was reduced by 20 per cent., and at the same time the unit weight on which postage was chargeable was raised from 50 to 150 grammes.

Until quite recently it cost as much to send a letter between any two towns in Egypt as between Egypt and the most distant country in the Postal Union. On the

* I may mention that in the town of Cairo alone there are nearly sixty miles of streets.

1st March, 1890, however, the inland postage was reduced by 50 per cent., that is to say, from P. T. 1 to 5 millièmes. This is equivalent to the cheapest rate charged in any European country.

The effect of this reduction exceeded the most sanguine expectations at the time it was made, for in the first year of its operation the number of letters posted increased by 50 per cent. The loss of revenue in consequence of this reduction, which had been estimated at £ E. 16,000, actually amounted to only £ E. 5,000. The general receipts of the Post Office in 1890 exceeded the expenses by £ E. 17,000. In few European countries has the effect of adopting a cheap and uniform rate been so immediate and decisive.

In 1889 a rural post was organized. By the end of the current year 275 rural stations will have been established.

A variety of other minor but very useful reforms have been instituted, amongst which I may especially mention the organization in 1890 of a gratuitous house to house delivery in the principal towns.

Much progress has been made in the direction of consolidating the Egyptian postal system. The French Government still maintains separate post-offices at Alexandria and Port Saïd. With this exception, all the foreign post-offices have, with the consent of the Powers concerned, been closed.

All the main facilities which are essential for a good working postal service have now been introduced into Egypt. All that remains to be done is gradually to develop the existing system.

Some draft Regulations have been drawn up with a view to the establishment of Post Office Savings Banks, but it is questionable whether the moment has yet arrived when a system of Savings Banks could be introduced into Egypt with any considerable prospect of success.

Lighthouses.

The subjects with which I have so far dealt are for the most part of interest to Her Majesty's Government only because, for obvious reasons, England is concerned in everything which affects the welfare and prosperity of the Government and people of Egypt. There are, however, two Egyptian Administrations which, from this point of view, stand on a somewhat different footing to all others. I allude to the Lighthouse Administration and the Quarantine Board. In view of the large trade between England and the East, direct British interests of great importance are involved in the administration of these two Departments.

The Lighthouse Department is charged with the construction and maintenance of the lights on the Mediterranean coast of Egypt, as well as of those on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea.

I have every reason to believe that this service is very well managed. I have certainly never heard of any complaints of its management. The lights in the Red Sea are frequently inspected by a steamer which was bought in 1882 at a cost of 21,000*l*. In 1883 a new light was erected on the dangerous "Brothers" rock at a cost of about 3,000*l*. In 1889 about 8,500*l*. was expended on a new light on the Island of Shadwan, situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Suez. Two new lights are now being constructed at Alexandria to facilitate entrance into the harbour at night, which, as I have already explained, will be possible so soon as the present tortuous channel has been straightened and deepened.

New lights are greatly required on the eastern side of the Red Sea coast, but the construction of these lights, inasmuch as they are situated in Turkish waters, does not devolve on the Egyptian Government.

The net annual revenue derived from the lighthouses was about £ E. 50,000 some ten years. It has gradually increased until it now stands at about £ E. 60,000 a-year. When, in October 1889, a Commercial Convention was signed between Great Britain and Egypt, it was stipulated that the light dues should be reduced by £ E. 40,000 a-year "as soon as the Tariff provided by the Convention is applied to all the Powers." ("Commercial No. 9, 1890.")

I have already mentioned that negotiations with a view to the signature of Commercial Conventions with other Powers are proceeding. Some satisfactory progress has been made, but it is impossible at present to fix a time when the stipulation which I have quoted above will come into force.

When it does so, I understand that it is proposed to devote the £ E. 40,000 a-year which will then be available to the construction of the Turkish lights. It may, therefore, be hoped that it will eventually be found possible to construct these lights,

which will be of great benefit to navigation, without the necessity arising for imposing any fresh burdens on trade.

Quarantine.

The Quarantine Regulations are applied by a Board sitting at Alexandria, which, although nominally an Egyptian institution, is not, in reality, under the control of the Egyptian Government. The voting power of the Government is, however, strong by reason of the fact that several Egyptian functionaries have seats *ex officio* on the Board. The Government nominates the President and Vice-President. The former is at present English, the latter French. Each of the Powers is represented by a Delegate.

I cannot attempt to deal with this very complicated and difficult subject incidentally in a general despatch. It will be sufficient for me to say that the present system does not work well; it fails to satisfy either those who advocate a severe system of quarantine, or those who are more disposed to disbelieve in the efficacy of any quarantine system. But in this case, as in that of other international institutions, the moderation of the individual members of the Board does a good deal to mitigate the bad effects of the system. Although troublesome and difficult questions frequently arise, there is, on the whole, less general friction now than was the case a few years ago.

On one point, I think, all are agreed: it is that the strict application of the present Rules, whilst they fail to satisfy the requirements of the rigorous quarantinists, causes a great deal of useless and unnecessary vexation to trade. No one who has actually seen the working of the system can, I think, deny the truth of this remark. I could give numberless instances in point. It is the manifestly vexatious character of many of the Regulations, rather than any scientific belief or disbelief in the efficacy of quarantine, which gives rise to so many justifiable complaints.

Negotiations are now in progress with a view to the adoption of a more rational system, but, in view of the great difficulty of conciliating not only the various interests, but also the divergent opinions which are involved, it is impossible to feel very sanguine that they will lead to any practical result.

Whilst on this subject I may mention that during the recent severe outbreak of cholera in the Hedjaz rigorous measures were adopted to prevent the disease spreading into Egypt. As a matter of fact, no case of cholera occurred in Egypt. It is, of course, impossible to state with confidence whether this immunity from disease was due to the preventive measures or to other causes, but I think that all are agreed in holding that some special measures for dealing with the pilgrims returning from Mecca are both necessary and justifiable, more especially in times when an epidemic is threatened.

Khedivial Steam-packets.

This Administration was a few years ago in a very bad state. Many of the ships were useless. The accounts of each year showed a deficit. Some of the old vessels have now been repaired. Other new vessels have been bought. The deficit has been turned into a surplus, which in 1889 amounted to £ E. 46,000, and in 1890 to £ E. 35,000. The decrease in the latter year was due to diminished traffic by reason of cholera in Arabia and Syria. The service is becoming favourably known to the public, so much so that, at certain seasons, the ships are too small to deal with the traffic. This difficulty will, however, disappear next year, as the fleet is about to be strengthened by the addition of three fast steamers having double the accommodation of the present ships for first-class passengers.

Slavery.

The decay of slavery in Egypt dates from the Convention negotiated in 1877 by Lord Vivian with the Egyptian Government.

A Khedivial Decree, which was issued imultaneously with the signature of the Convention, provided that slavery in the Soudan was to cease in 1889. This portion of the Convention has, for obvious reasons, remained a dead letter. Indeed, one of the first acts performed by General Gordon when he arrived at Khartoum in February 1884 was to issue a Proclamation which sanctioned slavery. ("Egypt No. 9, 1884.") This measure was a good deal criticized. I expressed an opinion at the time that, under the circumstances which then existed, General Gordon was perfectly justified in issuing the Proclamation. In point of fact, even if no rebellion had occurred in the

Soudan, it would, I believe, have been impossible to have given practical effect to this particular provision of the Convention.

In all other respects the Convention has amply fulfilled the expectations of those who negotiated it. It has been found a very efficient instrument for the gradual suppression of slavery.

The special influence exerted for the last few years by Her Majesty's Government in Egypt has, of course, given a great impetus to the work of suppression.

Before 1882 the duties of the Slave Trade Department were to watch the desert roads and to prevent caravans bringing slaves into Egypt. The sale of slaves in Egypt, the manumission of slaves, and the prosecution of slave-dealers were not in the hands of the Department.

This state of affairs was unsatisfactory. It was almost impossible to keep an effective watch over all the routes leading into Egypt, and unless this could be done the supply of slaves could not be cut off. The only practicable way of dealing with the question was to check the demand.

In January 1883 an important change was made. The Slave Trade Department was incorporated into the Police, and placed under the orders of Colonel Schaefer, who was charged to carry out the judicial stipulations of the Convention. It was not, however, till 1885 that the Manumission Bureaux were placed under his orders.

Colonel Schaefer found that there were thirty-two slave-dealers in Cairo, many of whom conducted their operations openly. They were arrested, tried by court-martial, and severely punished. It may be confidently stated that no slave-dealer now exists either in Cairo or in any part of Egypt. A very few slaves may still be occasionally smuggled into the country and sold privately, but, for all practical purposes, I think it may be said that the Slave Trade is extinct.

The question of the possession of slaves presented very peculiar difficulties. The Regulations based on the Convention of 1877 were drawn up more with a view to the suppression of the Slave Trade than to the suppression of slavery. Moreover, the treatment of this question brought the Department in direct contact with some of the most delicate features of Mahommedan social life. In overcoming these latter difficulties the greatest assistance has been derived from the tact and judgment shown by Major Hassan Haris, a Mahommedan officer of the Slavery Department.

In 1885 the number of Manumission Bureaux was largely increased. This step, together with the fact that the slaves did not, as heretofore, find any difficulty in obtaining their certificates of freedom, had the immediate effect of quadrupling the number of freed slaves. The number of slaves who apply for certificates is now, however, decreasing every year, the fact being that there are relatively few slaves left in private houses.

Looking to the fact that freedom from slavery is now obtained with the greatest ease, people who wish to become owners of slaves are naturally reluctant to risk their money in such a bad investment. So great a change has, in fact, come over native public opinion in connection with this matter that many slaves now leave the harems without taking the trouble to come to the Manumission Bureaux for certificates of freedom. They feel sure that no one will interfere with their liberty. People are beginning to be unwilling to have anything to say to slaves. Many wish to get rid of them, as they have to improve their condition considerably in order to induce them to remain in their houses.

I do not doubt that in most houses, if not in all, the slaves who still remain are now better treated than is generally the case with free servants. The Refuge for Female Slaves which was established a few years ago, and which is partly supported by voluntary subscriptions, obtained for the most part in England, has been very useful. An institution of this nature will be required for some time to come. Any attempt at proselytism has been rigorously forbidden, with the result that the institution, far from encountering opposition, is generally viewed with favour by the Mahommedan population. The demand for domestic servants is often greater than the Home can supply.

I regard this change in public opinion as of greater importance than any remedial measures which can be adopted by the Slavery Department, but, without doubt, it is largely due to those measures. Owing to the cautious manner in which the Department has worked, and still more owing to the influence and wise moderation of the Khedive, who has never ceased to take the warmest personal interest in this subject, the change has been effected imperceptibly and without encountering any strong opposition.

I have frequently had occasion to appeal to His Highness for assistance in connec-

tion with individual cases of slavery, which lay in some degree outside the strict letter of the Convention, and I have never appealed in vain. I doubt whether many natives of Egypt themselves realize the extent to which slavery has been already abolished. However much British influence may have helped to quicken the movement, the chief merit of this great reform is to be attributed to the Khedive. Without the active support and co-operation of His Highness relatively slight progress would have been made.

It may, therefore, be said that the Slave Trade in Egypt is extinct, and that slavery is moribund.

Colonel Schaefer complains that his office has become almost a sinecure. For the present, however, its abolition would be a premature measure. It will require watchfulness for some while to come to prevent a revival of slavery.

Preservation of Monuments.

It might be supposed that if there was one subject more than another which stood outside the sphere of international rivalry it was the preservation of the ancient monuments of Egypt, in which it may be said, without exaggeration, that the whole civilized world is interested. Unfortunately this is not the case. The subject has recently given rise to a good deal of acrimonious controversy.

The opinions, not only of Her Majesty's Government, but also of the Society established in London for the preservation of the monuments, whose views have been most reasonable, and have been expressed with great moderation,* have apparently been a good deal misunderstood in France. On the other hand, it is impossible to be surprised at the susceptibility evinced in France on this subject. French savants have in the past rendered the most eminent services to the cause of Egyptology. For many years past the Archæological Department in Egypt has been mainly, though by no means exclusively, in French hands. Any attempt to take it out of French hands would be certain to cause a good deal of unnecessary irritation, and looking at the circumstances connected with the general situation in Egypt, would not unreasonably be regarded by the French as an unfriendly and ungenerous act. No such attempt has, however, been made. What has happened is this: there can be no doubt that for some while past the monuments have been insufficiently guarded. A very general, and, I believe, well-founded, impression exists that sufficient attention has not been paid to the practical and administrative work of the Archæological Department.

Serious depredations and mutilations have from time to time taken place. A bad case which occurred some while ago at the tombs at Beni Hassan attracted a special degree of attention. Under these circumstances it was proposed by various authorities here that, amongst other reforms, an English Inspector should be appointed who would have been subordinate to the Head of the Archæological Department, and who would probably have been of very considerable assistance to him. A similar proposal was made by persons interested in the subject in England. There was nothing unreasonable in this proposal, neither was it made with any sort of intention of detracting from the authority of the French Head of the Department. When, however, it was found that the nomination of an Englishman, even in a subordinate position, gave umbrage in France, the proposal was at once dropped. As matters now stand, the Egyptian Government has decided to nominate two Inspectors. These officials have not yet been selected, but it is improbable that either of them will be English. Neither is it at all necessary that they should be English. All, I conceive, that is required is that whatever steps are possible should be taken to guard the monuments. All who are interested in Egyptology, of whatever nationality they may be, have a right to demand that this should be done, and will, I presume, be satisfied if it is done. I know of no special reason for supposing that the monuments will not be as well guarded by the members of one nationality as by those of another.

The grant made to the Archæological Department by the Egyptian Government has been increased. It now amounts to £ E. 10,000 a-year, of which about £ E. 6,100 is devoted to the Museum, and £ E. 2,900 to the preservation of monuments. This sum is exclusive of the money derived from a small tax paid by the tourists who now visit Egypt every winter in large numbers.

The question of the Regulations under which private excavations are to be allowed in Egypt has recently been under discussion. After a good deal of trouble Rules have been laid down by the Egyptian Government which safeguard the interests of the

* A few rather indiscreet letters have appeared in the English papers which caused some irritation to the French, but they did not in any way emanate from the Society.

Ghizeh Museum, and at the same time afford all reasonable liberty of action to private excavators. It is greatly to be hoped that these Rules will be strictly, but at the same time fairly, applied.

Special attention is being paid to the prevention of fire at the Museum, and provision is being made for the extinction of fire should one occur.

It would, without doubt, be desirable that a special fireproof building should be constructed to serve as a Museum, but the large sum of money necessary for this object is not at present available.

It remains to be seen whether the measures which have now been adopted will result in the monuments being better preserved in the future than has been the case in the past. It is also to be hoped that this subject, which would appear to be singularly suited for international co-operation, will soon cease to be a matter for international dispute. The mere fact that a purely scientific matter of this sort, which lies wholly outside the domain of politics, should have caused international recrimination, shows how little reliance can be placed in the smooth working of other international institutions which touch interests of a more material description.

In addition to the monuments of Ancient Egypt, there are a large number of mosques and other buildings in Egypt, some of which were constructed during the best period of Mahomedan art. They are looked after by a Committee. A certain sum of money, which is provided by the Wakf Administration, is spent every year on their conservation, and where that is impossible, on their restoration. The money appears, so far as I have been able to judge, to be judiciously spent, but on matters of this sort there is manifestly room for a good deal of difference of opinion.

The ancient Korans, and other valuable Oriental documents deposited at the Khedivial Library, are in charge of a very competent German savant, Dr. Völlers, who takes the greatest interest in his work.

Conclusion.

To sum up, the mere fact that public tranquillity has been guaranteed by the presence of a British garrison in Egypt has given fair scope to the action of those economic causes which work towards the improvement of the country. Confidence has been restored, capital has been invested. Independently of any specific acts of interference, the predominance of English influence has tended to diminish arbitrary and oppressive conduct on the part of Government officials, and to instil into the minds of the people the idea that they have certain rights which must be respected. I do not doubt that the fear of English interference has acted as a powerful check on maladministration, and has prevented the execution of many objectionable acts. The Egyptian Treasury has, under circumstances of great difficulty, been placed in a solvent condition, and certain measures, involving a relief of fiscal burdens, have been already adopted. The *corvée* has been wholly, and the use of the *courbash* almost wholly, abolished. Corruption has been diminished. The system of irrigation, on which the material prosperity of the country mainly depends, has been greatly improved, both by the execution of works under the direction of skilled engineers and by insuring a fair distribution of water.

A small but efficient army has been organized; slavery is rapidly disappearing; some considerable progress has been made in the direction of prison, medical, and educational reform.

Considering the very peculiar difficulties which have attended the work of reform in Egypt, the progress already made is, I think, as great as could reasonably be expected. The extent of that progress can, perhaps, only be fully appreciated by those who were well acquainted with the condition of affairs in Egypt some ten or twelve years ago.

I will not attempt the invidious task of stating to what class, and still less to what individual efforts, this progress is mainly due; but I wish to say that the work of the various reformers, whether European or Egyptian, would certainly have been relatively unproductive of result had they not received the consistent and cordial support of the Khedive, whose personal influence has been uniformly exerted on the side of moderate and gradual reform.

There can be no doubt that when, in 1882, the country was occupied by British troops, great satisfaction was felt by all classes of the population at being relieved from the military dictatorship of Arabi and his coadjutors. Subsequently a feeling of disappointment ensued. It was thought in Egypt, and also perhaps to some extent in England, that British intervention would bring about immediate and striking improve-

ments in the government of the country. The defects which then existed in the whole system of government in Egypt were, however, too deeply rooted to admit of any speedy remedy being applied to them. Moreover, the problems which had to be solved were of no ordinary difficulty. Inasmuch as most of the evils which existed in Egypt arose from an abuse of power on the part of the governing classes, reforms naturally took the direction of placing various restraints on the exercise of that power. It was no easy matter to introduce an orderly administration, and to inculcate respect for the law, without at the same time profoundly shaking the props which had heretofore supported the whole edifice of Egyptian society. The remarks which I have made in this despatch will show that this problem is not even yet solved.

As time went on the reforms which were gradually introduced began to bear fruit. I believe that the improved condition of the country is now very generally recognized by the mass of the population, and that, even amongst the influential classes, the opposition to reform is not so pronounced as was formerly the case.

In spite of the progress which has been made, a great deal remains to be done before the general condition of Egypt can be characterized as satisfactory. Grave defects still exist in the fiscal system. A further reduction of taxation is much required. The system of irrigation admits of further extension and improvement. Above all, the judicial and police systems require to be put on a sound footing. The work of educational reform, on which the political future of the country so greatly depends, can only be said to have commenced.

The question of whether the work which has been so well begun should be continued under British auspices is one that must be decided on many grounds, some of which stand outside the sphere of local Egyptian politics. I can only say that, looking at the matter from the local point of view, any premature abandonment of the work would very probably undo all the good which has been done. The partial reforms of which only the seeds may be said to have been sown have not as yet had time to take root. They have, however, had time to let the people of Egypt realize more fully than at any previous period both the extent of the misgovernment from which they had previously suffered, and the benefits which may accrue to them from an improved administration. Any attempt which might now be made to return to the abuses of the old régime would almost assuredly end in serious internal dissensions in Egypt, and not improbably in the fabrication for Europe of an Egyptian question of a more serious nature than any which now exists.

After the Arabi rebellion had been quelled in 1882 the general policy, which found a large measure of support in England and elsewhere, was one of reform, to be followed by the speedy departure of the British garrison from Egypt. The policy of speedy evacuation would have been extremely difficult of execution, but it might, perhaps, have been carried out had not the army of General Hicks been overwhelmed at the moment when it was in contemplation. The events which took place in the Soudan rendered the continuance of the British occupation an imperative necessity. The policy of reform was also possible of execution, provided public tranquillity was secured and European influence was allowed its due weight in the future government of the country. But it was a policy which required, above all things, time for its execution, and necessarily involved the prolongation of the British occupation. It was, perhaps, insufficiently recognized at the time that no middle course could be adopted. A policy of speedy reform, to be followed at once by evacuation, was wholly impossible of execution. The conditions of the problem which had to be solved did not admit of the attainment of both of these objects.

That the continued occupation of Egypt by British troops should be distasteful to the Government and people of a nation with whom most Englishmen would wish to live on the most friendly terms, though it can be no matter for surprise, is certainly one for deep regret, more especially as the work now being carried out by the Egyptian Government, with a very limited amount of English guidance and assistance, is one which is far from affecting exclusively the interests of England. On the contrary, it affects mainly the interests of Egypt, and, indirectly, the general cause of civilization and progress. I may, perhaps, be allowed to add that to no one is it a source of greater regret than to myself, for it was my good fortune at one time to act in cordial co-operation with various distinguished French officials in the work of improving the administration of Egypt. I have never, as your Lordship is aware, been a partizan of a British occupation of Egypt. Indeed, during my early connection with Egyptian affairs, I did all that lay in my power to prevent the creation of a state of things which would render any foreign occupation necessary. If, at this moment, I thought the evacuation of the country a policy the execution of which did not involve risks which

no prudent Government should run, I should not hesitate to recommend its adoption. It is because I am convinced of the serious nature of those risks that I am at present unable to recommend it.

Whether it would have been possible to have avoided any foreign occupation of the country may be a matter of opinion. This question, however, only presents an historic interest. As matters now stand, I venture to think that the Government and people of England cannot lightly throw off the responsibilities which they have not willingly assumed, but which have rather been thrust upon them by the force of circumstances.

There has been at times so much misrepresentation as regards the treatment of French local interests that I should wish to add some observations on this subject. The rise of Egyptian credit and the general improvement in the financial condition of the country has, of course, been of the utmost benefit to all those who are interested in the solvency of the Egyptian Treasury. Amongst these the French creditors of the Egyptian Government, who have at all times shown themselves singularly tenacious of their rights, occupy an important place. The Treaty rights of the French Government have, of course, been scrupulously respected, whilst any real or alleged rights secured by custom have been treated with the utmost consideration. The slight fluctuations which have taken place in French trade are due to ordinary economic causes over which no Government has any control. French contractors have been largely employed in the execution both of railway and canal works. Two important bridges now being constructed over the Nile have been placed in the hands of an eminent French firm. There has been no general displacement of French officials in the Egyptian service. On the contrary, I could cite instances in which French employes, whose services were scarcely required, have been allowed to remain in the service merely by reason of their nationality. In 1882 there were 328 Frenchmen in the service of the Egyptian Government. In 1886 the number was 319, a reduction of only nine. ("Egypt No. 6, 1887.") I cannot state the precise number of Frenchmen employed at present, but it cannot have undergone any considerable modification since 1886. Although more attention has been recently paid to English education, which was previously much neglected, no effort has been made to diminish instruction in the French language. On the contrary, the number of French teachers has been increased, and French education has been extended and improved. Neither has any effort been made to introduce English or Indian rather than French substantive law and procedure as the model on which to base the judicial system of the country, although in some respects the former rather than the latter is peculiarly suited to the special conditions which exist in Egypt. When the headship of the School of Law was left vacant the English officials in Egypt were the first to propose that the place should be occupied by a French jurist. Even in such a purely non-political question as the conservation of the ancient monuments of Egypt a proposal made to employ an English subordinate was at once dropped when it was seen that it gave offence in France. The fullest licence has been accorded to the French local press. A certain amount of resentment exists both amongst Englishmen and Egyptians in Egypt owing to the fact that in many cases French influence has been exerted to hinder the work of reform, but the extreme dislike of everything English which, I regret to say, is manifested by a section of the French residents in Egypt finds, so far as I know, no counterpart amongst any class of English society in the country. The recent nomination of a Judicial Adviser was not in any way directed against French interests, neither did it affect in the smallest degree any right acquired by the French Government. It was absolutely necessary in order to improve the judicial and police systems, of the working of which none have complained more loudly than the French residents in Egypt. On the whole, I venture to assert that, in spite of no little provocation to pursue an opposite course, French interests in Egypt have been treated with the utmost friendly consideration. I cannot, I regret to say, pretend that this conciliatory policy has produced much effect in mitigating French hostility. Nevertheless, I venture to think that, in so far as such a course is possible without sacrificing any important Egyptian interest, it should be continued, and that every care should be taken to avoid needless causes of irritation.

I cannot close this Report without bearing testimony to the excellent behaviour and discipline of the British troops which have garrisoned Egypt. Their conduct has materially contributed to lighten the difficulties necessarily attendant on the military occupation of a foreign country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 65.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

(No. 84. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 10, 1891.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 118 of the 28th ultimo, on the subject of Egyptian commercial autonomy, and I have to inform you that I approve the manner in which you conveyed to the Porte a warning of the risk it would incur by listening to the suggestions of Russia and France, and by attempting to go back on its Firmans.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 66.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

Sir,

War Office, Pall Mall, April 14, 1891.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Stanhope to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 9th March, 1891, from the General Officer commanding the troops in Egypt, with inclosures, regarding the action fought on the 19th February, 1891, at Tokar by the Egyptian troops under Colonel Holled Smith, Governor-General, Suakin, and the reoccupation, by the Egyptian Government, of the Eastern Soudan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RALPH THOMPSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

Major-General Walker to Mr. Stanhope.

Sir,

Cairo, March 9, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the inclosed despatch from Colonel Holled Smith, commanding Soudan expeditionary force, together with a covering letter from the Sirdar, Egyptian army.

I am strongly of opinion that this prompt and resolute advance on Tokar has entirely dispersed the Dervish forces in the neighbourhood, and will render further fighting unnecessary to secure the pacification of this part of the Eastern Soudan.

Colonel Holled Smith appears to have acted with great vigour and intelligence, and to have been ably supported by his Staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Settle, Royal Engineers, Quarter-Master-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Rundle, Royal Artillery, Assistant Adjutant-General, in particular, are stated to have rendered most excellent service.

Captain Beech, C.M.G., 20th Hussars, has been repeatedly mentioned by my predecessor as a cavalry officer of the greatest gallantry and dash, and it is with much pleasure that I have forwarded to the Military Secretary a recommendation that his brilliant services in this action should be rewarded with the Victoria Cross.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. WALKER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to Major-General Walker.

Sir,

Tokar, February 27, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to forward a despatch by Colonel Holled Smith, King's Royal Rifles, Governor-General Suakin, reporting on the action fought on the 19th instant at Tokar, which resulted in the complete defeat of Osman Digna's force, and the reoccupation, by the Egyptian Government, of the Eastern Soudan.

Colonel Holled Smith, King's Royal Rifles, has conducted the operations with great foresight, and his promptitude in rapidly seizing an important position resulted in the complete defeat of the enemy with comparatively slight loss to the Egyptian army.

The position of the dead on the field shows the determined nature of the Dervish

attack. The ground being very bushy, the advance was concealed until close quarters.

The steady conduct of the infantry and the dash of the cavalry, under Captain Beech, C.M.G., 20th Hussars, were all that could be desired.

Lieutenant-Colonel Settle, R.E., Q.M.G. Egyptian Army; Lieutenant-Colonel Rundle, D.S.O., R.A., A.A.G. Soudan Field Force; and Major Wingate, D.S.O., R.A., Intelligence Officer, ably assisted him in Staff duties.

To Colonel Settle's energy the good arrangements for transport of water, rations, and ammunition are due.

I am specially bringing to notice an act of gallantry on the part of Captain Beech, C.M.G., 20th Hussars, E.A., in saving the life of a native officer, which I trust His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief will consider worthy of reward.

I greatly regret the death of Captain Barrow, South Lancashire Regiment, E.A., killed early in the action. He was a most gallant and promising officer.

Surgeon J. Myles, M.S., with scanty materials did excellent service.

The officers commanding battalions appear to have held their battalions in hand and behaved with coolness and decision.

The officers and men of the Royal Navy rendered most valuable assistance in embarkations and disembarkations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. GRENFELL, *Sirdar.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 66.

Colonel Holled Smith to Major-General Sir F. Grenfell.

(Strictly Confidential.)
Sir,

*Head-quarters, Eastern Soudan Field Force, Afafit,
February 22, 1891.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 16th instant I advanced from Trinkitat at 8 A.M., following route south, which separates the sea from an extensive backwater or lagoon, with the following force to occupy El Teb:—

- 1 squadron cavalry.
2 6-centim. Krupp guns, No. 4 Battery.
4th Egyptian Battalion.
11th Soudanese Battalion.
12th Soudanese Battalion
Medical Corps, with—
Reserve Ammunition Column.
Water Column.
Entrenching Tools Column.
Forage and Rations Column.
Baggage Column.

In all 85 officers, 1,916 men, 151 horses, 195 camels, 36 mules.

Each man carried two days' biscuits and ninety rounds of ammunition, and each horse two days' forage.

A water depot was established on south side of Trinkitat.

As intelligence reached me that the enemy were occupying El Teb, I ordered all transport columns to be left at this dépôt, except the reserve ammunition and water columns, garrisoning it with two guns and sixty men of No. 4 Battery, and continued the advance in the following formation :—

Cavalry 1 to 2 miles to the front, protecting the right and left flanks.

[illegible]

During the advance enemy's scouts were reported crossing our front proceeding south to Teb.

At 1:45 P.M. the cavalry sighted El Teb, and reported it unoccupied, the force then marched into El Teb, occupied the wells, which were very dry, and bivouacked for the night.

The march was very trying owing to the great and heavy sand.

The force remained at El Teb on the 17th and 18th instant in order to throw in supplies and fortify the position.

On the 19th instant, at daylight, I advanced on the old Mamourieh of Tokar district, with the following:—

1 squadron cavalry.

4th Battalion.

11th Battalion.

12th Battalion.

Medical Corps.

Reserve Ammunition, Stretchers, and Water Columns, leaving behind, to garrison El Teb

Fort, Lieutenant Pullen, R.A., Commandant, with—

50 men of No. 4 Battery.


$\frac{1}{2}$ company 12th Battalion.

2 6-centim. guns.

The latest intelligence of the enemy's movements was that they were encamped between the sandhills lying to the east of Kurbayit, and that they intended to attack us in flank during our advance.

The old Mamourieh was reported unoccupied.

To resist their attack the troops advanced in the following formation:—



The general line of advance was south-south-west, in order to avoid the thick bush which was on our left flank.

At 9:30 A.M. the Mamourieh was sighted, the cavalry having reported that the enemy's scouts had been seen retiring towards our left rear. The cavalry then occupied the old ruins, and the troops were brought up to north-east side about 10 A.M.

Scarcely had they reached it before the enemy were seen advancing through the thick bush which closely surrounded the Mamourieh.

This consists of a series of ruins and mounds rendering any continuous line of defence an impossibility.

With the short time at my disposal I disposed the troops as shown in the accompanying sketch, the men having to move at the double to take up their position.

Some Dervishes had actually occupied some ruins on our left flank before the 11th Battalion had taken up the defence assigned to them. The main body of the Dervishes were 50 yards from our front line, and were extending to the right and left to envelop the position.

The bulk of their force was directed against the line occupied by the 12th Battalion, their attack being pushed home with their usual intrepidity and fearlessness. The troops, however, stood their ground, and did not yield one inch throughout the line.

They opened with independent firing, which steadied down in a short time to volleys.

As soon as the on-rush of the Dervishes was checked the 11th Battalion advanced into the bush and cleared them out, taking the ruins in their front, occupied by Dervishes, at the point of the bayonet, and occupying a commanding point 500 yards to the south-east of their original position.

The 4th Battalion remained in position, and with the escort of the transport column (half company of 12th Battalion) protected the rear.

The cavalry now advanced into the bush on the right, and did good execution over some ground that was fairly open.

This completed the rout of the Dervish attacking column, and they retreated in the direction of Temerin.

During the action Captain H. L. Barrow, South Lancashire Regiment, one of my Staff officers, was shot dead, and Captain Macdonald, D.S.O., and Lieutenant Jackson, Gordon Highlanders, had their horses shot under them.

The loss of Captain Barrow I deeply deplore; he was an admirable Staff officer, who had worked hard night and day in the organization of the force. He was a most promising officer.

The troops then formed up on the high ground occupied by 11th Battalion, and leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Rundle, D.S.O., in command of two companies of 4th Battalion and one company of 12th Battalion to hold the position and protect wounded and transport, I ordered an advance on Afaft, the head-quarters of the Dervish force.

Their reserve still occupied the sand-hills to the south-east, but, as an advance would enflade them, I decided to march straight on Afaft, turning their position.

On our arriving opposite the sand-hills they retreated hurriedly by Afaft.

At 4 P.M. the cavalry reported Afaft unoccupied. The troops bivouaced for the night.

Many Arabs who remained behind in this large and straggling village received us with many expressions of joy.

I estimate the strength of the Dervishes at 4,000; this was the number paraded in the morning by Osman Digna, 2,000 of whom were held in reserve in the sand-hills.

These were largely composed of non-fighting men.

Most of Osman Digna's leading Emirs were killed, and Osman Digna, who witnessed the action from Afaft, retired before our arrival to Temerin, thence to Debelawit.

Our losses were—10 killed and 48 wounded.

I have the honour to bring to your notice the good services rendered by the following officers:—

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Settle, R.E., Chief of the Staff, rendered me the most valuable assistance in every way in organizing the force for attack, and was especially active and useful in placing the troops in position to meet the rapid advance of the enemy.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Rundle, D.S.O., R.A., A.A.G., rendered himself very useful, and showed himself an efficient Staff officer, and rendered good service during the attack.

Brevet-Major Wingate, D.S.O., R.A., performed the duties of Assistant Adjutant-General Intelligence to my entire satisfaction, and he directed the advance of the column through the thick bush.

Surgeon J. R. Myles, M.S. The arrangements made by this officer with the small means at his disposal were in every way satisfactory. Of his disposition for, and unremitting attention to, the wounded, I cannot speak too highly.

He was ably assisted by Surgeon Gore-Graham, M.S.

Captain Machell, Essex Regiment, as Officer Commanding Lines of Communications, worked very hard in organizing the transport, and did good service during the action in getting his camels under cover, and doing his best to keep them together.

Lieutenant Curtis, R.E., with the late Captain Barrow, worked indefatigably to prepare the force at Suakin. It is due to their exertions that the force was enabled to leave Suakin with so much expedition.

Captain G. W. Hockett Pain, Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment, commanded 4th Battalion to my entire satisfaction, and kept his men well in hand.

Captain H. M. Sidney, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, ably assisted his Commanding officer.

Captain Besant, Norfolk Regiment, commanded 12th Battalion, and showed great promptitude in getting his men in position, which his men held against great odds.

Captain Macdonald, D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders, commanded 11th Battalion. This battalion rendered the greatest assistance in protecting our left flank, and the Officer commanding showed his usual soldier-like qualities in meeting the repeated and turning attacks of the enemy.

Captain Martyr, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, as second in command of 12th Battalion, showed great dash in seizing a house, thereby checking the advance of the enemy, and giving time for remainder of battalion to form up.

Lieutenant Jackson, Gordon Highlanders, and Lieutenant Cotton, Shropshire Light Infantry, of 11th Battalion, rendered their Commanding officer most valuable assistance.

Captain Beech, C.M.G., 20th Hussars. The splendid soldier-like qualities of this dashing cavalry officer are well known to you. His services from Trinkitat to the occupation of Afafit have been simply invaluable. The scouting was admirably done, and in the charge against the Dervishes he gallantly saved the life of one of his officers, Lieutenant Shehata Eff Kamil.

Commander Dudding, R.N., as Senior Naval Officer, rendered me valuable assistance in embarking the force at Suakiu, and disembarking them at Trinkitat. He further arranged boat transport to throw in supplies to the water depôt.

The officers and men under his command worked with the greatest zeal to push the expedition forward.

Lieutenant Craddock, R.N., Naval Aide-de-camp, was ever ready to carry out orders promptly.

I attach the state of troops in action, casualty returns, and list of Emirs killed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HOLLED SMITH.

Inclosure 4 in No. 66.

STATE of Troops in the Action of Afafit, February 19, 1891.

Corps.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Mules.	Camels.	Guns.
Head-Quarter Staff	9	9	11	..	83	..
Artillery	..	..	..	..		
Cavalry	7	116	123	..		
4th Battalion	15	517	3	13		
11th Battalion	24	614	4	15		
12th Battalion	22	491	3	8		
Medical Corps	3	10	3	..		
Veterinary Department	1	3	1	..		
Commissariat Department	..	..	..	..	83	..
Ordnance Department	..	..	..	..		
Intelligence Staff	..	2	1	..		
Total	81	1,762	149	36	83	..

(Signed)

HENRY H. SETTLE, L.E.W.A.,
Chief of Staff, Eastern Soudan Field Force.

Afafit, February 22, 1891.

Inclosure 5 in No. 66.

NOMINAL Roll of those Killed in Action at Afafit on the 19th February, 1891.

Regimental No.	Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Remarks.
	Captain ..	Barrow, H. L. ..	South Lancashire Regiment	Staff Officer to O. C. Force.
127	Nafar ..	Said Ibn. Hilmi ..	11th Battalion ..	
251	" ..	Farag El Said ..	" ..	
255	" ..	Farag El Shadlie ..	" ..	
272	" ..	Gohar Abdelal ..	" ..	
603	" ..	Morgan Biar ..	" ..	
173	Drummer	Said Ali ..	" ..	
898	Nafar ..	Tomb Beshir ..	" ..	
855	" ..	Abdalla Mohd. Soudani ..	" ..	
..	" ..	Kheirallah Adam ..	12th Battalion ..	

(Signed)

HENRY H. SETTLE, L.E.W.A.,
Chief of Staff, Eastern Soudan Field Force.

Afafit, February 22, 1891.

Inclosure 6 in No. 66.

NOMINAL Roll of those Wounded in Action at Afafit on the 19th February, 1891.

Regimental No.	Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Remarks.
	Captain ..	Beech, J. R., C.M.G. ..	20th Hussars ..	Slightly.
	M. Awal ..	Ali Eff. Kamel ..	Cavalry ..	Severely.
	" ..	Shehata Eff. Kamel ..	" ..	Slightly.
1,068	Nafar ..	Ali El Far ..	" ..	"
387	" ..	Hassain Moursi ..	" ..	"
1,409	" ..	Hassanain Hussain ..	4th Battalion ..	Very severely.
1,245	" ..	Said Mohd. Bargat ..	" ..	Severely.
536	Shaw ..	Morgan Mohd. Ali ..	11th Battalion ..	Very severely.
405	Nafar ..	Adam Hamid ..	" ..	Mortally (since dead).
872	" ..	Kheirallah Ibrahim ..	" ..	Severely.
827	" ..	Mersal Hag Ahmed ..	" ..	"
940	" ..	Abdallah Beecheet ..	" ..	Very severely.
193	" ..	Buckeet Mohd. ..	" ..	Severely.
225	" ..	Said Salam ..	" ..	"
249	W. O. ..	Mirsal Sharaf ..	" ..	"
507	Nafar ..	Kheirallah Abdallah ..	" ..	"
965	" ..	Buckeet Salem ..	" ..	"
401	" ..	Said Mohd. Gad ..	" ..	Very severely.
364	" ..	Abdallah Mohd. Shaban ..	" ..	Severely.
371	" ..	Gomah Shaheen ..	" ..	"
280	" ..	Said Ahmed Barah ..	" ..	Very severely.
413	Onb. ..	Farag Soudani El Sogyer ..	" ..	"
311	Nafar ..	Siroor Soudani ..	" ..	"
313	" ..	Rehau El Soudani ..	" ..	Severely.
110	" ..	Said Ahmed Hedeyeh ..	" ..	"
352	Shaw ..	Said Sid Ahmed ..	" ..	"
691	Nafar ..	Ragab Hawza ..	" ..	"
923	" ..	Almaz Morgan ..	" ..	"
937	" ..	Kheirallah Tabier ..	" ..	"
307	" ..	Said Abu Zaid ..	" ..	"
468	" ..	Rehan Ahmed ..	" ..	"
303	" ..	Said Moussa Kilali ..	" ..	"
697	" ..	Farag Mohd. Geda ..	" ..	"
463	" ..	Siroor Hamad ..	" ..	Very severely.
681	" ..	Faragallah Yousif ..	" ..	Slightly.
289	" ..	Said Hassanian ..	" ..	"

Regimental No.	Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Remarks.
	M. Awal	Khalil Eff. Hamdi	12th Battalion	Slightly.
720	Shaw	Gohar Raffi	"	Very severely.
380	W. O.	Mabrook Ibrahim	"	Slightly.
793	Nafar	Abdallah Buckeet	"	Very severely.
374	"	Mohd. Sami	"	"
897	"	Abdul Fatah Mustapha	"	Severely.
815	"	Bilal Mohamed	"	"
190	W. O.	Faragallah Suliman	"	"
297	Nafar	Rehan Hasehrubeh	"	Slightly.
441	"	Said Yousif	"	Very severely.
329	"	Allagabo Hamid	"	Mortally (since dead).
638	"	Farag Hassan	"	Slightly.

(Signed)

HENRY H. SETTLE, L.E.W.A.,
Chief of Staff, Eastern Soudan Field Force.

Afakit, February 22, 1891.

Inclosure 7 in No. 66.

Annex to Despatch on Action near Afakit on 19th February, 1891.

LIST of Emirs Killed in Action.

OSMAN EN NAIB, Dongolawi (commander of Osman Digna's horsemen).

Mohammed Wad Fanna, Dongolawi.

Mussa Fiki, Emir of Artega.

El Khudr Ali, Emir of Hassanab.

Hamad Mohammed Kheir, Dongolawi (Wakil of Emir Abugirgeh).

Dafallah Wad Khandawaki, Dongolawi.

Fadhl Wad Abdullah, Mahassi.

Hassan Wad-el-Kindi, Jaali.

Esh Sherif Mohammed Ali Abu Sukra, Dongolawi.

Esh Sherif Osman, Baggari.

El Haj Fadlallah, Jaali.

Idris Wad Fanna, Dongolawi.

Esh Sherif Ali, Baggari.

Osman Esh Shaib, Dongolawi.

Osman Mohammed Ali, Dongolawi.

Ibrahim Affad, Dongolawi.

Karamallah, Dongolawi.

Mussa Nefeh, Shayabi (a prisoner severely wounded).

The following Emirs are severely wounded, but escaped with Osman Digna,

viz. :—

Esh Shaib Ahmed, severely wounded in leg.

Magzub Abubakr, Shagalai (the Khalifa's Agent or Civil Governor of Afakit).

In addition to the above upwards of twenty Sheikhs of the various tribes of the Tokar district and surrounding country have given in their submission.

(Signed)

F. R. WINGATE, Brevet-Major,
A.A.G., Intelligence, Eastern Soudan Field Force.

Afakit, February 19, 1891.

No. 67.

Commander Dudding to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Hoskins.—(Received at the Foreign Office, April 18.)

Sir,

"Dolphin," at Suakin, March 16, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, having completed the work of fixing the position of Afakit, in compliance with your orders, I left Trinkitat on the 10th March, and proceeded to Suakin, arriving the same day.

2. Since arrival at Suakin Her Majesty's ships "Dolphin" and "Sandfly" have been employed, in compliance with your orders, in examining moorings and repairing and replacing buoys.

3. The country is perfectly quiet, and the state of affairs remains unchanged since your departure.

4. According to reports received to-day, Osman Digna is said to be about 130 miles from Afafit, in the direction of Kassala. He has about 400 followers, with many women and children. They are in distress, and are quarrelling among themselves, part wishing to go to Kassala, and part to Omdurman.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. DUDDING.

No. 68.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 10, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch, dated the 31st March, which I have received from Mr. Consul Barnham, at Suakin, indicating that a small movement in the direction of trade with Berber has taken place since the military operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, March 31, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report that there has been a small movement in the direction of trade with the Nile since the close of military operations. A caravan of Jaaleen merchants left for Berber last week with manufactures and colonial wares. Others are ready to go, but are detained by want of camel transport. No trade proclamation has been made, such as followed the Gemaya campaign, probably because it might by some be held binding upon the Government to respect it in all eventualities. The Governor is hopeful that trade will increase without it. He still awaits the arrival of certain Sheikhs of tribes located at a distance from Suakin, along the Berber road, from whom he hopes to receive assurances for the protection of trade. All accounts, however, now agree that the road is now perfectly safe, and that the Berber merchants are most anxious to push trade with the coast.

Since the occupation of Tokar I have had several British Indians thrown on my hands who had been prisoners of the Khalifa at Khartoum and elsewhere. They arrived here in a destitute condition, and, in one case, with a large family. As they originally came from Jeddah, I have forwarded them to that place with the help of funds subscribed among the local Indian merchants.

The port of Akik Sogheir, which was occupied at the commencement of the expedition, has been abandoned. It was occupied in the first instance with the object of forming a base of communication with Tokar, but has been abandoned on account of its distance from that place.

An Italian merchant of Massowah has arrived here with the object of establishing an ice depôt to be supplied from the factory in Massowah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. BARNHAM.

No. 69.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 19, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a Decree of some importance which has appeared in the "Official Journal."

In Egypt, as in most Oriental countries, the whole of the land belonged originally

to the Government. The tax paid by the occupiers was in reality more in the nature of a rent than a tax.

The land is divided into two main categories, "ouchoury" and "kharadji." The word "ouchoury" is derived from the Arabic word "Ushr," signifying the tenth part. The ouchoury lands were originally for the most part fiefs granted by the ruler of the country to friends or followers, whose descendants or successors hold the fee simple of the land, and continue to pay the tithe to the State. The ouchoury land-owners are, in fact, in much the same position as the Jaghirdars of Western India.

The tax on the kharadji lands is, on the other hand, in theory, variable, and, moreover, the State has heretofore been vested with the theoretical right to re-enter into possession of these lands whenever the Government of the day thought fit to do so. In practice, however, this right has rarely been exercised. Saïd Pasha, more especially during the period of his Khedivate, passed several measures more or less recognizing the testamentary rights of the occupiers of the soil.

When Ismaïl Pasha passed the well-known Law of the Moukabalah his avowed intention was to grant the fee simple of the land to all occupiers under kharadji tenure who redeemed a portion of their land tax by the payment of a capital sum. On the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry which sat in 1878-79 the Law of the Moukabalah was abolished, and interest is now paid by the State to those who had made *bonâ fide* payments towards redemption. So far, however, as regards the tenure, the privilege which the Law of the Moukabalah purported to confer was not withdrawn, that is to say, all holders of kharadji lands who had paid the whole or a portion of the Moukabalah were granted the fee simple of their holdings.

Thus only one class of land-owner remained, whose tenure was one of occupancy rather than proprietorship. This was the class who had not paid the Moukabalah either in whole or in part. By the Decree which has now been issued this class is placed in the same position as those who have paid the Moukabalah.

The principle involved in this measure is of some importance. It finally abolishes the last vestige of the theory that the State is the general proprietor of all the lands in the country. Its practical importance consists in this, that it was recently ascertained that when land was taken up for State purposes, such as railways and canals, occupiers of land which had not paid the Moukabalah in whole or in part, received no compensation from the Government for the land of which they were dispossessed. They will now receive compensation at the same rates as others.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 69.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of April 18, 1891.

Décret.

NOUS, Khédive d'Égypte,

Vu l'Article 5 de notre Décret du 6 Janvier, 1880, abrogeant la Loi sur la Moukabalah;

Sur la proposition de notre Ministre des Finances et l'avis conforme de notre Conseil des Ministres;

Décrétons :

Article 1^{er}. A partir de ce jour, les propriétaires des terres "kharadji" sur lesquelles la Moukabalah n'a pas été payée, auront la pleine propriété de leurs terres à l'égal des propriétaires ayant payé tout ou partie de la Moukabalah.

Art. 2. Tous Décrets, Ordres et Lois antérieurs, contraires aux dispositions du présent Décret, sont et demeurent abrogés.

Art. 3. Notre Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret.

Fait au Palais de Koubbeh, le 6 Ramadan, 1308 (15 Avril, 1891).

(Signé) MÉHÉMET TEWFIK.

Par le Khédive :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,

Ministre des Finances,

(Signé) RIAZ.

No. 70.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 78.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1891.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter from the War Office, giving the opinions expressed by some of the military authorities as to the desirability of increasing the Egyptian army; and I shall be glad to receive from you any observations which you may have to offer on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 71.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 3, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a telegram has been received at the head-quarters of the Egyptian army from Suakin, dated the 1st instant, stating that the Khalifa is reported to have ordered Osman Digna to appear before Abu Girgeh at Kassala to answer charges of cowardice, &c., connected with the loss of Tokar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 72.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, May 12, 1891.

I WAS summoned this morning by the Khedive. His Highness showed me a letter from Riaz Pasha, tendering, on the score of ill-health, his resignation. He stated that he had endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to dissuade Riaz from this course. The plea of ill-health seems to have some foundation, but, in addition to it, I suspect that the relations between His Highness and his Prime Minister have of late been marked by diminished cordiality. The Khedive has been assuming a greater share than has previously been the case in the government of the country, and his interference has been extremely beneficial. Riaz Pasha would appear to have resented this. No single special cause can account for his Excellency's resignation. At present there is no question of serious importance under discussion which might not be easily settled. I had some conversation with the Khedive respecting future arrangements. No decision has as yet been arrived at, but I am to see His Highness again shortly. Nubar Pasha's name was mentioned by him, nor would it surprise me if he were ultimately to summon him. I indicated the objections to this course, especially the circumstance of Nubar Pasha being a Christian, but it is not my intention to press the name of any other candidate should His Highness resolve to send for Nubar. It is probable that the latter might work fairly well for a year or two. It appears to me expedient to follow His Highness' own inclinations, as far as may be, and allow the principal responsibility of the selection made to rest with him.

No. 73.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, May 13, 1891.

MUSTAPHA PASHA FEHMY is about to be sent for by the Khedive in order to form a Ministry.

So far, very little excitement appears to have been caused here by Riaz Pasha's fall.

No. 74.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, May 13, 1891.

THE Khedive received the French Agent yesterday, who merely inquired whether it was intended to make any alteration in policy, and who appeared quite satisfied on receiving a negative answer. He showed no disposition to interfere, nor did he make any suggestion as to the choice of Riaz' successor.

No. 75.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, May 13, 1891.

THE post of President of the Council has been accepted by Mustapha Pasha Fehmy. To-morrow the other members of the Cabinet will probably be appointed.

No. 76.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, May 14, 1891.

LAST night the French Agent called on me and asked me for the true facts about the change of Ministry, that he might report correctly to his Government.

On my explaining how matters stood he expressed himself perfectly satisfied, and showed his great gratification at the fall of Riaz, who, it seems, had managed, by his manner, to already irritate the French Agent.

Whether the latter's attitude is due to instructions or is personal I cannot say, but he has certainly evinced a most friendly spirit so far.

No. 77.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 6, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, reporting the appearance of enteric fever at Afafite (Tokar), due, it is believed, to the impure quality of the drinking water.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, April 29, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the health of the troops at Afafite (head-quarters of the Tokar sub-district) has recently given cause for anxiety, enteric fever of a severe character having developed itself since the occupation. The cause has, I believe, been traced to the impure quality of the drinking water drawn from the wells, and I learn that samples of the water have been analyzed in Cairo, and found to contain much animal and vegetable matter.

The remedy is obviously to dig fresh wells and close the existing ones, and to protect the new wells from pollution by surrounding them with a parapet, and placing them under police supervision.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 6, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin on the subject of the state of trade in that district and between Suakin and the Nile. The account given by Mr. Barnham appears on the whole satisfactory, and I would merely remark, with reference to the last paragraph of his despatch, that the prohibition of the export of ivory is due to the fact that the Egyptian Government claim a monopoly of that article.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, April 29, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that perfect tranquillity prevails at Suakin and in the occupied districts. Trade with the Nile is progressing slowly, the exit of caravans being delayed owing to the demand for camels to carry Government stores to Tokar. This scarcity has necessitated the issue of a Regulation, that camels engaged for transport of merchandize to Berber must first make one journey to Tokar.

Very naturally, the camel-owners dislike the Regulation, and do not readily come in, for the hire received from the Government is not much more than one-half that paid by the merchants; and some declare that their camels, which are accustomed to pasturage north of Suakin, will not eat the "adlib," a species of tamarisk which covers the plain between this and Tokar. The Regulation is not, however, intended to be permanent, and, as large quantities of stores have reached Tokar, will, I hope, be soon rescinded. A caravan of forty loads left for Berber on the 26th instant.

In my despatch of the 29th January last, I alluded to the Pasha's proposal to establish a toll upon all merchandize proceeding to Berber, the proceeds of which were to be employed in subsidizing the leading Sheikhs who occupy or control the caravan route, they, on their part, engaging to facilitate the passage of caravans. The collection of this toll has now been in force about seven weeks, and the main items in the tariff are as follows:—

	Piastres.
A camel load of cotton piece-goods consisting of 2 bales, or 50 "taga," pays ..	30
" sugar	20
" spices and drugs	15
" soap	15
" flour, rice, figs, &c.	6

Before the occupation of Tokar there was no scarcity of camels, and the hire to Berber was from 13 to 14 dollars. Generally speaking, the camel-owners have to pay to their Sheikhs a tribute of 1 piastre on every dollar earned.

The consent of the principal merchants was obtained prior to the institution of the existing toll.

An order has been received from Egypt prohibiting the export of ivory. No reason for this measure has been given.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 115.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 14, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from to-day's "Journal Officiel," which contains a translation of the Khedivial Order summoning Mustapha

Pasha Fehmy to form a Ministry, and his Excellency's reply accepting this duty and transmitting a list of the new Ministers.

A Khedivial Decree, issued to-day and sent to me, with the notification of his assumption of office by Tigrane Pasha, approves this list.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of May 14, 1891.

L'ORDONNANCE Khédiviale a été adressée à la date de ce jour, 14 Mai, 1891 (6 Chawal, 1308), à son Excellence Moustapha Pacha Fehmy :—

"En considération de vos aptitudes et de vos capacités, et confiant dans votre dévouement, nous vous avons appelé aux fonctions de Président du Conseil des Ministres de notre Gouvernement, et nous vous invitons, en conséquence, à former un nouveau Cabinet.

"Soyez assuré que notre concours et notre appui vous seront acquis dans les importantes fonctions que nous vous confions.

"La ligne de conduite que nous nous sommes tracée depuis notre avènement, et dont nous ne nous sommes jamais écarté jusqu'à ce jour pour le bon fonctionnement des services de notre Gouvernement, est basée sur notre Décret du 21 Septembre, 1879; nous n'avons pas besoin de vous rappeler ici les dispositions fondamentales de ce Décret : gouverner avec et par notre Conseil des Ministres, nous réservant le droit de présider nous-mêmes ses réunions toutes les fois que nous le jugerons utile.

"Notre plus vif désir et notre but constant sont d'assurer la justice et l'intégrité, ainsi que les réformes et la bonne marche de tous les services publics de l'Égypte, de même que nos incessants efforts sont dirigés vers le développement moral et matériel de la prospérité et du progrès dans toutes les parties du territoire Égyptien. Vous devez donc être toujours pénétré de ces sentiments, afin que nous puissions, avec l'aide de Dieu, atteindre le but susmentionné.

"Que le Tout-Puissant nous soit propice dans l'accomplissement de cette tâche pour le bien du pays et le bonheur du peuple.

(Signé) "MÉHÉMET TEWFIK."

En réponse à l'Ordonnance Khédiviale qui précède, son Excellence Moustapha Pacha Fehmy a remis à Son Altesse le Khédive la lettre suivante :—

"Monseigneur,

"Votre Altesse a daigné me confier la Présidence du Conseil des Ministres et me charger de former un Cabinet.

"Je remercie votre Altesse de ce nouveau témoignage de haute confiance.

"Mon plus vif désir est d'y répondre et de contribuer dans la limite de mes forces et avec le concours de mes collègues, à l'application des principes qu'elle a affirmés comme base de son Gouvernement.

"C'est dans cette pensée que j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse, pour la formation du nouveau Cabinet, les noms suivants :—

"Son Excellence Abdel Rahman Rouchdi Pacha, Ministre des Finances;

"Son Excellence Mohamed Zéki Pacha, Ministre des Travaux Publics et de l'Instruction Publique;

"Son Excellence Hussein Fakhry Pacha, Ministre de la Justice;

"Son Excellence Youssouf Chouhdy Pacha, Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine;

"Son Excellence Tigrane Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

"Si votre Altesse daigne approuver ces nominations, je la prie de vouloir bien les sanctionner et me confier le portefeuille de l'Intérieur, comme elle m'a confié la Présidence du Conseil.

"Je suis, &c.
(Signé) "MOUSTAPHA FEHMY.

"Le Caire, le 6 Chawal, 1308 (14 Mai, 1891)."

Décrets.

NOUS, Khédive d'Égypte,
Vu notre Rescrit en date du 21 Septembre, 1879,
Sur la proposition du Président de notre Conseil des Ministres;

Décrétons :

Article 1^{er}. Sont nommés :—

Son Excellence Moustapha Fehmy Pacha, Ministre de l'Intérieur;

Son Excellence Abdel Rahman Rouchdi Pacha, Ministre des Finances;

Son Excellence Mohamed Zéki Pacha, Ministre des Travaux Publics et de l'Instruction Publique;

Son Excellence Hussein Fakhry Pacha, Ministre de la Justice;

Son Excellence Youssouf Chouhdy Pacha, Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine;

Son Excellence Tigrane Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Art. 2. Notre Président du Conseil est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret.

Fait au Palais d'Abdine, le 6 Chawal, 1308 (14 Mai, 1891.)

(Signé) MEHÉMET TEWFIK.

Par le Khédive :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,

(Signé) MOUSTAPHA FEHMY.

No. 80.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 118. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 15, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Lordship some observations of a confidential nature upon the Ministerial changes which have recently taken place in Egypt.

Your Lordship is aware that for some while past the whole machine of Government has not been working very smoothly. The friction was principally due to the character of the Prime Minister. Riaz Pasha is a perfectly honest man, and is animated with the best intentions. Moreover, he has at times during his long career displayed qualities of courage and determination under very trying circumstances which entitle him to respect and esteem. But he is singularly wanting in judgment. Without being exactly a Turk of the old school, he is not sufficiently acquainted with the commonplace requirements of modern State organization to enable him to guide the Egyptian Government along the path of reform into which it has now entered. Moreover, his somewhat harsh manners have created many enemies for him both amongst Europeans and natives.

Although it has been obvious for some while past that a change of Ministry might at any moment take place, I had no very special reason for supposing that it was imminent. Rumours had been in circulation that Riaz Pasha intended to send in his resignation directly after the Bairam holidays, but they did not obtain much credence. There was no special question before the Government which would be likely to produce any acute difference of opinion.

On the morning of the 12th, however, the Khedive sent for me and showed me a letter in which Riaz Pasha tendered his resignation on the ground of failing health. The Khedive informed me that he had pressed Riaz Pasha to reconsider the matter, but the latter remained firm in his determination to leave office. I may add that I rather doubt whether the Khedive exerted any very strong pressure on Riaz Pasha to stay. In fact one version of the story, in which there may perhaps be some truth, is that Riaz Pasha never really wished his resignation to be accepted, and was rather disappointed that stronger pressure was not exerted on him to stay. Instances of this sort are not without their parallel in other countries.

There appears to be some truth in the plea of ill-health, but the main reason which has led to Riaz Pasha's resignation is of a political nature.

For some while past the various officials connected with the Government have been in direct communication with the Khedive to a greater extent than heretofore. I have rather encouraged this procedure for two reasons. In the first place, I think it

wise to affirm the authority of the Khedive, and to associate him as much as possible with the work of administrative reform. In the second place, in view of the constant friction between Riaz Pasha and his European advisers, I thought it advisable to bring in the more moderate councils and temperate manners of the Khedive, to smooth over any differences of opinion which might occur. The Khedive, I may add, lent himself very readily to this gradual change of procedure, as he was rather pleased to occupy the rôle of arbiter between the European and native elements of his Government.

I thought it not improbable under these circumstances that a breach would eventually occur between the Khedive and Riaz Pasha, and, indeed, for some while past I have observed that they have not been on very good terms; but, as Riaz Pasha's retirement was on the whole desirable, I did not feel myself called upon to take any very active measures to restore harmony. If Riaz Pasha was to resign, it was on every ground more desirable that his retirement should be due to some dissensions with the Khedive rather than to any difference of opinion between him and one of his English advisers. I therefore let matters take their course, with the result that the crisis came rather sooner than I expected.

A few days ago Mr. Scott and Colonel Kitchener paid a visit to the Khedive and submitted to him unofficially certain proposals connected with the Tribunals and the police preparatory to their submission to the Council of Ministers.

I am led to believe that it was on hearing of this that Riaz Pasha, without consulting any one, decided to resign. He was annoyed at the Khedive consulting directly with Mr. Scott and Colonel Kitchener.

I discussed with the Khedive the desirability of reinstating Nubar Pasha. At first His Highness seemed rather disposed to adopt this course. I did not wish him to appoint Nubar Pasha. On the other hand, I thought it undesirable to appear in any way to dictate a choice of Ministers. I therefore merely stated the obvious arguments for and against the appointment, and I added that if, after full consideration, His Highness thought it desirable in the public interests to charge Nubar Pasha with the formation of a Ministry, I would do my best to make the whole machine work. There I left the matter; but, on calling upon the Khedive the next morning, I found that he had definitely decided against Nubar Pasha. I think the main reason for this decision was that the Khedive feared that Nubar Pasha would wish to impose some conditions, which might be distasteful, on him. In fact, the impression left on my mind by the Khedive's recent conversations is that he wants to govern himself more than heretofore, and that he is glad to get rid both of Nubar Pasha and of Riaz Pasha. Both of the latter are much older men than himself. They were his father's Ministers. They both, whilst in office, have treated him rather as if he were still an inexperienced youth, whereas he is now some 40 years old and rather chafes under the control exerted by his recent Ministers.

Failing Nubar Pasha the Khedive had, I believe, at first some idea of asking Abdur Rahman Pasha Rouchdy to form a Ministry. The latter is a Mahomedan of Maltese extraction. He was at one time Minister of Public Works, and has recently been the Khedive's Master of the Ceremonies. He is an old man, perfectly honest and respectable, but, politically speaking, an absolute cypher. Although the Khedive did not tell me so himself, I hear on trustworthy authority that he asked Abdur Rahman Pasha to form a Ministry, but that the latter declined. I am glad that he should have done so, as I believe that his nomination would not have been well received, and would, sooner or later, have increased our difficulties here.

The man I wished to have nominated was Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, but beyond remarking incidentally that he was a very honest man, I did not in any way press him on the Khedive. The result, however, was that the Khedive has named him President of the Council. I think the nomination is the best that could have been made.

Mustapha Fehmy has the reputation of being a weak man, but he has never as yet been tried in any position of real responsibility, and I rather doubt if he is so weak as is often imagined.

I have always found him very sensible, and I am confident that he is quite honest. I see no reason why he should not make a good Prime Minister.

His nomination, however, makes a considerable change in Egyptian affairs. For many years past Egypt has been governed by Cherif, Nubar, or Riaz Pasha. We are now taking a new departure. Mustapha Pasha Fehmy has for years past been an intimate personal friend of the Khedive. The new Ministry is essentially the Khedive's Ministry. It is highly improbable that Mustapha Fehmy or any of his colleagues, except, perhaps, Tigrane Pasha, will even put themselves in opposition to the Khedive. This situation has advantages and disadvantages peculiar to itself. The

disadvantages are that there will now be less check on the Khedive than formerly, and that if any difference of opinion should arise between the Egyptian Government and any foreign Government, the Khedive will in all probability be personally involved to a greater extent than heretofore.

The advantages are that it is generally desirable to increase the authority of the Khedive; that he is really on the whole the most capable man in the country; that he understands compromise, and is sure to avoid, if possible, any distinct collision either with his English advisers or any of the foreign Representatives; and that, looking at the Khedive's personal character and the situation generally, there is very little prospect of a return to the abuse of personal power which was so detrimental to Egypt in the days of Ismail Pasha. On the whole, I think the advantages more than counterbalance the disadvantages.

The fact that the Khedive will be in a greater measure than heretofore personally responsible for every act of the Administration, is one that will have to be carefully borne in mind, and one which I shall not fail to impress on the various English officials in the Egyptian service, but I should add that, should eventually any serious difficulty arise, I do not doubt that the Khedive would find some means for throwing over his Ministers and fixing on them the personal responsibility for any mistakes which might be made.

Another consideration of importance is that the local public expect that the change of Ministry will cause increased English interference in the internal administration of Egypt. This opinion is based on the alleged weakness of the Ministry, and on Mustapha Fehmy's well-known sympathy with English policy.

It is desirable to remove this impression, and I think it capable of being removed. I have explained to the various leading English officials here that, so long as Ministers like Nubar Pasha or Riaz Pasha were in power, who in the one case engaged in ceaseless intrigues, and in the other was actively hostile to a policy of reform, occasional interference on my part was both necessary and desirable; but that now, when no such opposition is to be anticipated, my interference will be far less necessary. I have also impressed upon them the desirability of being more than ever careful not to thrust their opinions too strenuously on the Egyptian Government, and of treating the Egyptian Ministers with all possible deference. I do not doubt that these views, which I have freely expressed, will soon become known, and that any false impressions which may now exist as to the degree of English interference to be anticipated in the future will be rectified.

I should add some observations on the composition of Moustapha Pasha Fehmy's Ministry. He himself takes the Interior. Zeki Pasha, who was Minister of Public Works under Riaz Pasha, remains in charge of that Department. Abdur Rahman Pasha Rouchdy, to whom I have already alluded, has been nominated to the Department of Finance.

Both Abdur Rahman and Zeki are weak inoffensive men. They are honest enough, and will do no harm, but they cannot be expected to show any vigour or power of initiation. They are representatives of a small class, who neither belong to the old Turkish party nor to any party of reform, but who represent with great accuracy the time-honoured principles of the Vicar of Bray.

For many years past they have been in the employment of the Government, and so long as they continue to draw their salaries, they will not be very curious as to the principles or the policy which they may be called upon to support.

Much the same may be said of Fakhry Pasha, the Minister of Justice. He is a very weak and incapable man. He does not get on well with Mr. Scott, but as the Khedive wished him to remain in office, I did not think it worth while to urge the nomination of any one else in his place.

The only really new elements in the Cabinet are Tigrane Pasha, who has been named Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Shuhdi Pasha, the new Minister for War.

Of Tigrane Pasha I need say little, as your Lordship is acquainted with his antecedents. He is the most able member of the Cabinet. Although a reformer, he will not improbably be at times opposed to the views of the English advisers of the Khedive. Under all the circumstances, a little opposition is to be desired rather than deprecated. He will be able to conduct negotiations with the foreign Representatives in the manner usual in diplomacy, and this is no small advantage. A good deal of unnecessary friction and irritation has been caused during the last few years, owing to Riaz Pasha's want of tact and unskilfulness in negotiation.

Shuhdi Pasha is a Circassian. He is not an Anglophobe, but he is a strong Mahommedan. He was for many years on the Khedive's Staff, and I believe that

prior to the Arabi rebellion he took a very strong anti-Egyptian line; moreover, he had the ear of the Khedive, and I fancy that his advice was at times unwise. I had very considerable doubt about this appointment, but I found that Sir Francis Grenfell approved of it, and that Shuhdi Pasha is generally popular with the English officers of the Egyptian army. I did not, therefore, offer any objection to it, but I have begged Sir Francis Grenfell to watch very carefully that Shuhdi Pasha does not manipulate promotions in the army in a manner calculated to give rise to any renewal of jealousy between the Turkish and Egyptian elements. I do not doubt that a sufficient watch will be kept to avert any danger of this sort.

Although I did not interfere about any of these nominations, I took the opportunity of discussing a question of much delicacy with the Khedive. I allude to the possibility of introducing a really Egyptian element into the Cabinet. I asked His Highness whether he thought it would be at all possible to name one Minister to the Cabinet—perhaps without giving him charge of any Department—from amongst what are known here as the “gens à Turban.” The Khedive listened very courteously and attentively to my remarks on this subject, but I found him very unwilling to make any move in this direction.

In the first place I do not think His Highness is nearly so convinced as I am that the anti-Turk feeling amongst the Egyptians is in reality the most important feature in the local political situation. He looks only to the present moment, and sees that everything is quiet. He fails, as it appears to me, to notice the under-currents of native opinion or to appreciate sufficiently the fact that, if at any time the British army should withdraw, the dislike of the Egyptians to the dominant race might again give rise to a great deal of trouble.

In the second place, the Khedive said that he had done more than any of his predecessors towards advancing the Egyptians in minor positions, but that it would be altogether premature to give Cabinet rank to any of the class of which I spoke. “Je vous assure,” he said, “qu’un de ces gens nous gênera beaucoup.”

I am not at all prepared to say that the Khedive may not be right on this point. In any case, seeing his reluctance, I did not think it desirable to press a reform which would be considered by local opinion as one of a very radical nature, more especially as I had no individual in my mind whose nomination I should have cared to recommend. I, therefore, let the subject drop.

I think it is somewhat to be regretted that, outside the special circles to which I have alluded above, the Khedive did not name some younger men of the same class to which the Ministers themselves belong, but I do not doubt that this will come later. On the whole it is rather an advantage to have got out of the Nubar and the Riaz grooves.

I see no reason why the Ministry should not last for some years, and do much useful work during its tenure of office, but the Fehmy stage is in reality transitional, and must eventually give way to a Ministry composed of younger men. It is, however, fairly well suited to the present condition of Egypt.

In addition to the Ministerial appointments, one or two subordinate places of importance have to be filled up.

Yakoub Pasha Artin has been appointed Director-General of Education without a seat in the Cabinet. The Khedive is opposed to cumulating the two Departments of the Interior and Finance in the hands of one Minister, as has recently been the case. Hence, in order not to increase the number of Ministers beyond six, Education has now been placed in the hands of a Director-General.

Another consideration pointing to the same conclusion is that Yakoub Pasha Artin is an Armenian, and that the Khedive was—wisely, I think—unwilling to nominate a second Armenian to the Ministry, Tigrane Pasha being already one.

Yakoub Pasha Artin is a very cultivated and intelligent man, and the appointment is in every respect satisfactory. His appointment leaves a seat on the Railway Board vacant. Also it is, I understand, intended to nominate another Under-Secretary at the Interior. The present incumbent of this latter post is a relation of Riaz Pasha, who has the reputation of being both corrupt and incapable. His removal will give great satisfaction, especially to the native public.

Mustapha Pasha Fehmy has consulted me about these appointments. I discussed a few names with him, but did not at all insist on any particular individual. I have, however, spoken strongly both to the Khedive and Mustapha Fehmy on the desirability of selecting persons to fill these and other similar places on the ground of merit solely, and not, as has been so frequently the case, on other grounds. The main, and, indeed, the only reason why Europeans are employed here is because there are so few capable

natives. I was somewhat disappointed to learn from Mustapha Fehmy that the Khedive rather contemplated appointing an old Turkish Pasha to the Railway Board, who, the Minister himself told me, was "complètement abruti." I begged him to ask the Khedive to reconsider the question. I added that, although I was unacquainted with all the names, Sir Colin Moncrieff would probably be able to indicate some young engineer, trained in the Public Works Department during the last few years, who might be nominated.

I also pointed out that, in view of the great dearth of native talent, the Egyptian Government would do wisely in cases of this sort, where the question of religion was relatively unimportant, to take the most capable man they can find, whether he be Egyptian or Turkish, Mahomedan, Copt, Armenian, or Syrian.

Both the Khedive and Mustapha Fehmy fully agree to my principles in this respect. Unfortunately, when the moment for action arises the Khedive too often yields to the pressure brought to bear upon him on family and other grounds, and ends by making a bad choice. I trust, however, that, in the particular cases under discussion, suitable selections will be made. Having, however, stated my views in general terms, I do not propose to interfere any more in the detail.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 81.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 16, 1891.

IT may be desirable that I should submit to your Lordship some observations as regards the present attitude of the Marquis de Réverseaux, the newly appointed French Consul-General.

The position of the French Representative in Egypt just now is one of somewhat exceptional difficulty. I have known many French Consuls-General during the time I have been connected with Egyptian affairs, but I do not remember a single case of one who for any length of time has acquired the support of the French colony resident in Egypt and especially in Cairo. The most popular for a time was M. Barrère, but the more reasonable amongst the French now recognize that the policy of petty irritation against everything English, which M. Barrère initiated, was very detrimental to French interests. Moreover, it is always supposed that even M. Barrère was eventually removed on account of complaints made against him to the "Quai d'Orsay" by some French residents in Egypt.

The circumstances connected with Count d'Aubigny's removal have of course greatly strengthened the confidence of the French colony in their own power, and the belief that should any differences of opinion arise between them and the French Representative, the latter will receive little or no support from Paris.

Under these circumstances it is particularly creditable to the Marquis de Réverseaux that he should not have attempted to gain any temporary popularity by adopting a line of hostility in small matters.

He has certainly done nothing of the kind. I informed your Lordship a few days ago that he called on me to ask me the true facts about the recent Ministerial crisis. There was nothing to conceal in the matter, so I explained to him frankly what had taken place. I added that I greatly appreciated his courtesy in applying to me for information, that I hoped he would do so again, if necessary, and that I could not help thinking that if this procedure had been more frequently adopted in the past, a good deal of misunderstanding might have been avoided.

On the following day I called on the Marquis de Réverseaux and had some further conversation with him. I had been rather surprised at the extreme satisfaction he expressed at Riaz Pasha's fall. I now know, partly from his own lips and partly from other sources, to what that satisfaction is mainly due.

In the first place, it appears that Riaz Pasha spoke to the Marquis de Réverseaux a short while ago about the nomination of some one to replace M. Grébaut as Head of the Ghizeh Museum. It is desirable that some one else should be nominated; and, moreover, technically speaking, the Egyptian Government have the right to send away M. Grébaut and name his successor without consultation either with the French Consul-General or any one else. There could be no harm whatever in Riaz Pasha

discussing the matter with the Marquis de Réverseaux, and in inviting his assistance with a view to obtaining a change. This is what I have myself done without causing the least irritation. It appears, however, that Riaz Pasha told the Marquis de Réverseaux bluntly that he intended to send M. Grébaut away directly, and intimated, more or less plainly, that he was indifferent to the opinion of the French Government on the subject. This unskilful way of putting the question was naturally resented.

In the second place, the Marquis de Réverseaux told me that although he could not explain all the details to me, the French Government had great reason to complain of the manner in which they had been treated by Riaz Pasha in the matter of Mr. Scott's appointment. I am not quite sure to what this alludes, but I fancy it is that, before Mr. Scott was appointed, Count d'Aubigny spoke to Riaz Pasha on the subject, and received from him some more or less positive assurances that the appointment would not be made. I dare say also Riaz Pasha indulged in some rather uncomplimentary remarks on English policy in general.

The result of all this, coupled also with the bad impression produced by Riaz Pasha's singularly harsh manners, was that the Marquis de Réverseaux said to me, after I had explained to him the nature of the Ministerial crisis: "Enfin, il n'y a rien de changé excepté qu'un homme qui gêne tout le monde s'en est allé. Personnellement, je ne puis pas traiter avec Riaz Pasha; cet homme est impossible."

He also appeared pleased that Nubar Pasha had not been reinstated in office. Neither did he address to me any remarks from which it might be inferred that any objections were entertained to the new Ministerial arrangements on the ground that the Government was likely to fall to a greater extent than heretofore into English hands.

I then pointed out to the Marquis de Réverseaux that there were a good many minor questions pending, such as the employment of the economies resulting from the conversion of the debt, the reorganization of the Archæological Department, the nomination of some European Head of the School of Law, &c., which I hoped it would be possible to settle within some reasonable time.

I gather from what the Marquis de Réverseaux said that his attitude as regards these different points was somewhat as follows.

The French Government were greatly displeased at the attitude which the Egyptian Government had recently adopted towards them; it would be his business to inquire into the true state of affairs, and to ascertain whether the attitude of the Egyptian Government was to be considered one of radical hostility, or whether it was merely due to some temporary misunderstanding which might be removed; he wished for time to settle matters; he proposed to return to Paris in the course of the summer; on his arrival in Paris he would render his report of the situation. He fully understood that neither he nor I were at Cairo to discuss the *haute politique* of the Egyptian question, but merely to establish a *modus vivendi* on local affairs; he hoped, when he returned to Egypt in the autumn, to be able to propose some arrangements as regards the employment of the economies, as he recognized the desirability of the matter being placed out of hand.

I told the Marquis de Réverseaux that he might feel assured there was no wish, on the part of either the English or the Egyptian authorities in this country, to adopt an attitude of radical hostility to French interests, and that I could not help thinking that any misapprehension which might exist on this score was in some degree due to the unskilful treatment which pending questions had received at the hands of Riaz Pasha, and of which, during his short stay here, he seemed already to have had some experience. I added that he might rely upon my doing everything I could to help towards a satisfactory solution of the pending questions, and although I hoped that no very long delay would ensue, I quite understood that he was not in a position to deal with all these matters immediately.

I then went on to say that, under the circumstances which he had stated to me, it might perhaps be desirable that I should explain to him in general terms my views as regards the particular points to which allusion had been made in the course of our conversation.

I dealt first with the question of the use of the economies. I said that the main facts were that some 320,000*l.* a-year was already available, and that 50,000*l.* to 60,000*l.* a-year more would be available when the Domains conversion was effected. It was manifestly desirable that this large sum of money should be used in some form or another to benefit the Egyptian people.

The Egyptian Government had proposed to devote 150,000*l.* a-year to the abolition

of the *corvée*. It appeared to me desirable to adhere to that proposal, more especially as it was one to which the public had become accustomed.

The Egyptian Government had also proposed to devote 100,000*l.* a-year to the abolition of the system known as the "*rachat militaire*." I thought the proposal a good one, and that it would be advisable to adhere to it, but that, both as regards this sum of 100,000*l.* and the unappropriated balance, if the French Government preferred any other plan, he would find all the authorities here very willing to consider any proposals that might be made. I indicated several methods for spending the money, such as the reduction of taxation, improvements in sanitation, construction of irrigation works, and an increase in the military expenditure, all of which might, on their own merits, be defended by valid arguments. The question to decide was which was the best of these methods. If the French Government had any decided opinion on the subject, I said that I thought the Financial authorities here would be very willing to meet them half-way.

I laid some special stress on the desirability of slightly increasing the military expenditure. I remarked that at one time the French Government had appeared very favourably disposed to expenditure of this nature. It was, I believe, thought that an increase of the Egyptian army would facilitate the withdrawal of the British garrison. Whether this was so or not was a point which I need not discuss. Subsequently, an idea seems to have got abroad that the object which the English and Egyptian authorities had in view in proposing an increase in the army was to facilitate the reoccupation of the Soudan. Since then the French Government appeared to have viewed the proposal with less favour than heretofore. As regards the Soudan, I said that I could explain to the Marquis de Réverseaux very plainly how the matter stood. However desirable it might be that the Egyptian Government should ultimately re-enter into possession of Khartoum, there was at present no sort of idea of undertaking any forward movement, and, indeed, the military strength of the Egyptian Government and its financial position were, for the time being, alike prohibitive of the adoption of any such course. I then went on to say that, for purely defensive purposes, the military authorities of the Egyptian Government were of opinion that the force of cavalry was somewhat insufficient, and that a slight increase should be made in order to obviate the risk of being obliged to apply for English assistance in the event of any further attacks on the part of the Dervishes. On these grounds, I thought it would be desirable to devote some small portion of the economies to an increase of military expenditure.

I then went on to deal with the question of Egyptology, as to which I had already had some conversation with the Marquis de Réverseaux. I may remark that the latter is fully aware that many of the recent difficulties have been due to the fact that M. Grébaut is scarcely the right man for the post which he occupies. I then made a suggestion to the Marquis de Réverseaux, which, I explained, came entirely from myself, and which I did not propose to bring forward in any official form, but which, inasmuch as it involved a proposal of a nature likely to be agreeable to the French Government, he might, perhaps, think it worth while to bring forward in their name.

I said that, owing to recent discoveries, and generally to the increased interests which is taken in Egyptological matters, the work of the Archæological Department was much heavier than in former years. It has often been pointed out to me by persons qualified to speak on the subject that the Ghizeh Museum is not in a satisfactory condition. Both Brugsch Pasha, who recently paid a visit to Egypt, and Professor Sayce, in conversation with me, dwelt strongly on this point. There is no proper catalogue. There is no library. Adequate facilities are not given for students of Egyptology to conduct their researches and inquiries. In fact, the care of the Museum is quite sufficient work for one man. It is enough to occupy all his time. It is difficult, if not impossible, to combine proper attention to the Museum with the administration of all the other matters connected with the Archæological Department in Egypt, which are by themselves also matters of great importance. I was aware, from what the Marquis de Réverseaux and others had said to me, that one of the main obstacles in the way of dealing properly with the whole of this question was the difficulty of finding the requisite administrative talents and Egyptological knowledge combined in one individual. It had, indeed, been decided to name two Inspectors, but although this proposal met with a good deal of public support, for my own part I doubted whether it would effect much good unless some change were made in the central organization.

It occurred to me that it might be possible and desirable to create a new post, to

be termed "Directeur-Général de l'Archéologie et des Beaux-Arts," or something of that kind; that the person chosen to fill this post must, indeed, have some sort of sympathy with, and knowledge of, artistic matters, but that he should be chosen more with reference to his administrative talents than to any profound knowledge of Egyptology; that he should be a Frenchman; and that the care of the Arab monuments, which is now confided to a separate Committee, might be intrusted to the new Director-General. Under my proposal, the Director of the Museum would be under the Director-General; he would have nothing to do but to look after the Museum. I thought it would be advisable to name some one in M. Grébaut's place, but that whoever was chosen must be a trained Egyptologist, who would be able to supply the purely scientific knowledge which might, perhaps, be wanting on the part of the Director-General. The latter, in addition to a general supervision over the Museum and the care of the Arab monuments, would control all private excavations, and would have charge of Luxor, Dendera, Abydos, and other important places where special guards have been appointed to the ancient temples and monuments. Where no such guards exist the whole responsibility of preventing thefts and mutilations should, I think, devolve upon the police.

I believe this plan will satisfy most of the requirements of English Egyptologists, and inasmuch as it would create a new French place of some importance, it ought to give satisfaction both to the French Government and to French public opinion.

The Marquis de Réverseaux thanked me very cordially for my suggestion, and said he would think over it.

Turning to the question of the School of Law, I said there was not the least objection to the nomination of a Frenchman, and, indeed, that Mr. Scott had been the first to propose that a Frenchman should be nominated. I also intervened somewhat strongly a few months ago to prevent Riaz Pasha nominating a very corrupt and incapable native.

On the whole, I think that the negotiations as regards all these matters have been well started, and I am in hopes that, with a little judgment and conciliation, it will be possible in the end to settle them satisfactorily. One difficulty, however, I foresee. I spoke to the Marquis de Réverseaux as to the desirability of settling all these matters together. He evidently does not wish to deal with the Economies question till the autumn. On the other hand, he wishes to return to France in July with something—probably the Museum question—settled in a sense favourable to French interests, as an earnest of the friendly sentiments of the Egyptian Government towards France.

The Egyptian authorities here, however, have been so often deceived by French promises that, although under present circumstances they are not likely to decide any pending question in a sense hostile to French interests, they are inclined to suspend action in respect to any concessions which it may be in their power to make, until they have actually in hand some *quid pro quo* from the French Government. It must be admitted that, judging from the experience of former times, this would appear to be the wisest course to pursue.

I am not, however, prepared to state definitely that, under all the circumstances of the case, it is the wisest course to pursue now; a good deal must depend upon the development of events. It may be that before long I may be in a better position than at present to form an opinion on this aspect of the case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 82.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 20, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, the one describing the attempts of the Fadlab Amarrars, the only remaining element of disturbance in the Eastern Soudan, to harass trade, and the other giving an account, accompanied by a Map, of a portion of the Tokar Delta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 82.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, May 11, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the surrounding country is quiet, and that the political situation is, on the whole, satisfactory. I have one reservation to make. At Kokreb, on the Berber road, three and a-half days from Suakin, the Fadlab Amarrars, late of Handoub, have, under their Sheikh Nafa-bin-Mahmoud Ali, again attempted to harass trade by establishing a toll. These people, who have been driven from Handoub to the mountains, will degenerate into professional footpads if an effective tribal police is not established on the road. As Mahdiists, they are of very third rate importance, and, indeed, I understand that their present proceedings are disapproved by the Khalifa's Government at Berber. I think it is a proper policy for the authorities to do all in their power to secure the safety of the caravan route with native help. It was with this object that they sought the services of, and subsidized Mahomet Guilior, of Otao, Sheikh of the Weled Guilior, Sheikhs Abd-ul-Kader Dhow, and Feeta Dhow, of the Hamdab, Sheikh Hamed Bakkash, of the Musseyab (Sultan of all the Amarrars), Sheikh Abou Ali, of the Shebodinab Hadendowas, and others (see my letter of the 29th January last).

Thus far, however, the hopes of the Government have met with disappointment. Mahomet Guilior, although exercising paramount influence over a large part of the caravan route immediately beyond Handoub, married into Mahmoud Ali Bey's family, and for that reason would be unwilling to act decidedly against his tribe. He married the sister of Hamed Darab Kati, the Fadlab Sheikh, who last autumn deserted the Government, returned, and was for a short period exiled to Cairo.

When the Fadlabs established this toll at Kokreb, the two Sheikhs of the Hamdabs above mentioned were sent up the road to drive them away, but they appear to have shown a desire to fraternize with them, and did nothing.

Now the Sheikhs of the Musseyabs and Shebodinabs have gone out on this mission.

A good tribal police, posted at the wells of Ariab, beyond Kokreb, would be of good service in this matter.

These Fadlabs are the only element of disturbance in the Eastern Soudan. The Arabs of Tokar, Sinkat, Erkoweit, and the country to our north, are perfectly contented and friendly to the Egyptian Government.

A rumour has been for some time current here that Osman Digna has been disgraced by the Khalifa, and that Mustafa Haddel, a native of Suakin, has been appointed in his place, as representing the Dervish cause in this district. Twelve days ago Osman was at Angerdan, at the confluence of the Gash and Atbara.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 82.

Consul Barnham to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, May 12, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a brief description of a portion of the Tokar Delta visited by me at the commencement of last month.

I restrict the scope of my Report to showing, as the result of personal observation from the back of a camel, the exceeding fertility of this district, which I feel sure will, after the lapse of a few years, and some expenditure of money, amply repay the Egyptian Government for the costs of administration.

1. The district in question is the zone of cultivated land which lies between the village of Afafite and the Khor Baraka. I have drawn up a small Sketch Map to illustrate the journey (herewith).

2. Of the Tokar Delta generally I can give no useful description here, for, as regards distance from point to point, extent of cultivation and flood, my data are only approximative, as no proper survey has yet been made which could serve as my guide. Under ordinary conditions, during the flood season, the apex of the Delta would probably be taken at Temrin, the point where the flood emerges from the mountains upon the

Tokar plain, the extremities of the base being Trinkitat on the north, and Agig Saghir on the south. These limits are at times exceeded.

The incline from Temrin to the sea, a distance of 34 miles, is about 110 feet. The area of cultivable land within the Delta has been estimated at 300,000 acres. This, however, is in process of verification by Government surveyors.

3. I estimate that during my ride to and from the Khor Baraka, an area of nearly 50,000 acres of land, cultivated or covered with rank growth, must have been in view. The route taken is marked on the Map in red ink, and the direction indicated by arrow-heads. The irrigated land is divided into the following districts:—

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| (1.) Afafite, or Fafei (more correct). | (6.) Belonei (Upper). |
| (2.) Galilama. | (7.) Belonei (Lower). |
| (3.) Agafar. | (8.) Kerab. |
| (4.) Adamadaloid. | (9.) Temrin. |
| (5.) Geleit. | |

Of these Galilama, Agafar, Belonea, and Adamadaloid are densely crowded with vegetation, and during the greater part of the ride through these districts no limit to the vegetation was visible.

4. The inhabitants proper to the districts are: (1) Ashraffs, (2) Artegas, (3) Hassanabs, (4) Comelabs.

(a.) The Ashraffs claim to be a distinct and pure race descended from the Prophet. It is probable that they represent the stock of some who, in the early days of Mohammed's teaching, were compelled by the persecution of the Korvish to take refuge in the Soudan and Abyssinia, but it cannot be maintained that they have retained absolute purity of race, for they have largely intermarried with the Beni Amer family. They are the handsomest and most intelligent race in the district.

(b.) The Artegas are a distinct race from Hadramant in Yemen.

(c.) The Hassanabs and Comelabs are the descendants of Hadramies, who intermarried with Hadendowas.

These four tribes are the owners of the soil, rich in land and flocks. Near Afafite, and within the limits of Galilama, I saw zareebas of cattle belonging to the Ashraffs and Comelabs, which, could they be seen on an English farm, would excite the greatest admiration.

5. Osman Digna appropriated the crops at pleasure, and compelled the cultivators to abandon their gardens and collect round him at Afafite. Now, however, encouraged by his flight, and the security afforded by regular government, they had to a great extent returned to their cultivation.

They do not appear to be first class agriculturists.

I had frequently heard them compared unfavourably with the fellahs of Egypt, and was struck with their want of care in allowing the rankest vegetation to grow unchecked among the standing crops.

6. The regular grain crops are dhourra and millet, other crops are cotton and tobacco (in small quantities).

A magnificent dhourra crop was ripening when I went over the ground, it being the third crop raised from one and the same plant. The seed was originally sown at the end of September, and the first crop ripened in December, the second in March, the third in April-May. This third crop was aided by a full and early flood, which came down to Afafite on the 23rd March. A smaller flood came down on the 4th April. The limits of these two floods are shown on the Map.

Millet is not grown so extensively as dhourra, but there was a very fine crop nearly ripe covering a large district in Galilama and Agafar.

The cotton gardens are scattered all over the irrigated land, generally in small patches, and the total crop from the seeds sown last September is small. I visited one garden of 7 acres in Galilama, from which about thirty-five cantars had been collected, and which, having been irrigated by the March flood, might be expected to yield another 150 cantars, lasting through the entire summer.

There are between 40 to 50 acres of cotton standing now. A very large part of the cotton planted in the autumn of 1889-90 was collected by the Dervishes, who used it in making uniforms.

There is a small cultivation of tobacco.

A large variety of garden vegetable are grown, such as the tomato, bamia, egg-plant, potato, pumpkin, vegetable-marrows, spinach, beans, onions, garlic, chili, radish, melon, &c.

Of wild growth we find the beautiful casurma tree fringing the banks of the Khor Baraka for miles, the tamarisk, covering the desert between Suakin and Tokar.

and appearing every now and again in the dhourra fields between Afafite and the Baraka, the mimosa, the castor-oil plant, attaining the height of 6 feet, oshur, tabbas grass, and others.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 82.

Sketch showing estimated Area of Cultivation visited, 13 miles by an average of 6 or 78 square miles, or about 50,000 square acres, representing about one-sixth of delta ground which is irrigated when Khor Baraka is in full flood.

[Not printed.]

No. 83.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 21, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a Khedivial Decree, dated the 18th instant, appointing Bogos Nubar Pasha Egyptian member of the Railway and Alexandria Harbour Board.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 83.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of May 20, 1891.

Décret.

NOUS, Khédive d'Égypte,

Vu l'Article 23 de notre Décret du 18 Novembre, 1876, instituant le Conseil d'Administration des Chemins de Fer et du Port d'Alexandrie;

Vu l'Article 1^{er} de notre Décret du 25 Décembre, 1879;

Sur la proposition de notre Ministre des Travaux Publics et l'avis conforme de notre Conseil des Ministres;

Décrétons :

Article 1^{er}. Boghos Nubar Pacha est nommé membre Égyptien au Conseil d'Administration des Chemins de Fer et du Port d'Alexandrie, en remplacement de Yacoub Artin Pacha, nommé Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère de l'Instruction Publique.

Art. 2. Notre Ministre des Travaux Publics est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret.

Fait au Palais d'Abdine, le 10 Chawal, 1308 (18 Mai, 1891).

(Signé) MÉHÉMET TEWFIK.

Par le Khédive :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,

(Signé) MOUSTAPHA FEHMY.

Le Ministre des Travaux Publics,

(Signé) MOHAMMED ZÉKI.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 24, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a Report addressed to the Khedive by Mohammed Zeki Pasha, Minister of Public Works, on the subject of the corvée for last year.

Your Lordship will observe that forced unpaid labour on the dykes and canals has been now abolished, with the one exception of the corvée for preventing the destruction of the Nile dams after the rise of the river, a work which employed last year in the thirteen provinces of Egypt a total of 67,206 men, working for periods of from fifty to ninety days, and whose abolition at present would entail not only expense, but public risks of inundation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of May 23, 1891.

MINISTÈRE DES TRAVAUX PUBLICS.

Rapport adressé à Son Altesse le Khédive par son Excellence le Ministre.

Monseigneur,

Le Caire, le 19 Mai, 1891.

CONFORMÉMENT aux dispositions du § 2 de l'Article 4 du Décret du 2 Avril, 1888, j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse un Rapport sur les opérations de la corvée en 1890.

Je crois que, pour la première fois dans la longue histoire d'Égypte, les canaux et drains de ce pays ont été curés et les digues réparées en 1890 sans l'emploi vexatoire ou non salarié d'un seul bras d'hommes. Dans cet exercice, en effet, les travaux publics, auxquels nul n'a été contraint à prendre part, ont été entièrement exécutés à l'entreprise et payés par les deniers de l'État.

Je prendrai la liberté de féliciter votre Altesse de cette réforme bienfaisante qui s'est accomplie sous ses hauts auspices.

On peut assurer, sans crainte de se tromper, qu'aucune amélioration apportée par les ancêtres de votre Altesse n'a été d'un aussi grand bienfait pour ses sujets, lesquels, au lieu d'être entraînés hors de chez eux et forcés comme des esclaves à travailler sans nourriture ni rétribution, sont aujourd'hui traités comme une population libre et indépendante.

Le Tableau suivant indique les sommes dépensées dans chaque province pour les travaux qui étaient autrefois exécutés par des recrues forcées et non salariées :—

						£ E. m.
Kalioubieh	..	..	..	..	..	21,115 689
Charkieh	..	..	..	..	..	28,257 743
Dakahlieh	..	..	..	..	..	24,051 513
Menoufieh	..	..	..	..	..	31,140 256
Gharbieh	..	..	..	..	..	32,499 230
Béhéra ..	..	..	..	..	..	61,808 692
Guizeh ..	..	..	..	..	..	7,188 525
Fayoum ..	..	..	..	..	..	11,957 860
Béni-Souef	..	..	..	..	..	17,996 920
Minieh ..	..	..	..	..	..	26,996 189
Assiout ..	..	..	..	..	..	57,000 000
Guirguch	..	..	..	..	..	36,131 293
Kench ..	..	..	..	..	..	41,811 331
Frontières	..	..	..	..	..	1,159 448
Total	..	..	..	..	..	399,114 689

Je crois devoir, à cette occasion, féliciter également votre Altesse des conditions florissantes des finances du pays qui ont permis au Trésor de pourvoir à une dépense aussi importante.

Mais il existe encore une autre corvée qui n'a pas été abolie et dont il n'a pas été tenu compte dans le cours des négociations qui ont si heureusement abouti à la suppression de la corvée des curages de canaux et des réparations de digues : c'est la corvée employée pendant la crue au gardiennage des digues du Nil et des bassins.

Il n'a pas été reconnu opportun, jusqu'à présent, d'abolir cette corvée, non seulement parce qu'elle eût constitué une lourde charge d'au moins £ E. 100,000 par an pour le Trésor, mais aussi parce que les conseillers expérimentés de votre Altesse ne sont pas certains de pouvoir en tout temps protéger le pays contre l'inondation par aucun système d'entreprise, et qu'ils craignent qu'un service de gardiennage fait à l'entreprise n'inspire à la population moins de confiance qu'elle n'en a dans le gardiennage que font aujourd'hui les classes agricoles elles-mêmes, qui sont les plus intéressées à la protection du pays.

Cette corvée pour la conservation des digues du Nil n'est pas en somme une charge impopulaire, car elle comporte un travail aisé dont l'époque correspond à une saison où la population n'a pas de grandes occupations agricoles.

Les Inspecteurs d'Irrigation, en général, trouvent que les contingents d'hommes qui ont été employés à ce travail de prestation sont très exagérés et ils s'occupent en ce moment de chercher par toutes les mesures possibles à en réduire le nombre et la durée de travail.

Ainsi que le démontre le Tableau suivant, un nombre total de 67,206 hommes ont été employés pendant 50 à 90 jours, ce qui représente, 48,488 hommes pour 100 jours.

Provinces.	Nombre d'Hommes effectivement employés.	Nombre de Jours de travail effectif.	Nombre d'Hommes par 100 Jours.
Kalioubieh.. .. .	5,374	77	4,115
Charkieh	7,588	77	5,843
Dakahlieh	9,702	77	7,471
Menoufieh	7,385	76	5,513
Gharbieh 1 ^{re}	4,120	75	3,090
" 2 ^e	2,558	73	1,867
Béhéra	3,238	75	2,428
Guizeh	2,725	75	2,044
Béni-Souef	2,747	90	2,472
Minieh	5,080	77	3,912
Assiout	6,000	60	3,600
Guirguéh	5,633	64	3,605
5 ^e Cercle	5,056	50	2,528
Total	67,206	..	48,488

La corvée, qui est aujourd'hui supprimée, comptait en 1883 un nombre total de 202,586 hommes pour 100 jours.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) MOHAMED ZÉKI.

No. 85.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 5, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Governor of Suakin has informed the Egyptian Government, in a despatch dated the 25th ultimo, that the Suakin-Berber route may be said to be open to trade.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 86.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 35. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Therapia, June 24, 1891.

I HAVE the honour to report that four Ministerial Councils have lately been held at the Palace in the presence of His Majesty the Sultan, at which Saïd Pasha, the former Grand Vizier, was instructed to attend, and at which it was supposed that

the Egyptian question and the rising in the Yemen were discussed, a connection between the two existing in the mind of His Imperial Majesty. This connection has recently assumed great proportions.

I have been able to ascertain very little as to what took place at these Ministerial Councils, but, having informed the Sultan of my application for leave, I received from His Majesty a very extraordinary communication in Turkish dictated by himself to his First Chamberlain, Hadji Ali Bey, and given by the latter to Sir A. Sandison.

The following I believe to be a correct, though free, translation of this strange document, a literal translation being hardly intelligible:—

"The absence from here of his Excellency the Ambassador for six weeks at a time when His Imperial Majesty is in hope that an important question, put off by one excuse and another for a long time past, will be at once and immediately settled fully in accordance with the interests of the two countries, is considered by His Imperial Majesty as most unfortunate, more especially as just at this moment a very great intrigue is believed to have been set on foot with regard to this subject, and His Imperial Majesty is justified in thinking so.

"If His Imperial Majesty succeeds in solving this question in accordance with the interests of the two countries His Majesty will consider himself fortunate, and in this way a calm will be produced in all other political matters; but if, on the contrary, His Imperial Majesty does not succeed, it follows that His Majesty will be in despair and grievously disappointed.

"Indeed, so far is this true, that on this very day the matter is occupying very serious attention."

I have reason to conclude, from information subsequently obtained, that the Sultan, greatly alarmed for his Caliphate by the recent disturbances in the Yemen, has determined to reopen the Egyptian question with Her Majesty's Government in some form or other. I am endeavouring to clear up the mystery of the alleged intrigue to which allusion is made by the Sultan in the above-quoted communication, and I will not fail to report to your Lordship any further information that I may be able to obtain.

No. 87.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

(No. 40. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 25, 1891, 5 P.M.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 35 respecting the Sultan's wish to reopen the Egyptian question.

Count Hatzfeldt told me yesterday that we should probably receive proposals from the Sultan for entering into a Convention, by which His Majesty's title in Egypt should, in some way which was not described, be further established.

The Convention would not, his Excellency said, raise the question of evacuation. From extracts which he read to me, it appeared that the information came from Count Radowitz.

Count Hatzfeldt gave me to understand that some such communication would be made to me by the Turkish Ambassador, but when I saw Rustem Pasha immediately afterwards, he only asked me for a contradiction of the rumour that the rebels at Yemen had received assistance from Her Majesty's Government.

I think you had better remain at Constantinople until the Sultan has had an opportunity of communicating with you on the subject of his proposals.

No. 88.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

(No. 137.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1891.

RUSTEM PASHA called upon me to-day, and informed me that the Sultan was much disturbed by the discovery that the rebels in Arabia were possessed of arms of precision which had apparently been manufactured in England. He said that counsellors who desired to make mischief had based upon this circumstance the suggestion, that England sympathized with the rebellion and was secretly helping it. I replied that there was not a word of truth in the suggestion. I only knew of the

existence of the rebellion through the newspapers, and I must disclaim any responsibility for the hands into which breech-loaders manufactured in England might ultimately fall. The trade in them was perfectly free, and it was quite out of our power to control it. We had no sympathy with the rebellion in Arabia, which could in no way subserve our interests, and which might have an embarrassing effect on them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 89.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 36. Very Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P

Therapia, June 26, 1891.

EGYPT: Your Lordship's telegram No. 40 of yesterday.

The information of Count Hatzfeldt appears to be on the whole correct. The Grand Vizier, when pressed quite lately to reopen negotiations with Her Majesty's Government, hoped to bring about, under German auspices, some arrangement on the lines mentioned. His Highness seems for some days to have been very sanguine of persuading the Sultan that the importance to His Imperial Majesty of a direct understanding with England was such that it would be better to drop the evacuation question, provided England recognized his sovereignty over Egypt by a solemn compact. Kiamil Pasha seems to have wished to keep this a secret from every one but M. de Radowitz.

It appears that the Grand Vizier might have been better acquainted with the Sultan's temper than to expect to succeed with this plan.

All along it has been the Sultan's desire to solve the Egyptian question himself, and not to let his Ministers obtain any credit for it. In dealing with His Imperial Majesty, one must never lose sight of his peculiar idiosyncracies. In the present case, it struck him that he might improve on the Grand Vizier's scheme by omitting the stipulation as to evacuation or right of reoccupation, and asking your Lordship yourself to fix the date of our leaving Egypt. With the single exception that this date was to be proposed by Her Majesty's Government, it appears to me that the plan corresponded exactly with the one submitted to your Lordship just a year ago, and was likely to share its fate.

I should not be surprised if Rustem Pasha were shortly to submit a proposal on these lines to Her Majesty's Government, but even if I were to delay my departure on leave, I do not suppose that the subject would be brought to my knowledge here.

The Sultan has once more placed himself in a completely false position, by taking the French Government into his confidence without the knowledge of his Grand Vizier. His Majesty says that your Lordship once told Rustem Pasha that Her Majesty's Government were not inclined to reopen negotiations which French influence might bring to nought at any moment, but now, he adds, "the matter is almost settled, for I have the assent of France to my plans."

His Imperial Majesty appears quite to have overlooked the value which we naturally attach to a right of reoccupation. He considers that he himself has successfully settled the question, and that his Ministers who hold other views are obstructive and intriguers.

No. 90.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 27, 1891, 10.30 A.M.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of yesterday's date, and I approve of your coming here on leave, as proposed by you.